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ABSTRACT 
 
The rising worldwide danger of Islamist militancy arouses the need to search for 
solutions for the containment of this danger at a highest priority. This thesis examines 
the case of the successful violence-ending experience of the Egyptian Jamaʿa Islamiyya 
(EJI), being a model for conflict resolution with the political regime and an example of 
the possible de-radicalization of one of the most militant Islamist groups in the modern 
history of Egypt. The study focuses on the Renouncing - Violence Initiative that was 
issued by EJI in 1997 and the subsequent issuing of a “Correction of Conceptions 
Series” that aimed to refute all previously held violence doctrines by the EJI, and those 
currently held by other militant Islamist groups. In order to do so, the study will attempt 
to analyze the factors that led to the transformation of that group to the moderate and 
even reformist path. The backgrounds on the emergence and behavioral evolution of 
the EJI will be reviewed, in addition to the violence legitimizing doctrines followed by the 
analysis of the new de-legitimizing violence literature. The thesis concludes that the 
occurrence of such de-radicalizing incident opens the prospects for other initiatives to 
occur, given that required conditions and appropriate frameworks are provided. 
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“The best of our years was that blessed year during which the 
Initiative came into being. Only then, joy entered homes and hearts 
that have long been hit by pains and sadness”.   
EJI historical leaders, “Nahr al-Dhikrayāt”. 
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Introduction 
The “Re-thinking Initiative” (al-Murajaʿāt al-Fikriyya) that took place in 1997 
between the Egyptian regime and the most militant Islamist group in the modern history 
of Egypt - known as “al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya” (EJI) - is a remarkable case of ideological 
and behavioral  transformation from violence to moderation. This initiative ended more 
than twenty five years of a deadly confrontation with the Egyptian regime, during which 
the EJI brutally took away the life of President Sadat, head of the Egyptian state in 
1981, and the lives of hundreds of local civilians, tourists, police officers, state officials, 
Christians and intellectuals. In 1997, the leaders and ideologues of the EJI, from their 
jails, to the surprise of all observers, declared an initiative known as “Renouncing - 
Violence Initiative” in which they abandoned all acts of violence and bloodshed. The 
Initiative came as a culmination to a long process of negotiations and dialogue – from 
inside prisons - with the regime’s security authorities. Since then, the Jamaʿa 
ideologues embarked on issuing a series of books clarifying and refuting the 
misconceptions as perceived by themselves, and by other Islamist militant movements, 
setting an ideological framework as a reference for the non- violence path. The Initiative 
was followed by the release of thousands of EJI prisoners successively and most 
importantly, the integration of its members into social, intellectual and political life. This 
study will examine the unique- so far- and prominent case of the Re-thinking Initiative of 
the EJI as a model for successful ideological and behavioral transformation, analyzing 
the context within which this Initiative emerged. 
The transformation process of the EJI, from a formerly militant group to a 
moderate one, was also seen as a political success for the Egyptian ruling regime then. 
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Needless to say, the violence of Islamist militant groups has become one of the most 
critical challenges facing the regimes that have to deal with the containment of this 
deadly threat. In doing so, the regimes adopt the internationally acknowledged 
techniques for the disengagement of terrorist groups and campaigns. Among these 
techniques are either a security repressive approach (defeat by repression), and/or a 
political reconciliatory approach (the transition to a legitimate political process). While 
the security repressive approach has proven to be necessary, it has also proven to be 
insufficient. In this context, the political reconciliatory containment approach based on 
ideological dialogue - among several other procedures - gains importance, side by side 
with the security solution. The Initiative stands as an outstanding example of ending an 
extended, mutually exhausting, and deadly struggle between a political regime and an 
Islamist militant group in modern history.  
The aim of this study is to analyze the Re-thinking Initiative that was issued by 
the EJI in 1997. Through the study, a number of queries will be attempted to be 
answered; how the Initiative took place and why it did succeed in ending an ongoing 
deadly struggle. The study will try to pursue the lines of thought and action of the EJI, 
which started as a non-violent group in the Egyptian universities during the seventies, 
then changed to a strongly violent path, then retreated again to its peaceful coexistence 
path. In that regard, the factors that contributed to the process of transformation will be 
verified comparing the significance of the ideological shift to that of the security forces’ 
dual repression/containment approach. The study will also try to address the subjective 
and objective factors that had contributed to the success of the Initiative, and whether 
the subsequent rejection of some operatives of the EJI to the Initiative represented a 
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failure, or a resurrection for the same circumstances that had previously ignited their 
violence. The relationship between religion and the classes that adhere to it according 
to the religious sociology approach will be explored, focusing on the EJI, and whether 
this relationship can be attributed to the deprivation theory or to the theory that holds 
religion as a form of protest. The study will briefly cover the ability of other militant 
groups to issue similar initiatives and examine the extent to which the Initiative can be 
relied on for predicting the behavior of political Islamist movements. Finally, the 
prospects of success for the continued presence of the EJI in the daʿwa, social and 
political arenas will be addressed. The study also aims at following up the continuing 
credibility of the reconciliatory impact of the Initiative after a time-span of around two 
decades since it first emerged. 
This research is divided into three chapters. Chapter one examines the 
emergence and the behavioral evolution of the EJI, showing that it had passed through 
two phases. The first was the peaceful phase of religious preaching and pursuing social 
roles only, followed by the second phase, witnessing the dramatic shift to the violence 
course after less than seven years of the first phase, taking into consideration the 
historical context within which the EJI emerged and how this had a direct impact on this 
shift. Chapter two will start with the legacy of violence literature which might have had 
an impact on the ideological conception of violence in the EJI, then will proceed to 
explain, in detail, the violence - legitimizing (killing in the name of Allah) doctrines of the 
EJI, and in the end of chapter two, some concepts that explain the motives of violence 
and its applications in the case of the EJI will be briefly examined. 
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The core of the study will be presented in chapter three which aims at analyzing 
the Re-thinking Initiative. The Initiative has three main components: the emergence, the 
causal factors that may have contributed to the occurrence of the Initiative, and finally 
the ideological transformation doctrines (muraja’āt). The causal factors are either 
internal pertaining to the EJI itself, or external pertaining to the domestic political 
environment within which the Initiative emerged. Among the internal factors under 
discussion are the organizational nature of the EJI and the effect of imprisonment, while 
the external factors include the security approach varying from repressive to 
reconciliative measures (carrot and stick), the political agenda of the ruling regime, and 
the role of civic actors. The analysis of the new de-legitimizing violence muraja’āt 
doctrines known as “Correction of Conceptions Series” (Silsilat Taṣḥiḥ al Mafāhīm) - the 
ideological component of the Initiative- will be presented in this chapter.  
The conclusion will sum up the results that have been reached throughout the 
study. Within this context, the extent to which this unique Initiative can be considered a 
form of post- conflict settlements within which transitional justice mechanisms can be 
applied will be discussed. Among the presented results will be addressing the future of 
the Initiative in relation to the extent to which other militant Islamist movements can 
follow the EJI de-radicalization model, in addition to the continued presence of the EJI in 
the contemporary daʿwa, social and political arenas. Risk -assessment of the probable 
foreseen difficulties that may jeopardize the Initiative are also referred to. It is hoped 
that this might give some guidance when studying the likelihood of the emergence of 
similar reconciliatory initiatives settling the disputes between regimes and other Islamist 
movements.  
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Literature Review 
The phenomenon of Islamist militancy has produced a wealth of literature 
ranging from documenting, to analyzing and examining the future prospects of the 
phenomenon. However this literature is focused more on the phenomenon of “violence” 
rather than the “renunciation of violence”, the category to which the Re-thinking Initiative 
belongs. Four relevant books and two articles will be mentioned in this literature review. 
Three books and one article are in Arabic, and one book and one article in English. 
Among the Arabic sources two are documentary, the third is as an evaluation of the 
Initiative on the occasion of the passing of ten years since its emergence in a 
conference held in al-Ahram Center of Political and Strategic Studies ACPSS, while the 
fourth is on the mechanisms of reconciliation providing a practical program for the 
activation of the de-radicalization process. 
It stands to reason that the series of books of the Re-thinking Initiative known as 
the “al-Murajaʿāt al-Fikriyya” (ideological re-assessments) are a very important 
reference for any researcher on this field. The first collection was issued under the title 
of “Silsilat Taṣḥiḥ al Mafāhīm”, the subsequent books that were printed later came under 
separate titles. 
1- Arabic Sources: 
a. Books: three main books are examined: 
1. Salwa al-ʿAwwa, al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya al-Musallaḥa fi Misr: 1997-2004, 
(Cairo: al-Shorouk International Bookshop, 2006). 
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The book is concerned with the analysis of the religious speech of the EJI which 
adopted armed violence as a means to political change considering it part of the 
mandatory duty of jihad in Islam. The book comes in four chapters; the first is the 
“Introduction” covering the scope of research which is the EJI, demarcating it from other 
similar contemporary groups as al-Jihad Group. Chapter two is about “Methodology and 
Resources” showing that the study is not concerned with the ideological analysis of the 
EJI doctrines except in the context of analyzing its operations from a historical 
perspective (as it is presented to the Birmingham University, Department of Historical 
Studies). The third chapter is “The History” covering the emergence of the EJI along 
with other similar groups reaching the date of President’s Sadat assassination, till the 
issuing of the Re-thinking Initiative. The fourth chapter “A Second Reading to the 
History of the Islamic Groups” shows the points of view of some leading and influential 
figures in the EJI as extracted from the personal interviews held with these figures. The 
study concludes that most of the violent attacks committed by the EJI during the 
eighties and the nineties were not really for the jihad cause for establishing an Islamic 
State, but rather a struggle with a political rival, the victory over which seemed to be an 
end in itself in the minds of the EJI members and leaders. On the other hand, the 
clarification is made that the incongruence of these acts with the Islamic Shariʿa, is 
more of condemnation to the persons- not the religious texts- who were not adequately 
qualified to interpret those texts. 
The effort exerted in this work is remarkable and outstanding considering also 
that it was a leading research in this area of study at that time. However, some gaps 
need to be addressed. The first is the time gap considering that the study was 
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accomplished in the year 2006, a date which was very recent to the occurrence of the 
Initiative (1997-2002). This might have given the writer a better opportunity for 
documentation but not for thorough analysis of the initiative over a long period of time, 
especially that significant events took place later in the Egyptian scenery. The time 
lapse of around two decades, given the domestic, regional, and international changes 
that took place within this period would give better judgment concerning the credibility of 
the Initiative.  
Another gap is the questioned objectivity of the writer, although in very limited 
parts, but existent throughout the book. The choice of the Qur’anic verses with which 
the book starts (al-Haj: 38-41) which are known as verses legitimizing “fighting- in-
defense” in a study concerned with the illegitimate resort to combat by a militant Islamist 
group brings the issue of objectivity to question. In addition, the terminology used 
describing violent life - taking attacks by the EJI on innocent civilians including Muslims 
and non-Muslims as “armed struggle” (al-kifāḥ al-Mussallaḥ), a term used in Arabic 
terminology to connote dignified legitimate struggle, raises further questions. Finally, the 
study is as an excellent legal documentary work to the EJI Initiative, however, it lacks 
the ideological documentation to the violent vs. non- violent ideologies of the EJI, which 
is attempted to be covered by this study. 
2- ʿAbdel-Latif al-Manāwi, Shahed ʿala Waqf al-ʿUnf: Taḥawwulāt al-Jamaʿa al-
Islamiyya fi Misr, (Cairo: Dar Atlas, 2005). 
Al-Manāwi believes that dialogue in every possible way, rather than extinction, is 
a main tool for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the members of the EJI. The author 
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based his study on collecting all data required through conducting interviews with core 
members of the EJI. The first chapter: “Years of Anger” focuses on the ideological 
formation of the EJI members followed by “Little Wisdom, Plenty of Violence”  
describing  the behavioral path of the EJI witnessing the inclination to violence, followed 
by the final escalation during the Mubarak era, a phase characterized by violence and 
counter violence, “al-ʿunf wa al-ʿunf al-muḍad”. The book proceeds to present a short 
account of other militant groups emerging at that time. In the second part of the book 
the author describes the “Years of Transformation” witnessing the emergence of the 
Initiative. The third part presents the interviews held by the author with core members of 
the EJI, a biography for each one of them, and reading in the future of the Initiative. The 
book comes as a detailed documentation of the version of the story as narrated by the 
EJI members. It is hoped that the interviews held in this study will present a continuation 
to the interviews carried by al-Manāwi, serving as an evaluation to the reconciliatory 
impact of the initiative. 
3- Diyaʾ Rashwān, ed., “al-Murajaʿāt: min al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya ila al-Jihad”, 
(Cairo: al-Ahram: Center for Political and Strategic Studies ACPSS, 2008). 
The book comes in seven chapters; the authors can be classified into three 
researchers in al-Ahram ACPSS and four eye witnesses. The first is by Diyaʾ Rashwān, 
ed., presenting a theoretical framework for the concepts of murajaʿāt (ideological 
reassessment), the meaning, the context, and the implications. The second is presented 
by Najeḥ Ibrahim, EJI main ideologue and one of the historical leaders, analyzing the 
strategic importance of the murajaʿāt, and its consequences on the domestic and 
international levels. The Third section is by Dr. Kamal Ḥabib, a former member of al-
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Jihad Group, and specialist in the field of political science and the first ideologue of 
murajaʿāt in the militant Islamist movements. He presents a comprehensive vision of the 
murajaʿāt through a comparison with the initiative presented by al-Jihad Group ten 
years later. The fourth chapter is by the Islamist Lawyer Montasser al-Zayyat, adding an 
additional perspective by stating that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) murajaʿāt cannot be 
neglected in this context and giving a detailed account to those murajaʿāt. The fifth 
chapter is by Nabīl ʿAbdel- Fattaḥ, discussing the difficulties facing the re-thinking 
ideologies. The sixth chapter is presented by Dr. Amr al-Shoubaki around the legal fiqhī 
problems and the projection on reality. The seventh and last chapter is presented by Dr. 
Wahīd ʿAbdel- Majīd, in which he analyzes the future of the Initiative .This study, will 
examine the validity of the opinions presented in this book providing further analysis 
considering the occurring events and the time interval that had passed since its 
publication. 
b. Articles: One article is examined: 
1. Mamdouḥ al-Sheikh, al Jamaʿāt al Islamiyya fi Misr: Murajaʿāt al-Fikr wa al-
Asālīb wa al-Mawāqif, www.murajaʿāt.com/tarajuʿat_akra_php. 
The author is a specialist in Islamist movements; the first part of the article 
presents a summary of the history of the EJI till the date of issuing of the Initiative. The 
second part presents an analysis to the four main Re-thinking books known as “Silsilat 
Taṣḥiḥ al-Mafāhīm” focusing on the ideological characteristics of the Re-Thinking 
doctrines and describing the ideological transition in these doctrines. The author sums 
up his article by listing the main problematic ideological concepts affecting the 
emergence of any future similar initiatives. 
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2- English Sources 
a. Articles: One article is examined: 
ʿOmar Ashour, Lions Tamed? “ An Inquiry into the Causes of De-radicalization of 
Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group”, Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Autumn, 2007), pp. 596-625. 
The article falls in 30 pages, focusing on the process of de-radicalization of the 
EJI in the context of examining the factors that may lead radical and militant Islamist 
movements to de-radicalize. The main research question is “can militant, Islamist 
radicals turn into relatively peaceful groups that accept the “other”, and if so, under what 
conditions”. The writer begins with defining key terms and concepts and providing a 
typology of Islamist movements. In the second section, some of the literature on the 
causes of radicalization and moderation of Islamists is briefly synthesized underlining 
what the writer perceives as gaps in previous literature. In the third section, the 
theoretical framework is presented, and in the fourth, the EJI is taken as a focus of the 
attempted case study. Finally, the writer provides tentative conclusion as well as policy 
recommendations. 
Two areas were not attempted to be covered by the article, as stated by Ashour; 
comparing the variables that led to the Initiative with potential others, and investigating 
other variables including the international factor. However, the two other areas that were 
not attempted by the article but will be briefly covered by this study are the detailed 
analysis of the relationship between the EJI and the Egyptian regime, in addition to the 
effect of the causal variables of the Initiative on other similar militant groups. 
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 Finally, some comments have to be brought up. Again, as in Salwa al-‘Awwa’s 
book, the publication date (2007) falls short in re-reading the Initiative, taking into 
consideration the impact of the recent events taking place on the domestic level in 
particular and on the regional and global levels in general, a task that will be attempted 
by this study as well. In addition, Ashour mentioned some information that was 
considered by specialists in the EJI, and some of the interviewed ideologues as fallacies 
and misconceptions. First of which, is his consideration of the Re-thinking doctrines as 
an extension of the MB “moderate” curricula. Secondly, is his mistaken classification for 
the EJI as a former ally of the-Qaʿida and as a formerly Salafi-Jihadi movement 
although it started as a daʿwa group, i.e. a Salafi-ʿilmi moderate one.   
Books: One book is examined: 
1. Lasse Linekilde and Georges Fahmi, ed., Building De-radicalization Coalitions 
(Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, ACPSS, 2011). 
The book comes in ten chapters written by ten prominent contributors in the field 
of Islamist movements worldwide. The book is concerned with presenting a practical 
program for the activation of the de-radicalization process. This is suggested to be 
accomplished by forming “De-radicalization Coalitions” for the integration of the efforts 
of all concerned institutions as bureaucrats, security agencies, religious authorities, civic 
organizations, academics and media representatives aiming at the formulation of 
policies intending to prevent radicalization, and of policies designed to de-radicalize, 
disengage and re-integrate members of radical groups into society.  The book highlights 
the fact that although experiences with radical Islamism and political violence have been 
very different in terms of scope and intensity in Europe and the Middle East, some of 
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the driving forces of radicalization, as well as the relational dynamics between members 
of de-radicalization coalitions seem to be similar. 
Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
As far as the methodology is concerned, the study will incorporate three 
approaches. The first is the case-study approach over a limited time frame, which aims 
at understanding the emergence, and the behavioral and ideological evolution of the EJI 
from the seventies to the present, the factors that led to issuing the Re-thinking Initiative 
by the late nineties, and finally the extended impact of this Initiative after the passing of 
almost twenty years since its occurrence in 1997.  The second approach is the historical 
approach, taking into consideration that the militancy of the EJI constituted an ongoing 
process which has taken different forms throughout modern history, and stemming from 
the earlier legacy of extremism prevailing in the Egyptian society at that time. The final 
approach is the content analysis approach of the ideological doctrines of the EJI before 
and after the Re-thinking Initiative under study as written by its ideologues.  
As the study attempts to explain the factors that had led to the behavioral and 
ideological transformation of the EJI, the argument is based on the analysis of the four 
main factors that led to this transformation. In doing so, interviews with key figures 
relevant to the study are held. The interviews include: two historical leaders who issued 
the Initiative; two former State Security Department senior police officers; a former 
member of al-Jihad Group who issued several books promoting non-violence ideology; 
a member of the “Mediation Committee” involved in the Initiative; the Head of English 
department of al-Azhar University; also responsible for al-Azhar English section website 
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for refuting fatāwa al-takfīr (al-Marṣad); and finally an ex- core Muslim Brotherhood 
member. Other interviews will be collected from archives and published material. This 
will help with updating the available documentary data on the Initiative, and more 
importantly, to hear their stories in their own words. Within this context, studies 
undertaken elsewhere on doctrines relevant to this study will be analyzed, making 
related inferences which are hoped to contribute to this study.  
The theoretical framework within which the causes of violence can be referred to 
is either the structural psychological approach, or the political process approach. The 
argument presented by Moḥammad Ḥafez on these two approaches in “Why Muslims 
Rebel”1 will be taken as a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the 
phenomenon of violence. The first approach argues that several types of socio-
structural strains as socioeconomic, cultural, and political strains are introduced as 
violence motivators. However, the application of this approach to militant Islamist 
movements has not proven to be always right. Several empirical studies, especially in 
the case of the EJI, indicate that the structural strains led to the de-radicalization of the 
movement (as manifested by the Re-thinking Initiative), while the radicalization process 
did not come as an outcome of any direct strains. The alternative approach is the 
political process approach which begins with the premise that: “it is neither necessary for 
Islamists to be contended to be moderate nor sufficient for Islamists to be deprived to become 
rebellious”. 2 It argues that the resource mobilization, whether material, organizational, 
institutional, or ideational within a specific political environment can act as motives for 
militancy. It examines the context within which the Islamists operate including the 
                                                          
1
 Moḥammad Ḥafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (London: Lynne Reinner    
    Publishers, 2003) 
2
 Ibid., p. 19. 
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political environment, the ideological frames upon which they legitimize their actions, 
and the mobilization structure through which the resources are gathered. This approach 
is believed to be useful in studying a single case which is most appropriate to this 
research.   
There were some limitations related to data collection relevant to this study. One 
limitation was the subjective nature of the data collected by means of personal 
interviews. Another limitation was the difficulty of meeting any of those who retreated 
from the Initiative, or did not approve of it from the very beginning. Those are either 
secretly hiding their militant ideology, or if declared, they have either fled out of the 
country (as ‘Aṣem Abdel- Majid and Tarek al-Zumur: members of the EJI) or are still 
imprisoned.  Another difficulty was talking to the main State-Security Department Official 
(Ahmad Ra’fat known as Haj Mostafa Rifʿat), who was the key figure responsible for the 
Initiative as he passed away in 2010. However, this limitation will be minimized by 
interviewing other former State - Security Department officials in the same field, and by 
referring to the interviewed EJI leaders’ reflections on their relation with him. In general, 
all limitations were attempted to be compensated by referring to the wealth of available 
documentary material on the Initiative.  
However, it is worth mentioning that although the research topic may have some 
sociological, psychological, and political implications, these perspectives are only 
covered in relation to the ideological transformation that had taken place by the EJI and 
not as a specialized paper on these themes. 
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HYPOTHESES 
The study poses the following hypotheses: 
There is a positive relationship between resorting to underground activities- under 
any justification- by the militant Islamist groups and losing the trust of the ruling regime 
and the security forces. These clandestine activities provoke the state’s violent 
repressive reactions, whether legal or illegal. Likewise, the illegal security measures and 
absence of proper procedure of law are in direct proportionality to the ignition of more 
violence on the side of the militant groups, or pushing other non-violent ones to the 
violence, thus keeping the fire of militancy burning long. The need for the intertwining of 
both legal repressive policies and the ideological dialogue approach is a prerequisite for 
the transition of militant Islamist groups to a legitimate political path. The violent 
behavioral deviation of the Islamist militant groups is inversely proportional to adequate 
understanding, and profound knowledge of “Shari’a Objectives” (Maqaṣid al-Shariʿa) on 
behalf of these groups. This ideological deviation heightens the violent projection on 
unacceptable social, religious and political realities. 
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“Conflict…is a theme that has occupied the thinking of man more 
than any other, save only God and love” 
Anatol Rapport, “Fights, Games and Debates”. 
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Chapter One 
I. Emergence and Behavioral Evolution of the Egyptian Jamaʿa Islamiyya (EJI  (  
The emergence and behavioral evolution of the EJI in the early seventies passed 
through two main phases. The first phase lasted for around nine years (1970-1979) 
during which the Jamaʿa emerged, while the second phase lasted for around 18 years 
(1979- 1997) witnessing the EJI’s transformation to the violent path until issuing the 
Renouncing - Violence Initiative in 1997. The EJI and the Islamist movement in Egypt in 
general, were affected by the political and historical context within which these 
movements were acting. The behavioral transformation of the EJI changed from the 
peaceful means of addressing the religious and spiritual well-being of the individuals, to 
the coercive interference for the correction of the perceived “un-Islamic misbehavior” on 
university campuses. Holding it as a religious duty, they took the authority of imposing 
their version of Islam on the society to its culmination, ending by targeting the 
misbehavior of the whole political regime and all its institutions in every possible violent 
way. Distinguished by its highly organizational structure, the EJI managed, even while 
its main leaders were inside the jails, to execute almost all of its violent attacks. 
A. Early Sadat Presidency Period 1970-1979: Permitted Presence 
Three main features characterized the first phase of the emergence and 
behavioral evolution of the EJI. The first was the freedom of action granted 
exceptionally to the broad spectrum of Islamist movements under Sadat’s permissive 
policies,3 the second was the relative inter-fusion of these amorphous and un-
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 Salwa al-ʿAwwa, al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya al-Musallaḥa fi Misr: 1997-2004 (Cairo: Al-Shorouk International Bookshop, 
2006), p. 60. 
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crystallized movements, along with substantial differences among them, and finally the 
gradual transition of the EJI towards violence by the end of this phase.4 The historical 
contexts, within which the EJI emerged and evolved, include some domestic, regional 
and international events. Among the major events taking place in the first phase was the 
1973 victory, and towards the end of the nineties, some serious events took place, 
including Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and the beginning of the Peace 
Treaty negotiations. In addition, there was the legacy of the clash of the Nasserite 
regime with the Islamists represented by the MB, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The Islamist political movement began in Egypt in the early part of the twentieth 
century by the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) group during the British 
occupation in 1928. Until the 1967 defeat, the MB was virtually the only significant 
Islamic political organization in Egypt; however the MB was banned and suppressed by 
Nasser's regime since 1954.5The rise of the subsequent religious movements dates 
back to the aftermath of the Arab defeat of 1967. The Islamist movement in general 
made a comeback during the early seventies within the context of a tactical alliance with 
the Sadat regime,6 known in political analysis as: “creating balanced conflicts”.7 Upon 
the advice of some of his counselors,8 Sadat released the MB from prison and permitted 
them to be active on university campuses to counterbalance what the regime perceived 
as a Nasserite-leftist opposition (the enemy of my enemy approach) and to enhance 
Sadat’s popular base.9 It is noteworthy that the State Security Department was not 
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informed of this decision which they considered as a wrong strategic tactic.10 The 
decision coincided with a growing interest in religion and in religious oriented activism 
among students at Egyptian universities. The 1973 victory added to the religious 
enthusiasm, as it was associated with faith and resurgence to religion as expressed by 
al-Zayyat: “we perceived that the reason behind the victory was the shift towards religion”.11   
The second feature of this phase was the absence of a clear demarcation or well 
defined organizational structure within the movement. A wide spectrum of Islamists 
started to move under variations of the title12al-Jamaʿa al-Dīniyya (the Religious 
Group),13or al-Jamʿiyya al-Dīniyya (Religious Society). For this reason, reference to the 
word jama’āt in general, rather than the EJI, will be more common in the study during 
this phase of emergence. By the end of 1973 it was decided to take the title of al-
Jamaʿa al- Islamiyya for the emerging Islamist movement after that of Abu al-Aʿla al-
Mawdudi in Pakistan. However, in spite of this amorphous nature, they were rapidly and 
widely spreading. In general, these Islamist groups represented the small hard core of a 
broad, but amorphous, mass of religiosity in the society as a whole.14 
Thus, al-jamaʿāt Islamiyya were established as an inter-university club aiming to 
promote religious and social activities.15 Most of the jamaʿāt’s activities took place in 
Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyuṭ universities. Starting 1973, big summer camps were 
allowed by the official authorities to be organized by the jamaʿāt where no less than 500 
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students would spend two weeks contemplating religious sciences, training in various 
group sports, and listening to preachers.16 Towards mid-1970s, the jamaʿāt had 
managed to gain the majority of student union seats in Egyptian universities.17 This was 
due to the services they rendered to the student bodies. The jama’āt offered cheap 
photocopies of manuals, minibuses for the female students, low-cost Islamic dresses, 
cut-rate pilgrimage, and so on.18It was claimed that they had contacts with some 
government officials and received government funds in various forms.19   
By the mid-1970s, the jamaʿāt, previously known as the “Religious Group”, had 
transformed into a nation-wide organization with a well-defined structure. The 
organizational structure of the jamaʿāt consisted of a Majlis al-Shura (consultative 
council), an ʾamir (leader) in each university, and a national ʾamir al umarā” (leader of 
all the leaders).20Despite having such a structure, the jamaʿāt were a multi-ideological, 
de-centralized organization. As for the membership, few obstacles were placed and few 
demands were made on its members.21 They did not have to break ties with other 
groups, adopt clandestine names, or pay dues. Membership recruitment came from 
among students or recent university graduates, and with many young people 
increasingly observing religion and attending mosques for prayers, recruits were easily 
found among worshippers. 22 
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In 1977, the MB was able to recruit the ‘amirs of Cairo, Alexandria and Minya 
universities: ‘Abdul Munʿim Abul-Futuḥ, ʿEṣam al-ʿEryan, and Abul ‘ila Maḍi 
respectively. The MB was not able to recruit the ‘amirs of the Group in Asyuṭ University, 
Najeḥ Ibrahim and Karam Zuhdi. Both figures emerged later as co-founders of the EJI, 
Zuhdi headed the Majlis al-Shura of the EJI and Ibrahim was the principal ideologue.23 
The interference of the MB in universities and the reaction to such interference in Asyuṭ 
were among the factors that ignited the idea of the establishment of a new Islamist 
movement, less compromising and more conservative than the relatively “pragmatic” 
MB, as conceived by these newly emerging groups. Najeḥ Ibrahim – appreciated for his 
good manners24 - was elected the ʾamir of all Upper Egypt, marking the beginning of a 
new phase in which the EJI emerged as an independent Islamist movement with a 
distinct leadership as well as a base in Upper Egypt.25 
Broadly speaking, up to 1977, no obstacles were put to the freedom of 
expression as expressed by one of the main leaders of the EJI: “the era of Sadat was one 
of the most prosperous eras for the Islamic movement in Egypt”.
26 In return, the latter 
refrained from attacking the regime openly. Until then, the jamaʿāt were quite aware of 
the limits they should not exceed, but the infrastructure they were establishing and the 
training of their affiliates in the summer camps seem to have qualified them for a task 
other than countering the communist opposition for the benefit of Sadat ruling regime. It 
was not clear whether this was “a gentleman agreement or a fool’s game”.27 
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Two serious significant attacks by militant Islamists took place in 1974 and1997 
respectively with which the universities jamaʿāt Islamiyya publicly dissociated 
themselves. While the regime was priding itself on being based on faith and science 
(Dawlat al-‘ilm wa al–‘Imān), two dissonant, but alarming attacks took place by two 
clandestine Islamist movements which considered the regime an infidel one that had to 
be toppled. The first was the attempted coup d’état in 1974 by a militant Islamist group 
led by Saleḥ Siriyya,28 of a Palestinian origin, known as “al-Fanniyya al-‘Askariyya 
group”. This attempt was spectacular in volume, planning and timing as it took place 
following the 1973 victorious war, which strongly enhanced the state’s legitimacy and 
credibility in the eyes of the public, and more importantly, introducing - for the first time - 
the concept of Islamist militancy revolting against the regime. Three years later, in 1977, 
another stunning and unprecedented attack in the Egyptian political life took place; the 
hostage taking and assassination of the former minister of Awqāf (Religious 
Endowments) Sheikh al-Dhahabi by a group known as “Jamaʿat al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra”, 
led by Shoukri Mostafa, who was jailed during the Nasserite period and upheld violent 
ideologies from within the prison.29  
A third major event which took place was the massive food riots in January 1977. 
These riots were followed by a multitude of repressive measures against all kinds of 
political opposition, martial law was declared, and the army was called in to enforce 
curfew, all demonstrations and strikes were banned by an order issued by the Egyptian 
cabinet, and although not related to Islamist militancy, it definitely added to the 
prevailing tension. 
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Gradually, signs of transformation towards violence on the university and social 
level started to show. The freedom of action that was widely granted to the jamaʿāt 
opened the way for the radicalization. As stated by one of the prominent members of 
the jamaʿāt: “We did not miss the chance in the context of the general freedom called to by 
President Sadat, we took advantage of this”.
30 According to one of the leaders, the 
beginning of violence started in the universities with clashes with the communist 
“atheist” students who were acting, in a way, in opposition to sound Islamic norms.31 In 
the universities, especially in Upper Egypt, the couples were physically attacked for 
violations of upright Islamic morals, and artistic and cinematic exhibitions were 
considered provocations against the jamaʿāt and as such were considered forbidden. In 
the 1970s and early 1980s, those jama’āt criticized MB for confining its role to advise 
rulers of Muslim countries instead of capturing power itself.  Moreover, they blamed the 
older generation of the MB for growing tired and for adopting compromising stances 
towards the governments of Muslim countries.32 
The real battle between the Islamist students and the state started after Sadat’s 
trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, and the subsequent Egyptian –Israeli peace talks 
in 1978.33 Al-jamaʿāt expressed their opposition in different forms including seminars, 
publications, cassette tapes, demonstrations and public meetings to denounce this 
“munkar” (absolute evil). Concurrently, the asylum offered to the ex-Shah of Iran by 
Sadat in Egypt, gave rise to further opposition.34 Tension started to increase and in the 
summer, the Islamist camps were suddenly shut down. Only the Minya camp was held, 
                                                          
30
 Al-Zayyat, al-Jamaʿāt al-Islamiyya, op. cit., p.72. 
31
 Osama Ḥafez in: Salwa al-ʿAwwa, op. cit., p. 78-79. 
32
 ʿAbdelnasser, the Islamic Movement, op. cit., p. 61. 
33
 Kepel, Muslim Extremism, op. cit., p. 148. 
34
 Ibid, p.159. 
 26 
 
but the authorities refused to pay its expenses. The regime was still far from halting the 
jamaʿāt, however this was a sign of change toward harassment. The Camp David 
accords were signed in March 1979,35 and afterwards, Sadat mounted his restrictions 
against the Islamists until, in June 1979, the decree 265/1979 banned the General 
Union of Egyptian Students and froze its assets, but the jamaʿāt had already built solid 
infrastructures of their own.  
Whether Sadat’s banning policies were enough to control these movements or 
not is not the real issue; anyway the direct outcome was the radicalization of these 
movements, and the decline of moderate figures in favor of more militant elements. The 
calls to moderation were ignored and the atmosphere on the campuses was extremely 
tense. The shift from peaceful means of daʿwa to a “vice squad” targeting violently all 
forms of un-Islamic norms of conduct was the entry point to a more serious and tragic 
shift to violence against the regime including all representative entities and symbols. 
B. Late Sadat Presidency Period, Mubarak Era –the Initiative: 1979- 1997: 
The second phase lasted around 18 years from 1979 till issuing the Renouncing 
Violence Initiative in 1997. This phase was characterized by the escalated violence of 
militant groups including the EJI, the restricted freedoms, and total clash with the 
regime, which resorted on its part to suppressive policies in retaliation. In addition, this 
phase witnessed the clear demarcation and crystallization of each group from the other, 
the consolidation of the EJI as a distinct movement, and the clear radicalization of the 
EJI escalating their operations to include assassinations, sectarian clashes, mass 
murders and bombings. Moreover, the field of action was enlarged to encompass Cairo 
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city, the capital, where violent attacks would have a wider destructive and exhausting 
impact on the “corrupt” regime.36  
Similar to the first phase, the changes in the behavioral path of the EJI were affected 
by the ongoing prevailing domestic, regional and international events. Among the most 
significant events were the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Peace Treaty held with Israel, the assassination of President Sadat, and the collapse 
and disintegration of the former Soviet Union. 
The religious enthusiasm which was inspired in the first phase (1970-1979) by 
relating the 1973 victory to the return to Islam was further inspired by the success of the 
Iranian Islamic revolution to seize power in 1979. According to al-Zayyat, describing the 
impact of the Iranian Islamist Revolution on the young youth: “We adopted the Islamic 
evolutionary ideas and the revolution was inflaming our feelings”.
37The differences between 
the Shi’a and the Sunna were willingly dismissed,38 and it was hoped that the Egyptian 
people, following the Iranians, would rise to install, a second Islamic republic.39 
Concurrently with the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979, Sadat held negotiations 
to conclude a peace accord with Israel. This was conceived by the whole Islamist 
movement, in addition to many opposition components, as a betrayal to the anti-Zionist / 
pro-Palestinian cause (and it is argued to have been the direct reason for the 
assassination of Sadat( and more importantly, betrayal to the unannounced alliance 
between the Islamist movement and the “Pious President”, who has now become infidel 
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in the eyes of the potential violent Islamists who considered that “when Sadat found that 
he had achieved his goals, he started to change to a new phase, in which he embraced the 
views of the USA and hosted  the thrown Shah of Iran, then was his great disaster by visiting 
Jerusalem and holding the Camp David Agreement”.40 
Towards the end of the late seventies, the EJI had recruited thousands of 
members in a well-knit organizational structure with internal list of regulations, steered in 
by a central leadership, intermediary leaders and bases spreading all over Egyptian 
governorates.41 The members were doctrinally educated with a view to launching an 
armed confrontation with all their enemies,42 including Copts, statesmen, secularists, 
security agencies and ordinary citizens. The followers were young men who were 
religiously and dogmatically raised in conformity with a literature of deviant exegetic 
commentaries and books.43 The members were divided into groups of seven persons 
and only one of them was entitled to communicate with the leadership. Military training 
was carried by carrying the trainees in closed Jeep vans to isolated places in the 
mountains of Upper Egypt. Abbud al-Zumur44 was responsible for this military training.  
Moreover, the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan by the end of 1979 raised the call to 
support the fellow Muslims there giving another offshoot to the militant Islamist 
movement. Almost all Islamist movements of Egypt were contributing to the Afghani 
resistance troops (mujahidīn) and during the early 1980s, the EJI was believed to have 
contributed with about 300 combat troops training and fighting in Afghanistan among the 
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5,000 to 10,000 highly motivated Muslim youth, from the Middle East and other parts of 
the world, who went to Peshawar, the headquarters of the Afghan mujahidīn, financed 
and armed principally by Saudi Arabia and the USA. Now, the concept of jihad was 
becoming fully elaborated and practiced, and the EJI was dragged to the violence path 
thus losing an important opportunity to emerge as a socio-political force.45 
In 1979, al-jamaʿāt al Islamiyya were officially banned and this was followed by 
Sadat’s wide “September Detention Decisions” in 1981 according to which 1536 figures 
from different opposition backgrounds were imprisoned. The jamaʿāt godfather, 
Moḥammad ʿOthman Isamʿil, who previously advised Sadat of freeing the Islamist out 
of prisons to counteract the leftists, was removed from his post as governor of Asyuṭ.46It 
is worth mentioning that Sadat encouraged the Islamic movement until he realized his 
mistake in the late 1970s. The official public speech started to call members of these 
groups as deviants, abnormal, heretics and Khawarij, and although the Nasser era was 
a period of infidelity for the Islamists, the Sadat era did not turn to be any better.47  
Time was ripe to plan for killing the “pharaoh” who ruled in contradiction to the 
injunctions of Islam.48 The EJI had numerous contacts with other like-minded, small 
Salafi-Jihadi factions in Cairo and the Delta region. In 1979, an ominous coalition 
between the EJI and the more militant Jihad Group took place.49 Al-Jihad, headed by 
Moḥammad ʿAbdel-Salam Faraj, the principal ideologue of the group, brought in Sheikh 
ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman, a graduate of al-Azhar, Cairo's leading Islamic university, to 
bless al-Jihad's military operations and provide religious credentials to the group. Faraj 
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had written a tract which called for the execution of Sadat, “the apostate of Islam 
nourished at the tables of Zionism and imperialism”,50 especially, after his slogan “la 
siyasa fi al-din wa la din fi al-siyasa” (politics should be separated from religion, and 
religion should be separated from politics).  
On September 28, 1981, Faraj, Ibrahim, Zuhdi, ‘Abbud al-Zumur and Khalid al-
Islambulli 51held a meeting to plan for the assassination of Sadat and a subsequent 
nation-wide coup d’état.52 The assassination took place on the 6th of October 1981, and 
two days later, 35 members of the EJI attacked Asyuṭ security Department, killing more 
than 100 security men. After the shocking impact of the big number of killed security 
men, ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman issued a fatwa by their spiritual leader, obligating fasting 
sixty days on all those involved, in expiation of the committed nefarious sin.53  
After the imprisonment of hundreds of Islamists following the assassination of 
Sadat, the EJI started a quick process of complete and clear consolidation and 
demarcation.  In 1982-83 in the Tura prison complex, a split between the EJI and al-
Jihad Group took place. The split ended in the consolidation of the EJI as a separate 
group headed spiritually by the blind preacher ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman and the Jihad 
Group which was headed by the group’s imprisoned military planner, Abbud al-Zumur 
and Ayman al-Ẓawahri. The split was mainly due to disagreements on three issues: 
leadership, ideology, and tactics. 
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Regarding leadership, there was a consensus among the leading EJI figures, 
which were exclusively from Upper Egypt, that ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman, being a ʿalim 
(scholar of Islamic jurisprudence) must lead the EJI. The leading figures in the Jihad 
movement authored a 64-page document in which al-Ẓawahri argued that the 
leadership of a blind man “wilayat al-ḍarīr” in military or paramilitary matters is 
Islamically unacceptable. The EJI answered back by discrediting the leadership of the 
imprisoned Abbud al-Zumur considering “wilayat al-asīr” as unacceptable. 
The second difference that was centered on an ideological concept: “al-ʿUdhr bi 
al-Jahl” (excuse due to ignorance) will be separately explained in the second chapter on 
the Ideology of violence. The disagreement regarding this concept was particularly 
raised questioning the legitimacy of killing the soldiers in the Asyuṭ Security Department 
attack. The third main disagreement between the EJI and the Jihad was regarding 
tactics. The EJI leaders preferred to be publicly active in mosques, universities, and on 
the streets. In their “Charter of Islamic Action”,54 two of their means for changing the 
society emphasized publicity: “al-daʿwa” (proselytizing) and “al-'amr bi al-maʿruf wa al-
nahi ʿan al-munkar” (ordering good and forbidding evil). By contrast, al-Jihad Group, by 
its very nature was a secret society that emphasized covert action and the tactic that 
they strongly advocated for bringing about change by al-Jihad leaders at that time was 
an Islamist- led military coup.  
The consolidation phase was further enhanced by the production of literature that 
highlighted the EJI’s violence ideology. This literature has provided Islamic-based 
ideological legitimacy for the militarization process. Outside-the-prison, a rebuilding 
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process was conducted in parallel by the second-in-line commanders after the 
devastating strikes conducted by the Egyptian security forces in the after math of Sadat 
assassination. In the 1980s they recruited heavily among the unemployed young 
graduates of the new rural universities and newly urbanized ones with the main center 
in Asyuṭ, “kingdom of the jamaʿāt Islamiyya”.55After the assassination of Sadat, Mubarak 
released subsequently the arrested detainees of Sadat’s September Decisions and 
allowed some freedom to counteract the anger that was provoked by these decisions. 
The EJI core members, who were responsible for rebuilding the group and recruiting 
new affiliates, made use again from this relative atmosphere of freedom. They 
deliberately changed the focus of their recruitment speech-to have more appeal to the 
addressed Islamists - from the deviation of the Sadat’s regime from Islam, to the 
necessity of the solidarity and support with the arrested “brothers” who were considered 
heroes56 who sacrificed their freedom and lives for the cause of Islam. They would even 
take pride in the number of years they spent in prisons. 57 
The Jamaʿa was now organized in cells, making it very hard to monitor and 
suppress having a separate military and da'wa, or "call," wings. The military wing seems 
to have been strengthened by the return of Egyptian volunteers from the war against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan. The Soviet giant collapsed and disintegrated adding to the false 
feeling of pride by those mujahidīn. After Moscow had withdrawn its forces from 
Afghanistan, the surviving Muslim fighters, battle-hardened and more militant than ever, 
began to look for some other areas, like Egypt, where they could fight for the "cause of 
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Islam."58 Known as "the Afghanis," these militants were said to be the EJI toughest and 
most effective fighters. The Afghani jihad militarized the Islamist behavior, a process 
that lacked any moral or legal regulations.59  
The successful expansion of the EJI in Cairo's poor suburbs and universities, its 
radical rhetoric, and its attempt to change traditional practices that were deemed" un-
Islamic" through violent means in the period between 1987 and 1989 alarmed the 
regime. The EJI was responsible for 90% of the distributed leaflets opposing the regime 
then. As a result, the security forces started a crackdown on EJI activists. By early 
1989, the EJI attempted to stop the crackdown by issuing the so-called" six demands" 
appeal.60The security forces ignored the demands and continued the crackdown. In 
reaction, the military wing of the EJI, led by Mamduḥ ʿAli Yusuf at that time, decided to 
assassinate General Zaki Badr, the minister of Interior Affairs. The attempt did not 
succeed, but it did initiate a cycle of assassinations. By August, 1990, the speaker of 
the EJI, Dr. 'Ala' Muḥyi al-Din, was found shot dead near his apartment in Giza. The EJI 
accused the State Security Department. Members of the supposedly peaceful daʿwa 
wing were now participating in violent activities, including the assassination of Dr. Rifʿat 
al- Maḥjūb, Head of the People's Assembly in1990. In October 1994, 83-year-old Najīb 
Maḥfouz, Nobel Laureate in Literature, who was critical of Muslim extremists, was 
seriously wounded in a stabbing attack by Islamists at his Cairo residence. On the same 
year, the EJI assassinated General Ra’ouf Khairat, head of Combating Radicalism 
Section in the State Security Department by bombing his car. 
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Terrorist attacks on pro-Western citizens by militants and retaliatory mass 
executions by the government made the situation increasingly violent and frightening. 
Moreover, the group believed in the position of tributary or dhimmi for Christians in 
Egypt and opposed any signs of Coptic "arrogance" (istikbār), such as Christian cultural 
identity and opposition to an Islamic state. The group distributed a leaflet accusing 
Egypt's one Christian provincial governor (appointed by the government) of providing 
automatic weapons to Christians to attack Muslims, and the Sadat administration of 
following orders given by the United States.61 
Internationally, the radical behavior was reflected in seeking alliances with other 
extremist groups, as well as the internationalization of the EJI’s violent operations, most 
notably the attempt on President Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in 1995, although the 
EJI attacks between 1981-1997 focused solely on the Egyptian regime, and refrained 
from attacking targets outside Egypt. The EJI’s literature never indicated it had any 
regional, let alone international aspirations.62 Anyway, confrontation with the regime and 
related institutions escalated till issuing the Initiative in 1997. 
Over the period of extended Islamist militancy, regional and international external 
support was suspected.  Among the list of accusations came Sudan63which was 
considered then the biggest foreign patron of terrorist activities in Egypt,64Iraq was 
accused of providing weapons and financial support and Iran65 which supported ʿOmar 
ʿAbdel-Raḥman,66 and provided the alternative accommodation and travel 
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arrangements for the Islamist militants. According to Egyptian security officials, Osama 
bin Laden was the major financier of a camp in Afghanistan where recruits from Egypt's 
al-Jihad and EJI were trained. Moreover, the USA and Saudi Arabia, in addition to the 
Egyptian regime itself, supported - in every possible way - the “mujahidīn” to counteract 
the Soviet occupation, an action which backfired in the three countries.  
 According to official records, the death toll resulting from the confrontation period 
between 1992 and 1996 reached almost 1200 deaths including 47I EJI members, 401 
from the security forces, 306 Egyptian civilians, and 97 tourists. The number of 
detainees during the mid-1990s reached a maximum of 30,000 people.67 This period 
also featured a rise in the use of terror tactics, many assassinations/ assassination-
attempts, bombings, and mass-murders. In retaliation, severe security measures were 
being taken including systematic torture in prisons, 98 military show-trials, regular 
curfews in many Upper Egyptian towns and villages, and the destruction of hundreds of 
acres of arable land.68It was more of a low-grade civil war with the EJI.69 
Among those who fell victim to EJI violence were police personnel, military-men 
and government officials, who were regarded as pillars of the Hosni Mubarak 
Administration. The tourism industry was another target of the Islamists' anger. Many 
Christian Copts, school teachers, journalists and other professionals, and innocent 
civilians fell prey to terrorist violence. According to one of the leaders, “the biggest loss in 
the assassination of Sadat was the success of the attempt, that success deceptively gave the 
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impression that it was a right step”. 
70
 The plan aiming at changing the ideological and 
political structure of Egypt within three years, according to the vision of Abbud al-Zumur, 
simply ended only as an assassination of a president.71 
 In conclusion, the EJI which emerged as a peaceful daʿwa group, transformed 
gradually to the most militant group in Egypt. All the EJI and militant Islamists atrocities 
were committed within the context of ideological justifications, and slogans naming their 
violence as “heroic acts” launched for the sake of gaining God’s pleasure: “ghaḍba 
lillah” (ghaḍba li Allah).The ideology to which the EJI justified their violence will be 
examined in the following chapter.    
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“Aggression breeds aggression. One comes to expect 
aggression to be a way of solving all problems…Thus aggression 
is pretty much of a habit; the more you express it the more you 
have of it”.  
Gardon Allport, “The Role of Expectancy” . 
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Chapter Two 
II. Ideological Evolution: Legitimization of Violence 
A. Legacy of Violence 
The mindset and the behavior of most of the Islamist youth generation of the 
1970s was affected by both the remnants of the Nasser-MB clash, and those ideologies 
reacting to the post Arab nationalism era, which was conceived as an era of western 
imperialism and the dominance of socialist and secular ideologies.72Moreover, this was 
taking place in the intellectual and religious vacuum of an effective presence of the 
moderate Azhar ‘ulama73 and the infiltration of the Salafi Wahhabi ideology after the oil 
boom.74  
The clash between the Nasserite regime and the MB provoked the religious 
anger sentiments. It was widely publicized within the Islamists circles as a clash with 
Islam rather than a mere political conflict.75Most of the Islamists went as far as 
interpreting this clash in terms of hostility of a communist regime with religion 
altogether.76 The defeat of that anti-religion regime in 1967, in addition to the previous 
loss of Palestine in 1948 by all Arab regimes, and the collapse of all nationalism 
dreams,77 was perceived as a clear indication of the failure of secular and semi-secular 
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ideologies78 and a clear sign of deserved divine wrath, an element which substantiated 
the attack by the Islamist movement against Arab nationalism. 79 
This religious interpretation of the ongoing events came as an intellectual 
descent of the ideology of the most important contemporary Islamist ideologues then: 
Abu al-ʾAʿla al-Mawdudi (1903–1979), and Sayyed Qutb80 (1906-1966). Al-Mawdudi 
and Qutb were both opposed to colonialism, imperialist controls and irreligious 
leaders.81 The militant Islamists ideology was also believed to draw on the classic 
interpretation of Ibn-Kathīr (1300-1373) on the Qur’anic verses on ḥakimiyya (confining 
authority of governorship to God only) (Surat al-Ma’ida, verses 45-47), and Ibn-
Taimiya’s (1263–1328) books: al-Imān, al-Ṣarem al-Maslul, and especially on his fatawa 
pertaining to Mongols and his famous fatwa in volume 28 of his Great Fatawa about “al-
tattarruss”, ( the permissibility of killing Muslims if the enemy is taking them as 
shields).82  
Qutb and al-Mawdudi were considered “the intellectual godfathers of jihadi groups 
across the Muslim world”83 including even al-Qaʿida. Qutb’s name appears repeatedly in 
the leaflets produced by the Egyptian jamaʿāt’s rank and file.84 Montasser al-Zayyat, 
who was in charge of the recruitment and ideological training of the new affiliates in the 
early eighties explained how the intellectual training was based on reading “Maʿalim fi 
al-Ṭarīq”  (The Milestones) of Qutb, and the interpretation of some Qur’anic chapters 
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from Qutb’s “Dhilal al-Qur’an”. In this way the conceptual mindset of the new member 
was formed to be fully convinced with the idea of revolting against the ruler”.85 
On their part, Al-Mawdudi and Qutb developed their ideology interpreting the 
abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in the terms of a colonial and Zionist conspiracy,86 
which led to the division of the umma into mini-states where secularism prevailed, 
shari’a lost its dominant role in Muslim societies, and the infidels imposed their laws. 
The main theologian for the “Islamic state” - al-Mawdudi - established the original       
“al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya in Pakistan, from which the EJI drew their name, thirteen years 
after the foundation of the MB in Egypt.  After the death of the MB founder Ḥassan al-
Banna in 1949, Qutb was influenced by al-Mawdudi’s ideology, especially on ḥakimiyya, 
which became a primary theme for both scholars, a theme which entails the rejection of 
human governorship whenever it was present in any form whether secularism, 
nationalism or democracy.87 The disobedience to these disciplines is a Godly order, if 
the ruler does not draw his power form God, and the law he administers is not God’s 
law, then he is a usurper and the duty of obedience is replaced by a duty of 
disobedience.88 Both al-Mawdudi and Qutb,89argued that both ethnicity and nationalism 
were opposed to Islam and criticized those forms of nationalism because they 
presented themselves as substitutes to Islam.90 Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
hostile vision of the world leads to an overthrow of power, but it was not until the mid-
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1970s for it to spread widely among the first universities generations coming out of the 
demographic explosion and the literate rural exodus.91 
Al-Mawdudi and Qutb, also taught that the prevailing ruling governments are “jahili” 
(a Qur’anic term that describes the society of ignorance and barbarism that prevailed 
before Prophet Moḥammad), and which symbolized the antithesis of Islam. For their 
more extreme followers, war was not only permitted, but also mandated, to restore the 
Muslim world to righteousness. Qutb constructed, from behind the bars, the theory of 
the Islamic rupture with the established order. In his texts, Qutb explains that the 
societies of the so-called Muslim world are not at all Islamic, but are in reality the 
equivalents of the Jahiliyya; Nasser’s regime was seen as the illustration of this par 
excellence.  Qutb defined the jahili society: “but what then is the jahili society? If we need an 
objective definition, it would be every society that does not worship Allah sincerely …according 
to that definition, all existing societies on earth now are jahili societies”. Qutb proceeds to list 
all socialist, atheist, Jewish and Christian societies and he further adds to the list of jahili 
societies “all those societies which claim to be Muslim, not because they worship other than 
Allah, but because they grant one of the Godly attributes (ḥakimiyya) to entities other than 
Allah….so in the first place they are “wahimūn” (delusional)  and secondly they are 
“kafirūn”(infidels)”.92 
  In addition, Qutb exemplified Ibn-Taimiya’s sharp93 distinction between Islam and 
non-Islam. In his view, leaders of modern nation-states are analogous to the Mongols. 
Based on Ibn-Taimiya’s assertion, the Muslim identity of these modern rulers must be 
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questioned. The principle of takfīr was widely seen in the newly emerging and widely 
disseminated book al-Fariḍa al-Ghāʿiba (The Hidden Imperative), by Moḥammad 
ʿAbdel-Salām Faraj, the ideologue of the group that engineered Sadat’s assassination. 
Faraj cites Ibn-Taimiya’s fatwa on the Mongols as a legal precedent in his takfīr of 
contemporary rulers and religious authorities. Ibn-Taymiya took his position with regard 
to the contemporary situation of the Tartars who were, in his view, kāfirūn, because they 
applied a non-Islamic system of law: the “yasa”. The  phenomenon of declaring Muslims 
disbelievers and its consequent results goes back in history to the early emergence of 
al-Khawarij during their clash with the fourth Caliph ʿAli ibn Abī-Talib (656-660). The 
common ideological denominator that united all militant groups by the end of the 1970s, 
through which they legitimized their violence was labeling the rulers as kāfirs holding it 
as lawful to spill their blood. 94  
Radical Islamist movements argued that nation states alienated Muslims from 
Dar-al-Islam (The abode of Islam) and thus they called for bypassing nationalism in 
order to emulate the model of the “umma” which existed in early Islamic history. They 
accused all nationalist movements and intellectuals in the Muslim world of being agents 
of the crusading West.95The doctrinal influence of Egyptian Islamist authors (as well as 
of the Pakistani al-Mawdudi) which predominated in the Sunni world, remained the 
prime sources for all who seek to overthrow the impious society (jahiliyya) and build the 
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Islamic state on its ruins. In the 1970s, Arab nationalism became increasingly identified 
with Nasser, the arch-enemy of the MB96.  
The radical Islamist movements extended their definition of “liberation” so that 
the term would not be confined to the liberation of Muslim territories from a foreign 
presence “al-ʿaduww al-baʿīd” (far enemy) but would include as well, the liberation of 
Muslim peoples from oppressive rulers and governments “al-ʿaduww al-qarib” (near 
enemy), who were now representatives of the classic external far enemies; Israel, the 
colonialist Christian West and the Communist Soviet Union. Now the internal near 
enemy was everywhere; the EJI and other militant movements did not distinguish 
between the Egyptian regime and its" infidel" US and Israeli allies, or between armed 
police and tourists.97  
All components of the Islamist movement during the 1970s, even the moderate 
ones, agreed on the goal of Islamic unity, however, they differed on the means to 
achieve this unity. While radical elements adopted jihad to achieve that end, considering 
jihad as an end per se,98 moderate forces were peacefully propagating the objectives of 
Islamic unity among Muslims and rulers. The MB, whose ranks had included Qutb, was 
considered by militant Islamists to have betrayed their past in the interest of 
accommodation with the regime.99 
With the polarization of modern Islamist political thought on these issues in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the radical Islamist movements, including the EJI, 
has become dominant on one side of the political debate with their own ideology 
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defining their view of the world. These groups did not merely seek self-empowerment 
but aggressively sought to disempower, dominate or destroy others.100 
B. EJI Violence Doctrines101 
The worldview of the EJI was relatively simple: The Islamic caliphate had been 
replaced by small states ruled by secular-minded “infidels” in league with Crusaders and 
Jews. These infidels would never re-establish the caliphate, essential to the revival of 
Islam; and must therefore be toppled through jihad. At the same time, Muslim societies 
have to be purified from deviant practices via “al-‘amr bil maʿrouf w al-nahi ʿan al-
munkar”, or ḥisba, in addition to never-ending proselytizing (da’wa). It is noteworthy that 
the EJI did not go so far, as did al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra and al-Jihad Group, to declare 
almost all of society to be infidel. This direct action on behalf of religion would bring 
society back to the true religion of God.102 
Prior to writing their doctrines in 1984, the EJI drew on its own contemporary 
violence “godfather”, the fellow Jihad Group’s primary doctrine of Faraj “al-Fariḍa al-
Ghaʾiba” which was the reference book inspiring all jihadi movements then.  Faraj’s 
book103 was heavily indebted to Qutb's writings and provided the worldview and 
ideology of Islamic jihad considering jihad as an obligation on par with the other five 
pillars of Islam. Faraj’s doctrine was written in 1979–1980, but it was first published, in 
the Egyptian newspaper al-Aḥrar, on December 14, 1981, more than two months after 
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the assassination of Egyptian Sadat. The MB’s corrective book “Duʿah la Quḍah” 
(Preachers not Judges), which was a trial to correct Qutb’s deviation from the MB 
mainstream, went without recognition for the emerging radical militants. Qutb’s 
terminology and their interpretation as “al-mufaṣala” (separation) or “ʿuzla” (withdrawal) 
and “istiḍʿāf” (weakness) denoted the position that necessitated the spiritual detachment 
from the contemporary Egyptian jahili society which had to be excommunicated. This 
was the basis for al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra group whose leader – Shoukri Mostafa - was a 
disciple of Qutb in jail and heavily drew on the latter’s ideas. 
Second in the line after Faraj came Sayyed Imam al-Sherif104 of the Jihad Group, 
who preached for the use of violence in the 1970s in his famous tract “al-ʿOmda fi Eʿdād 
al-ʿOdda”, who claimed in his conclusion that “rights can only be attained by force”,105 and 
that today’s rulers are more infidel than the Mongols. In addition, Sheikh ʿOmar ‘Abdel-
Raḥman, who had been charged with complicity in the assassination of Sadat, but was 
acquitted and later fled to the United States,106 had the highest spiritual impact. 
CHARTER OF ISLAMIC ACTION 
The conceptual violence framework of the EJI, which transcended the nation 
state, was reflected in the titles of their violence doctrines.107 Titles, such as “Mithāq al- 
ʿAmal al-Islami” (the Charter of Islamic Action) (1984), and “Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwajaha” 
(The Inevitability of Confrontation) (1987) were the first to appear.108 The EJI and al-
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Jihad Group relied on the oral circulation of their ideology before the written 
documentation of the ideologies. Although the Charter, EJI main violence doctrine, was 
issued in 1984, yet it belongs ideologically to the seventies era since the EJI’s leaders 
who composed it belonged to the 1970s generation.109Unlike the widely known pattern, 
the EJI produced its violence literature after it had already got fully involved in 
radicalization following Sadat’s assassination. They thought of documenting their 
ideology after being imprisoned for the sake of preserving this action- motivating  
ideology fearing that it would be lost in case they were sentenced to death. Prior to that, 
no specific document portrayed their ideology except the general Salafi legacy of Ibn-
Taimiya and Faraj’s doctrine. 
The violence literature of the EJI totals to about 10 main books and papers,110 
representing the so called EJI’s “Fiqh al-'Unf” (Jurisprudence of Violence) issued from 
within the jails through a period of six years starting 1984. Those books, including the 
most famous “Mithāq al ʿAmal al-Islami, explained the main objectives of the EJI and its 
applied strategy. “Kitab Aṣnaf al-Ḥukkām wa Aḥkāmihim” (kinds of Rulers and their 
Rulings) stipulated the obligation of revolting against the ruler who alters divine rulings. 
The book specifically ascertains the infidelity of Sadat. In “al-Ṭa’ifa al-Mumtaniʿa ʿan 
Shariʿa min Shara’iʿ al Islam” (The Desisting Party from a Law of Islamic Laws), and 
also in “Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwajaha” (the Inevitability of Confrontation), the obligation of 
jihad and of fighting anyone or group refraining or hindering the application of any 
Islamic injunction is legitimized. The book comes in complete compliance to Ibn-
Taimiya’s fatawa and was intended to emphasize precisely the legitimacy of calling for 
                                                          
109
 Rifʿat S. Aḥmad, al-Nabiyy al-Musallaḥ, op. cit., p. 165. 
110
 Refer to appendix B, p. 113. 
 47 
 
jihad against Sadat. Another book is “Kalimat Ḥaq” (A Righteous Word) wich constituted 
the pleading that was presented by ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman to the courts in defense of 
the accused EJI members then.111“ʾAʾiIlahun maʿa Allah? Iʿlan al-Ḥarb ʿala Majlis al-
Shaʿab”  (Another God with Allah? Declaration of War on the People's Assembly), 
discussed the prohibition of political parties and any kind of political participation in the 
parliamentary and political secular life. “Baḥth al-‘udhr bi al-jahl wa al-Muwallah” 
(Excuse due to Ignorance of the Sin) is a paper which warns against labeling those 
“ignorant of the sin” as unbelievers, and draws sharp lines between those who should / 
should not be rendered as infidels. The second part of that paper discusses holding 
alliances with the infidels and divides this into internal alliance (which is prohibited), and 
external alliances,(which is still prohibited but does not render the person an infidel). 
“Jawaz taghyīr al-Munkar li ‘Aḥād al-Raʿiyya” (the permissibility of changing the evils by 
the individuals) explains how individuals are granted the right to interfere in correcting 
the evils and sins. “Wujūb al-‘Amal al-Jamaʿi” (the Obligation of Collective Action) 
stipulates the necessity of collective action as a prerequisite for establishing a caliphate 
according to the fiqhī rule “whatever is a pre-requisite for an obligation is in itself an 
obligation”, hence it is obligatory and to be enrolled in a jamaʿa in which the total 
obedience to the leader is a must.112  
In summary, the broad violence theoretical framework was: the infidelity of the 
ruler who alters the rule of God, in addition to all subsidiary institutions and individuals 
like the security agencies among others, the obligation of fighting any refraining group 
or individual from applying a certain religious rule,  the permissiveness of individuals to 
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assume the right of changing the evils and misconducts, the prohibition of parliamentary 
and political life participation, the obligation of joining a jamaʿa, the hostility of 
secularism to the doctrine of Islam, the infidelity of man-made laws, and the societal 
obligation of jihad. In addition to echoing some of al-Jihad’s Group concept of the 
priority of fighting the “near enemy” (as represented by the infidel regimes) to fighting 
the “far enemy” (Israel and the West including USA), the infidelity of all non-Muslims, 
and the permissiveness of killing Muslims if they stand as shields or cannot be 
separated from the desired attacked targets.113The tradition of tolerating an unjust ruler 
for the sake of preserving the unity of the 'umma is completely rejected believing that it 
is the duty of every true Muslim to remove injustice “ẓulm” and misguidance “ḍalala”, 
including that committed by a ruler.114They restricted the concept of jihad to combat, 
restricted combat to killing, and confined jihad to jihad of demand (jihad al-ṭalab) 
disregarding the other kind of jihad in defense “Jihad al-dafʾ”. According to the Mithāq, 
jihad is one way to achieve sociopolitical change. The other two means being da’wa 
(preaching or proselytizing) and al-‘amr bi al-maʿrouf wa al-nahi ʿan al-munkar 
(enjoining good and forbidding evil). The latter method could be violent or non-violent.115 
 That literature employed the general religious terms, used by most of the Islamist 
literature, with sacred or historical connotations in the collective memory of Muslims, 
such as ‘umma, jihad, dar-al-ḥarb, dhimmis and jahiliya. Those terms which were 
reinterpreted, to fit contemporary political actors into classical stereotypes, were also 
radicalized and taken to their extremes, and were universalized to cover the globe by al-
Mawdudi, Qutb and by the new ideologues. That terminology was even utilized by what 
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was considered then as the most moderate component of the Islamist movement, 
namely the MB. Another One linguistic feature characterizing the EJI violence literature 
was the repetition of the terminologies of monotheism, worshipping, submission and 
governance. It reflects that they remained captive to dogmatic and juristic concepts 
which made them incapable of seeing the contemporary surrounding political 
environment or international relations, considering that their dogmatic aspects are the 
ones which exclusively, or fundamentally, determine their political options.116This comes 
in compliance with all firmly held systems of belief, especially those founded on religious 
conviction, which are in some way supremacist.117 
One of the distinguishing - less radical - ideological concepts for the EJI was the 
concept of al-ʿUdhr bi al-Jahl (excuse due to ignorance). The concept is well 
established in Sunni theology, and argues that if a person has violated Islamic laws due 
to "ignorance" and/or a misunderstanding he should not be punished. On the other side, 
leaders of al-Jihad Group argued that even that person should be punished. The 
practical implication of the argument has to do with fighting Muslim soldiers protecting 
"secular" regimes. Whereas the EJI gave those Muslim soldiers an "excuse" due to their 
"ignorance" and therefore argued for narrowing the selection of its targets, al-Jihad 
leaders argued that both soldiers and leaders of secular regimes are "apostates" and, 
therefore, legitimate targets.118 In general, the EJI was more cautious than al-Jihad in 
accusing others of kufr and they excluded “'ahl-al- Qibla” (Muslims), kufr al-muʿayyan” 
(a specific person or entity). In this point the EJI adopts the creed of the majority of 
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Sunni scholars which was believed to be one of the ideological factors which opened 
the road for its de-radicalization.  119   
After the EJI had emerged in in a full-fledged shape, it developed its doctrinal 
and political schemes based on juristic foundations and special religious exegetic 
explanations whereby they judged the ruling regime as infidel and called for fighting it. 
The EJI adopted this orientation in a more mass-oriented way than the “elitist”, more 
dogmatic and uncompromising fashion pursued by the Jihad Group.120The EJI, like 
other militant Islamists, have deployed several ideological frames to justify and motivate 
collective violence. Violent militants usually justify carrying out inhumane conduct by 
deactivating self-inhibitory norms against violent behavior. They do this through several 
mechanisms that can be explained upon examining the phenomenon of violence in 
general.121 
C. The Phenomenon of Violence 
The phenomenon of religious-based violence cannot be explained by one simple 
direct answer, rather a set of factors are always presented as a possible explanation. 
Moreover, in the case of the EJI, the well-established answers do not seem to give a 
logical explanation for their radicalization; to the contrary, more questions are even 
raised. It seems that the EJI was unique both in radicalization, as much as it was unique 
in de-radicalization. The factors leading to the violence of the EJI in particular and 
militant Islamists in general, will be portrayed in an attempt to examine the extent to 
which the EJI’s violence conforms with the explanations given to the general question 
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of: “Why Men Rebel”,122 then, the more specific question of: “Why Muslims Rebel”,123 in 
an effort to reach a final possible explanation to the most relevant question of this study: 
Why did the EJI rebel?  
The answer to this question demands discussions of the factors that set the 
context for revolt, considering not only forms of state, economic policies, external 
control, and class structure, but should add two more important elements, namely; 
ideological formation and mobilization capacity, to name but some.124The fact of the 
matter, however, is that radical Islam had been in the making for well over half a century 
in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt, the region's center of gravity. Several factors 
are suggested as explanations for the emergence of religious violence in general during 
the seventies in Egypt. These explanations include political vacuum, the failure of any 
alternative opposition – other than Islamic -  in gaining popular support, the failure of 
secular ideologies in compromising between the Islamic values and the modernity 
process, the westernization of the political leadership, the loss of role models,  the 1967 
defeat , the Arab- Israeli conflict, the Western prejudices towards Israel in addition to 
political suppression of the Muslim youth after 1965, the year of the second clash of 
Nasser with the MB and the impact of the economic policies of Sadat leading to the 
alienation of the youth.125. 
In the case of the EJI, some of the common violence interpreting factors are not 
in full conformity with the classical violence motivating explanations, while others seem 
to be, to a large extent, in compliance to these explanations. Among the controversial 
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examined factors in the case of the EJI are the political oppression, economic 
deprivation and discontent with the regimes’ secular tendencies. Among those in 
conformity with violence explanations are text misinterpretation (legacy of extremism), 
the set of distinguishing characteristics of the EJI (the demographic nature of the 
Upper Egyptian component of the EJI members, the youth factor, absence of an 
independent scheme of action and loyalty to the group), the influence of the MB 
religious rhetoric, and finally resource mobilization. 
As for political suppression and exclusion, the common assumption is that 
definitely, the most fundamental human response to the use of force is 
counterforce.126During the Nasserite period suppressive security approach was applied 
with opposition altogether. Qutb, who was tortured in prison, argued that the Egyptian 
military and its brutal persecution of Islamic activists proved that it was non-Islamic, or 
pagan. The Takfīr and Hijra group’s leader, Shoukri Mostafa said “it is impossible that they 
torture us and still be considered Muslims”.127Faraj - al-Jihad Group’s ideologue - went one 
step further, saying that the state's determination to crush Islamic activism made all 
courses of action futile with the exception of violent attempts to overthrow the ruler.128 
During Sadat’s presidency, however, the only recorded state-violence incident 
was the September Detention Decisions in 1981, which included all opposition actors, 
yet only the Islamists answered back by assassinating Sadat. As expressed by one of 
them: “Khalid (al- Islambulli) had the idea of assassinating Sadat, he was definitely affected by 
the imprisonment of his brother Moḥammad (in the September detentions), and a group of 
religious scholars to which he was attached, he considered the arrests, as a war on 
                                                          
126
 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., p. 232. 
127
 Al-Zayyat, al-Jamaʿāt al-Islamiyya, op. cit., p. 38. 
128
 Idem.  
 53 
 
Islam”.129However, during Mubarak’s presidency, the state violence went to its extreme 
level and was described to be the worst ever among the three regimes.130 Mubarak 
criticized the initial trials of dialogue with the Islamists calling it “ḥuwar al-ṭurshan” (the 
dialogue of the deaf) and one of his ministers of Interior Affairs, Genral Zaki Badr (1986-
1990), announced the policy of “al-ḍarb fi suwaidā’ al qalb”131 indicating the intention to 
give the Islamists a deadly blow in retaliation for their violence. The EJI answered back 
by attempting Badr’s life, and according to Ali al-Sherif, one of the EJI historical leaders: 
“when the minister of interiors said that the new policy is stabbing the Islamists in the heart, we 
thought of defending ourselves otherwise we would be extirpated”.132 
Such empirical data would seem to emphasize the assumption of the causal 
relationship between state repression and the violence of militant groups, in other 
words, “a vicious circle of repressive autocrats breeding violent theocrats”.133However, in the 
case of EJI, whereas repression contributed to the radicalization of the EJI starting the 
early 1980s culminating in the assassination of Sadat, and the production of fiqh al-ʿunf 
literature during the prison period in Mubarak era, it has also contributed to the revision 
of both the behavior and ideology of the EJI, as admitted by the EJI leadership.134 
Moreover, the Interviewed historical leaders and some writings by core members 
emphasized the degree of unlimited freedom granted to them by Sadat. Najeḥ Ibrahim 
and karam Zuhdi described how they took advantage of the continued forbearance and 
indulgence of Sadat “the more he became forbearing, the more aggressive the preachers 
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became in attacking him”.135 In the end, he was assassinated by them, and according to 
one of the observers: “The freedom that was granted to these groups (to the youths of 1970s) 
was intoxicating, for these young activists, filled with a false sense of their own power, thought 
that anything was possible”.136Moreover, one of the interviewed ex-core members of the 
more radical Jihad Group stated that 1970s generation did not suffer from any political 
repression or cruel imprisonment conditions and torture, to the contrary, all the 
circumstances were set to produce a psychologically and ideologically sound and 
balanced generation, but the Islamists lost all the offered opportunities,137and as put by 
the EJI leaders: “If I could turn time back, we wouldn’t have killed Sadat, we would have 
appreciated his value”.138 
Consequently, the factor of political and security repression does not seem to 
provide a convincing explanation for the violence of the EJI. Other factors as economic 
deprivation and discontent with the secular regime tendency will be examined in an 
effort to either consider or eliminate them as possible causes of the EJI violence.  
As for economic deprivation, Ted Gurr, in his seminal work “Why Men Rebel”139 
put forward the theory of relative deprivation, which linked rebellious activity to feelings 
of economic deprivation.140Nationalistic governments have further suppressed socio-
economic growth in a majority of the Muslim countries. From this poverty and social 
instability, a desire to revolutionize the political structure has arisen. This accounts for 
the majority of desirable recruits being of the male middle-to-lower-class demographic.  
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However, contrary to popular belief, a large share of the leaders of the EJI and 
dominant Islamist movements’ members and participants were rather highly educated 
and came mostly from Engineering and Medicine faculties. The interviewed leaders of 
the EJI and of al-Jihad Group totally negated this assumption confirming that even if it 
holds for the grassroots, the decision makers were not mobilized by this factor141(Tarek 
and Abbud al-Zumur, Ayman al-Ẓawahry, and Osama bin Laden, to name but some, 
came from highly prestigious economic and social backgrounds). Another empirical data 
on the regional level was the Islamic Iranian revolution which was carried out by the 
elite intelligentsia and no participation was recorded by the economically marginalized. 
In short, these participants are far from the “Third World, uneducated” perception that 
exists in many Western minds.142 
The third factor is the discontent with the political regimes’ secular 
tendencies, in other words: the “separation of the Sultan and Qur’an”.143 Many writings 
have related the accumulated anger of militant Islamists to the failure of secular 
ideologies in compromising between the Islamic values and the modernity process, in 
addition to the westernization of the political leadership. However, it was previously 
mentioned that the FaniyyaʿAskariyya coup d’état in 1974 took place when the state 
was priding itself of being the "State of Science and Faith”, Sadat was being called the 
“Faithful President” after his tactical alliance with the Islamists, and was also keen to be 
seen performing the ritual prayers. Religion, then, was just used to cover political 
objectives while winning the masses of people.144Moreover, a counter argument with 
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sound proofs defends Nasser’s stand from Islam in refutation for the claimed accusation 
of being anti-Islam or anti-religion, affirming that the clash with the MB was mainly a 
political clash rather than a religious one. Even the EJI clash with the regime was 
described by Salwa al ʿAwwa and Najeḥ Ibrahim as a mere political one. Moreover, on 
the regional level, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is witnessing religious violence although 
it is applying the Shariʿa rules (Islamic Jurisprudence).145 In addition, later empirical 
data reveal that even the “assembly of the Sultan and Qur’an” resulted in 
unprecedented violence, as in the case of Daʿish, to the extent that militant Islamists are 
described as being more of “death cults”.146 Historically, even the highest religious 
authority of the third and fourth Caliphs - ʿOthman and ʿAli - was accused of being 
deviant from religion worth to be killed for infidelity. 
Thus, the discontent with political repression, economic deprivation and deviance 
from religion still fall short of providing a reasonable causal relationship of the EJI 
violence. Four main factors will be further examined to provide an explanation of the EJI 
violence phenomenon namely: text misinterpretation, EJI special characteristics, the 
influence of the MB religious rhetoric, and most importantly resource mobilization.  
Text misinterpretation is one of the examined factors for religious-based 
violence.147 Islamists’ violence was and is still committed with cries of tahlil 148 and 
takbir149 and under ideological justification of being a “ghaḍba lillah”.150 Militant Islamists 
go as far as considering it “legitimate violence”. The inadequate religious knowledge of 
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the militants whose only tools were just enthusiasm and sharp reactions to reality was a 
direct path to radicalization.151The misinterpretation is conceived as more of "A Crisis in 
Thought", and not an original approach adopted by the Islamist movement.152The 
legacy of extremism added to this crisis of thought. The Grand Imam of al-Azhar claims 
the responsibility of the Azhar institution for "the heritage of extremism and fanaticism in the 
Islamic thought" considering that the faulty reliance on the misinterpreted fatawa of Ibn-
Taimiya further derived them to embrace harsh or violent interpretations153. 
The deviance from the moderate religious speech was further accentuated by the 
dissociation of the Islamist groups in this era from the Azhar mainstream of thought. 
None of the radical group’s members was an Azhar affiliate, except for ʿOmar ʿAbdel-
Raḥman who was considered an exceptional deviance from al-Azhar 
mainstream.154Attitudes towards al-Azhar ʿUlamāʾ among most militant groups ranged 
from indifference to hostility, viewing those ʿUlamāʾ as a group of state employees – 
bureaucrats and describing them as babbaghaw'āt al-manāber (pulpit parrots). Sheikh 
al-Baqouri (1907- 1985) was called al-Munafiquri (indicating his condemned affiliation 
with the regime) and Sheikh Gad al Ḥaq (1917-1996) was called Ḥad al-Ḥaq155 
(indicating the deviance from the right path). They invariably described those ʿUlama as 
people who would reverse religious edicts “yuḥallilūn al-ḥaram, wa yuḥarrimūn al-ḥalal” 
and were strongly advised not to pray behind them in mosques where official ʿUlama 
presided. The kidnapping and subsequent assassination of Sadat's former Minister of 
Awqāf Sheikh al-Dhahabi culminated the groups’ hostility toward Egypt's religious 
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establishment. 156 The only accepted external influence was that of the Wahhabi Salafi 
oriented trend, which builds heavily on Ibn-Taimiya.157 The text misinterpretation, so far, 
seems to introduce the first acceptable explanation for the EJI religious-based violence. 
The next examined factor is the set of the EJI’s distinguishing features of. 
The distinguishing characteristics of the EJI seem relevant in the context of 
the process of the EJI radicalization. The first feature among those characteristics was 
the demographic human component considering the high percentage of both the EJI’s 
rank and file and its leadership who came from such Upper Egyptian cities as Asyuṭ, 
Sohag and Beni Swaif. The people in these regions tend to be more alienated from 
Cairo from those in the north, they are also more prone to blood feuds and other 
violence, and due to their firm psychological nature they tend to enforce their ideas 
aggressively. Moreover, the large number of Christians in these regions exacerbated 
Muslim extremists’ sentiments.158 
 A second feature was the relative immaturity of the EJI members considering 
their young age group, and as put by Najeḥ Ibrahim ”the ere of Sadat was the most 
prosperous for the daʿwa in Egypt, but we were not satisfied by this, the youth always wishes for 
more”.159It can be easily said that while the official regimes were unable to absorb the 
youth and find outlet for their energy and enthusiasm, the Islamist movements were 
able to provide this alternative.160Moreover, sometimes violence came in the context of 
search for identity, leadership and political ambitions: “they created an imaginary state that 
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did not exist in reality”.161This Ideological immaturity was a characteristic of all Islamist 
groups acting at that time. 
A third feature of the EJI was the absence of a defined independent scheme of 
thought and action during the formation and radicalization phase. This subjected them 
to become absorbed into the defined scheme of the more radical Jihad Group.162The 
Jihad’s ideological doctrine; al-Fariḍa al-Ghāʿiba, considered jihad as an equivalent to 
armed combat, and considered it as an end per se. According to Ḥabib,163 the merge 
with the Jihad Group was the reason for the tragic transformation towards radicalization.  
This explains why after being imprisoned, the EJI sought to dissociate itself from the 
Jihad Group by developing its own Charter of Islamic action.   
A fourth and final important feature of the set of characteristics of the EJI, as 
defined by one of the historical leaders,164 was the exaggerated sense of and loyalty 
and alignment to the group. This factor is a characteristic of the Islamist movement in 
general. Over appreciation for the group, intermarriages, and excessive sense of 
devotion that subconsciously transcended even the loyalty to the creed of Islam 
characterized the zealous members to the extent that members would “tolerate insults to 
Islam and would not tolerate insulting the Jamaʿa”.165  
After examining the two factors of text misinterpretation and the characteristics of 
the EJI as more possible motives for radicalization, a third possible factor will be 
examined. All the interviewed members of both the EJI leaders and al-Jihad, in addition 
to several studies, emphasized the influence of the religious rhetoric of the MB 
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members. MB members, who could not depart from sharing the same Qutb’s 
“psychology of the prisoner”166were regularly invited as prominent spokesmen to the 
university lectures held by the jamaʿāt. The emphasis on the atrocities committed 
towards the MB by the Nasserite era ignited unjustified anger of the Islamists towards 
the tolerant Sadat regime. This inability of the MB’s members to let go the residuals of 
the painful memories,167 was of no good except in fueling the unjustified discontent with 
the official authority in the subconscious of the Islamist youngsters as described by 
Najeḥ Ibrahim: “we would talk about torture when there was no torture at all”.168 Later on, the 
EJI leaders avoided this rhetoric after their release from the prisons in an effort to evade 
creating a similar cycle of inherited violence. Nowhere in their new ideology comes any 
mentioning of the details of their sufferings from any unlawful security measures torture: 
“we were deeply deluded by the exaggerations that we heard about the clash of the Nasserite 
regime with the Islamists as if it was an intended plan”.
169
  
The final critical factor to explain the religious-based violence of the EJ and the 
militant Islamists in Egypt is resource mobilization. Belief in both the utility and 
desirability of violence (through ideological justification) can motivate men to organize 
and participate in political violence especially if they are in some degree discontent.170 
Recruitment was made easy in the context of the success of Islamic fundamentalists to 
channel public discontent with the economic and political conditions into support for an 
Islamic regime, especially in the context of the wide freedom granted to them during 
Sadat’s presidency period. In general, discontent allows men to believe violence against 
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political actors is both justified and potentially useful in enhancing or defending their 
value positions. The failures of increasingly discredited secular forms of nationalism 
strengthened new voices who appealed to an Islamic alternative.171 
On the other hand, the1970s Egyptian Islamists’ time spent in academia has 
helped them to understand how social rebellion can change the course of a civilization, 
and their knowledge of the Islam of the past, which is seen as “a true Islamic society”. 
Moreover, the socio-economic charitable role of these religious groups competed for the 
loyalty of their citizens and the legitimacy of their own political power.172 As for financial 
support, it was not an easy task; but was made possible by several financing channels. 
Sadat’s regime publicly supported the university activities of the Islamist groups. Later 
on, stealing Christian-owned gold shops was legitimized as a source of financing their 
violent attacks, in addition to the suspected external role of Sudan and Iran and the 
announced logistic and financial support of Saudi Arabia and USA and even the 
Egyptian regime (Afghani mujahidīn).  
To sum it up, the militant Islamists were radicalized through a multilayered set of 
factors.173 Misinterpretation and false apprehensions have steered the course of the 
general opinion of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. 174In addition, the EJI was able 
to radicalize its affiliates considering its special characteristics and ability of resources 
mobilization. Religion was a vehicle to mobilize deprivation and discontent and takfīr 
was the ideal and fastest means to express the bitter reality.175 Militant Islamists have 
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relied on several ideological frames to justify and motivate collective violence. Violent 
militants carried out inhumane conduct by deactivating self-inhibitory norms against 
violent behavior. They did this through ethical justification of violence and displacement 
of responsibility for violence by shifting it onto its victim’s.176 The threat posed by 
“oppressors” was heightened and the struggle was portrayed as a total war against 
corrupt and irredeemable enemies, thus facilitating moral disengagement. Religion was 
misused to serve their anarchistic tendencies. They thought they were in a war where 
anything was allowed.177  
In conclusion, while Islamist movements are not alone in perpetrating violence as 
militant Christians, Jews, Buddhists, and Sikhs have also been inspired by their 
religious beliefs to engage in violence. With regard to Islamic fundamentalism, those 
who desire this return to the “fundamentals” do so because they feel that today’s 
changing modern world is blemishing the “sanctity” or “purity” of Islam and therefore that 
a return to the religion’s basics will preserve the faith and provide for a morally just life 
for its believers.  
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“If we eschew violence, it is not because of any moral imperative, 
but it is because violence cannot change human beings”.  
Jayaprakash Narrayan,  
“The Nature of the Revolutionary Situation Around the world”. 
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Chapter Three 
III. The Re-thinking Initiative: De-legitimization of Violence 
A. Emergence of the Initiative  
After the EJI had entered into a violent confrontation with the regime and failed, it 
was only natural that they revise the “ideology of failure”; in order to establish an 
“ideology of success”.178 On the 5th of July 1997, during one of the military tribunals of 
the EJI members, Moḥammad al-Amin ‘Abdel- ‘Alīm, asked the generals presiding over 
the tribunal for a word. To the surprise of everyone, including security officials, and even 
other EJI members, he announced a statement179on behalf of the historical leaders 
renouncing -violence and calling EJI affiliates to renounce all military operations at 
home and abroad.180After much bloodshed, the Jamaʿa, that long glorified violence, 
made a complete shift in the violent ideological and behavioral stance held by the group 
since the late 1970s.  
Not only did the EJI dismantle its armed wings as a proof to its credibility, but it 
also published a series of well-argued renouncing violence doctrines (Murajaʿāt) 
authored by members of the consultative council (Majlis al-Shura) of the group. The 
initiative, which was called in the media the "Initiative for Renouncing Violence", 
succeeded in freeing around 15,000 to 20,000 of the group, hence driving them away, 
at that time, from the path of militancy.181 
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The declaration of the Initiative passed through four phases over a period of 
about five consecutive years.182The first phase was the announcement of the intent to 
shift to the non-violent path which necessitated the internal consensus of the leadership. 
The second was the Ideological contextualization of the new ideology through issuing 
the series known as “Silsilat Taṣḥiḥ al-Mafāhīm” authored and revised by eight 
members of the Majlis al-Shura. The third was convincing the affiliates and the 
grassroots with the new ideology, taking into consideration that the Initiative was taken 
by the imprisoned historical leadership, without approval from the leaders outside prison 
and abroad. The last phase was appealing to the Egyptian people and to the whole 
Muslim community. In addition, before the 1997 initiative, at least 14 attempts were 
made, the most notable of which was the one made by al-Azhar scholars starting 1988, 
and the one made by the so-called “Lagnat al-Wusaṭāʾ” (Mediation Committee) in 1993.  
The Initiative came as a surprise to many parties including the EJI members 
themselves. The security forces reacted cautiously and even suspiciously in the 
beginning.183Internally, the Initiative came as a blow to the leaders in exile to the extent 
that Ayman al-Ẓawahri, leading the opposition from outside, considered the Initiative as 
a “surrender”, and enlisted two main figures among the EJI to sabotage the Initiative by 
carrying out a massive attack on November 17th 1997 in Luxor leaving 71 death 
casualties, 58 of which were tourists. Rifaʿi Ṭaha, who headed Majlis al-Shura abroad, 
took responsibility for the massacre which was the last violent act by the EJI. This 
almost came as a death blow to the iIitiative causing it to halt for the successive three 
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coming years. However, the Initiative managed to came into action again by the year 
2001. Another death blow, which raised the suspicions of the spectators and the 
security authorities, came in 1998 with the declaration of Rifāʿi Ṭaha of joining “al-Jabha 
al-Islamiyya al-ʿAlamiyya li Muḥarabat al Yahūd wa al-Ṣalibiyyīn” (World Islamic Front 
for Fighting the Jews and the Crusaders) of al-Qaida. However, the historical leaders 
from within the jails declared their objection, and Rifāʿi Ṭaha was removed from the 
Majlis al-Shura and was forced to draw from the Front, not long after signing it. The 
leadership consensus about the unilateral ceasefire was reached only on March 28, 
1999, when the leaders in Egypt and abroad declared their unconditional support for the 
Initiative. ʿOmar Abel-Raḥman, the spiritual leader in exile initially supported it.184 
Externally, the reactions to the Initiative were divided into three opinions: the first 
categorized it as a deal with the government in exchange for mutual benefits for both 
parties, the second considered it as submission and surrender due to strong security 
pressures, and the third considered it as a real ideological reassessment and behavioral 
transformation. The suspicions included those regarding the Initiative as a kind of 
dissimulation “taqiyyah” that the EJI resorted to as a result of failure, believing that if 
there was a chance for them to go back to violence, they would.185  
B. Transformation Factors 
The factors that led to the Initiative can be divided into internal and external 
factors. The internal factors include the organizational nature of the EJI, especially its 
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leadership, and the effect of imprisonment. The external factors include the security 
approach, the political regime agenda, and civic actors. 
1. Internal Factors  
a. Organizational Nature of the EJI 
         It could be said that organizationally wise, the Initiative passed peacefully without 
any disintegration from within the group, nor any bloodshed. According to Najeḥ 
Ibrahim, this was a great success because when a similar initiative took place in other 
groups it was faced with great opposition as the case in the Jihad Group causing deep 
internal conflicts. 
It is crucial in the analysis of any movement’s behavioral evolution to differentiate 
between the reasons that led to the emergence of these movements and the reasons 
that led to resorting to violence, as violence may by accidental to its nature, which is the 
case of the EJI.186As mentioned earlier, the EJI emerged from a much broader peaceful 
student movement. Unlike the Jihad Group which emerged as a dissident from the 
militant Faniyya ʿAskariyya Group, the roots of the EJI go back to the “Religious 
Committee” that was formed in the universities during the early seventies for daʿwa 
purposes.187Moreover, the main reason for the split with al-Jihad Group was the 
divergent organizational orientations of the two tendencies in the1980s. While the EJI’s 
tendency aimed to build a mass movement through public preaching and direct action, 
al-Jihad wanted to form a disciplined clandestine organization capable of launching a 
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decisive strike against the state. The EJI’s “vice squad”,188 that was established to 
combat immoral behavior in public places was only a temporary, but a tempting shift in 
the original structure of the group. And although” violence is a temptation, it leaves you in 
the predicament of how to get out of it”
189 yet, the EJI was able to get out. In addition, it was 
targeting the “near enemy”, so when it came in good terms with this “near enemy” - the 
regime - violence lost its momentum. When violence reaches a “saturation point”, it 
starts to decline. The EJI realized that it had reached this point of saturation. On the 
ideological level, the EJI initially belonged to the groups which perceived the violent 
combat as a means to an end unlike other groups as al-Jihad which perceived it as a 
“sacred” end per se.190  
The local Upper Egyptian rural nature of the human component of the EJI which 
once facilitated violence also facilitated the acceptance of renouncing violence. 
Following the “paternal” leaders was a deep rooted habit that facilitated compliance with 
their respected decisions.191Many writings interpret the compliance of the EJI grassroots 
to the state of “high respect” to the members of the Majlis al-Shura, which is a 
repeatedly mentioned theme in many writings192considering the tribal-like habits of 
following the chief of the tribe or the senior person in the extended family.  Social bonds, 
intermarriages and similarities contributed to the domino effect of spreading the 
acceptance of the Initiative. Moreover, unlike the Jihad, the EJI was a local Egyptian 
movement which worked on mass scale in poor villages and city slums. The local nature 
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of the EJI protected it from influential external impact and support (though hindered the 
Initiative for a while after its declaration) which also served to prevent the globalization 
of its terror as happened in al-Jihad Group case. In Addition, the decision making 
process was fairly democratic as exemplified by the Majlis al-Shura and practiced on a 
mass approval basis. This process was noticeably reflected in the prolonged dialogue 
between the leaders and their grassroots during their tours in the prisons for explaining 
the Initiative. All points of view were expressed and discussed, and consensus was 
always sought by the leaders. 
Among the factors that had also contributed to the de-radicalization process was 
the special nature of the leadership of the EJI. It is known that change in general, and 
change towards de-radicalization in particular, is often surrounded with accusations of 
“betraying the struggle”193 in the view of many militant  Islamist movements. Thus only 
through a charismatic leadership that is perceived by the majority of followers “credible, 
pious, Islamically knowledgeable, and with a history of struggle”,194 could such a 
process by accepted. The imprisoned “historical leadership” had presented the spiritual 
leadership replacing that of ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman (since the latter’s imprisonment in 
the USA following 9/11) around which the members rallied around in times of crises for 
psychological and spiritual comfort. The second generation of leaders outside the 
prisons, which executed decisions and administered the group’s affairs on a daily basis, 
derived their legitimacy from the former.195According to one of the second line leaders, 
Mamdouḥ Youssef,:  “we accepted the Initiative because we trusted that it originated sincerely 
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from our leaders, whom we know would never be weakened under any kind of pressures”.196 
More importantly, they were able to break the taboo set by the militant jihadi trend which 
condemned any cooperation with the political regime as “al-ḥiwār maʿa al tawāghīt, 
maqbrat al daʿwa wa al-duʿāh” as stated in the Jihad’s famous decree”.197 And although 
most of the arguments in the literature were not new, the message bearers made a 
difference. The appeal to the masses was made easier because it was their leaders 
who called them to the Initiative, and as put by one of the former commanders of the 
EJI’s armed wing: “hearing the arguments directly from the sheikhs (EJI leaders) was different, 
we heard these arguments before from the Salafis and from al-Azhar, but we did not accept 
them. We only accepted them from the sheikhs because we knew their history.”198The leaders 
cared for their members and when the  prison administration decided to put detainees 
from different ideological backgrounds in the same cell, the leaders rejected these 
mixed prison cells as they were worried that the more radical takfīr ideology would 
appeal to its members or that they would be affected by the raised criticism to the 
Initiative.199 
Another important factor was the perseverance of the leaders who had the idea 
of the Initiative in mind and kept pursuing it. They were able to gain the trust of both the 
regime and the EJI members twenty years later. The historical leaders toured all known 
political detention centers and prisons, from Damanhūr in the north to al-Wadī al-Jadīd 
and Asyuṭ in the south, for a period of 10 months in 2002. These tours aimed to 
illustrate the new ideological perspectives, and then to address the questions, 
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comments, and critiques of the members.200 The leaders would discuss the four new 
books, followed by an extended period of questions and answers. The leaders would 
also meet the members in their cells to discuss the new ideology in small groups. The 
leaders considered these meetings as being one of the main reasons for the relative 
success of the Initiative.201 
The leaders were also able to read the history of similar contemporary Islamist 
experiences, avoiding mistakes and benefiting from successful ones. In their 
conferences, and interviews, they mentioned that their fear of an Algerian- like scenario 
was among the motives behind the Initiative,202 by which they meant fear of the loss of 
control over their followers and the fragmentation of the EJI during the confrontation 
period. This logic is still present in the leader’s mindset as they constantly blame fellow-
Islamists for choosing the unsuccessful path of clash with the regime instead of exerting 
equal efforts in reconciliation. 
The virtue of self-criticism and introspection were amongst the leaders’ 
distinguishing characteristics203as it takes a special psychological nature that allows 
people to reconsider their actions.204 Moreover, they never blamed the regime for their 
militancy, nor did they resort to the usual conspiracy theory for justification of their 
violence. They claimed full responsibility for misleading their followers by propagating all 
violence mis-conceptions causing a large scale of damage to the society and the state. 
Karam Zuhdi announced his readiness to tolerate any resulting consequences or 
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costs.205 “Not only should we possess the braveness to refrain from any harmful action, but we 
should also be brave enough to declare this action as erroneous and to regress from it”.206 
b. Effect of Imprisonment 
Imprisonment is definitely a painful and disturbing experience. However, in spite of 
the well-known negative impacts of the imprisonment, it had three positive effects that 
had contributed to de-radicalization process of the EJI. Firstly, the sufferings and 
miseries resulting from the long and cruel prison conditions derived them to reconsider 
the utility of their actions compared to the costs. Some former detainees recalled being 
held in solitary cells in the Scorpion prison for years to the extent that when they were 
released 1997, the last news they had heard about the world was in 1993.207 Not only 
did the arrested individuals suffer, but also their families, especially during the Mubarak 
era, which was described as the worst.  It all shows in the opening dedication in one of 
his books: “To my dear mother, who wandered all of the prisons of Egypt following me, my 
father and my brothers. She was not familiar with that because the only place she used to know 
was the small Dayrouṭ village. She left it just because of us. My deepest regards and respect to 
you”. 208     
Prisons severely affected hygiene and health conditions, and in some cases 
resulted in deaths. Outside prisons, the families of those detainees were suffering from 
economic deprivation, social alienation, and systematic discrimination by the state. 
Yusuf argued, “If God was on their side, these things would not have happened to the EJI 
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members and their families”. He concluded that there has to be something “theologically 
wrong”, with the decision to confront the regime”.209The second positive effect of 
imprisonment was on the intellectual level. The imprisonment allowed a chance for deep 
contemplation and reassessment due to the state of isolation over the long years of 
detention away from the details of everyday struggle with the regime outside the jails. 
All interviewees of the EJI and al-Jihad Group agreed that the imprisonment gave them 
the chance to mature thinking and reconsidering their stances. The third remarkably 
positive effect of imprisonment is that it sets people free from communal pressure. 210 
Paradoxically, the threat of prison provides protection from life endangering threats. It is 
speculated that had these leaders announced the renouncing violence from outside the 
jails, they might have been subjected to material and intellectual harassment by militant 
jihadi groups as happened elsewhere.211  
To sum up, the internal factors of the organizational structure, leadership and 
imprisonment enabled the EJI historical leaders to mobilize human and intellectual 
resources towards the process of de-radicalization. Still to be considered, the external 
factors that contributed to that process.  
2. External Factors  
Among the examined external factors for having an impact on the emergence of 
the Initiative are: the security approach, the political regime agenda and the element of 
the civic actors. As mentioned earlier, the radical groups’ disintegration occur either due 
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to defeat by repression or due to the change to the legitimate political path.212 Initiatives 
can come from “above” through state officials or security agencies proposing policies 
and setting out guidelines for action as primarily happened in Egypt. Also, initiatives can 
be formulated and implemented from “below” by civic actors such as NGOs, religious 
authorities, and ex-activists from radical groups. in Egypt, the focus was not so much on 
prevention of radicalization as it was on ideological revisions and re-integration of the 
tens of thousands of members.213 
a. Security Approach 
It is well-known that authoritative coercion in the service of the state is a crucial 
concept in political theory; some have identified the distinctive characteristic of the state 
as its “monopoly of physical coercion”.214The EJI and other militant Islamists were faced 
with such coercive measures taken to their highest level in response to their militancy. 
The security crackdown on Islamists started right after Sadat’s assassination. All 
possible confrontational activities, were applied by the security forces ranging from 
campaigns of mass arrests, chasing Islamists out of the city mosques, military trials, 
executions and alleged widespread police torture. Towards the end of the 1980s and 
the early 1990s, the EJI’s violence (in addition to other jihadi groups) had exhausted the 
Egyptian security forces to the extent that the security became occupied mainly with 
combating religious violence rather than criminal violence.215The established applied 
policy was “al-ʿunf wa al-‘unf al-muḍad” (deterring the militants’ violence with counter 
security violence), and “al-ḍarb fi suwaidāʾ al qalb” (stabbing through the heart). 
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In the meantime, the gradual and slow reconciliation efforts were taking place 
inside the prisons on the side of the EJI on one hand, and the State Security 
Department senior officers on the other hand. Both parties were aspiring to find an 
alternative path to end this crisis. The security officials involved in such efforts were 
doing so on personal basis and carried the burden of trusting the repenting Islamists 
and convincing higher authorities in the Security Department and the political regime of 
the utility of such efforts.216The importance of ideological dialogue at this stage shows in 
the story told by one of the core members describing how the dialogue with the security 
officer pecked him as he was stunned by the officer’s logic arguing how the EJI 
members justified their attacks as being in retaliation to the security’s attacks telling him 
“if we (security officers) committed actions that are deviant from correct religious rules, what 
about you? Don’t you represent religion? How can you commit such deviant attacks just 
because you are retaliating and countering our (security officers) attacks?” Mamdouḥ 
proceeds to describe how he kept pondering on this conversation in his prison for days 
and how this resulted in further introspection. 217 
By early 1989, the EJI presented the so-called “six demands” appeal,218 the 
demands included releasing all detainees who were not charged, ceasing torture, 
Improving the prison conditions, releasing female hostages who were taken to force 
male relatives to surrender to police forces, re-opening the EJI mosques that were shut 
down, and ceasing the policy of renewing detention indefinitely.219Although the 
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demands were rejected due to security doubts,220however this indicated that a process 
of negotiations was taking place. It was only when the EJI leadership ceded all of these 
demands that a turning point happened allowing the security forces to start considering 
the Initiative seriously.221 
Gradually, the Initiative was in the making due to the sincere efforts of the State 
Security Officer: General Ahmad Ra’fat (Haj Mostafa Rifʿat) 222 head of Combating-
Fanaticism Section in the State Security Department who succeeded the previously 
assassinated General Khairat. According to several testimonies and writings on the 
subject, Raʾfat exerted great effort,223 not only that he believed in the Initiative, but that 
he held the responsibility of embarking on such a risky mission in spite of the doubts of 
the ruling regime and the risks of being attacked by the opposing members outside jail 
for being suspected of forcing the EJI leaders to accept the Initiative. He was able to 
convince the senior officers to give the EJI the benefit of the doubt, he toured the jails 
with the leaders and he even supplied them with whatever religious books they 
requested to read during their search for the correct ideological interpretations.224      
After the intervention of Ra’fat, the security approach entered a new phase of 
positive interaction with the Initiative. The first level was improving the prison conditions 
in addition to a number of inducements including ceasing systematic torture in prisons, 
gradual release of the imprisoned members and leaders, the payment of social 
pensions to their families, the allowance of conjugal visits for the first time in Egypt 
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where members were allowed to get married and some had children while in prison, the 
improvement of prison meals, prison visits were allowed again since it was banned in 
1992, and the conditions of visits gradually improved as described by one of the former 
detainees that they were allowed to sit with their families with no fences in between.225 
The second level took place by December 2001,226 the leaders were allowed to tour the 
prisons, and in 2002 the gradual release of the leaders and members, first in groups of 
hundreds and then in thousands started to take place.227From this step onwards, the 
political regime had a say with what was going on with the Initiative. 
b. Political Regime Agenda 
When the historical leaders declared the Initiative in 1997, there was no apparent 
coordination with the state, 228and the regime stepped cautiously towards responding to 
the Initiative. After the news about the early secret negotiations of the security 
department with the EJI militants reached Mubarak, he was angered and the resignation 
of ʿAbdel Ḥalīm Moussa, the minister of Interior Affairs then followed the news leak. The 
government did not respond to the prior calls by the jailed leaders in July 1996 (an 
earlier initiative by Khalid Ibrahim ‘amir of Aswan during a tribunal). By that time, the 
only approach adopted by the regime was to decapitate the Islamists. The government 
ignored the imprisoned leaders’ calls motivated by what was believed to be successful 
anti-terrorist measures that had pushed violence out of the country.229 
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It is worth mentioning that this was not the regime’s political approach during 
Mubarak’s early presidency. EJI members charged in the assassination of more than 68 
members of the police forces at Asyuṭ Security Department on 8 October 1981 were 
rather leniently sentenced on 30 September 1984, only 58 received sentences of prison 
under high security or hard labor out of 299 defendants requested for death by the 
General Prosecutor. Moreover, as early as mid-1980s the regime’s tried to isolate the 
extremists by launching a campaign of repentance, widely broadcasted over Egyptian 
television,230 and re-transcribed in the newspapers. Professors from al-Azhar, and other 
Muslim intellectuals also participated in the campaign.231 
However, as the violence of the EJI and other militant Islamists escalated by the 
early 1990s, Mubarak ended his policy of the initial distinction between the “good” and 
“bad” Muslims,232 which he adopted upon his early presidency period. Now all Islamists 
were considered “bad”, including the MB. Harsh security measures replaced the tolerant 
ones.233 The clash with the Islamists then reached its peak, especially after the 
assassination attempt of Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995.234The shift of Mubarak 
regime toward accepting the Initiative was therefore very significant. It is claimed that 
after 9/11the regime shifted towards the re-containment of the escalated Islamists’ 
threat. 235The Egyptian component of the 9/11 attack put some blame on the Egyptian 
regime. Form this point, the Egyptian regime tried to prove that it is in control, 
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henceforth, the Initiative gained momentum from 2001 onwards.236Mubarak’s response 
shifted from “all stick, no carrot” to a more reconciliatory one237and the approach of 
dialogue was given green light, and the media gave extensive coverage of the 
transformations, and the regime went as far as disseminating the EJI Re-thinking books. 
And according to Najeḥ Ibrahim: “And this wise policy was fruitful in consolidating the 
Initiative” to the extent that some of the members voluntarily turned themselves in to 
security forces. 238 
c. Civic Actors 
It is well-known that for a major change to happen, a catalyst is needed to 
mediate between conflicting parties.239 Civic actors including ex-activists and religious 
authorities are usually a part in the making of de-radicalization and disengagement 
policies.240 Civic actors represent competent and credential figures, being non-
governmental actors which might be an important factor in its own.241 Furthermore, their 
deep ideological knowledge of firsthand knowledge of being an ex-activist has proven 
important for establishing the respect, trust, and legitimacy needed to build successful 
interaction with radicalized youngsters. 242 
In the case of the EJI, the new catalyst was the “Committee of Mediators”. It first 
started in 1987 with the voluntary intervention of Sheikh al-Shaʿarawi, but was 
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immediately aborted when an imprisoned group of al-Jihad made an escape trial.243 The 
second committee was formed in 1993 by the famous lawyer and Islamic Scholar Dr. 
Moḥammad Salim Al-‘Awwa including Sheikh Al-Sha’rawi, Sheikh Al-Ghazāli, Fahmi 
Huwaydi and Dr. Ahmad Kamal Abul-Majd, all of whom were known to be prominent 
Islamic figures.244  
However, the Initiative received another blow but this time from leaking the news 
to the media, raising suspicions and opposition for holding any kind of reconciliation with 
the “terrorists” and considering this as a mere maneuver. These suspicions were 
confirmed when it was followed by an attempt to assassinate the minister of mass-
media Ṣafwat al-Sherif by the military wing of the EJI in 1994 outside the prison led by 
the second generation who wanted to send the imprisoned leaders a message of 
consolidation. They interpreted the reconciliation efforts as pressures being exerted on 
the imprisoned leaders. However, the gap widened and more effort had to be put from 
the EJI leaders inside prisons to prove their intentions. In any case, while it appeared 
that the committee of mediators did not reach a direct and successful conflict resolution 
in the real sense of the word, it was definitely a step forward in the process of 
reconciliation.  
The media was a second crucial civic actor as it played a central role in giving 
the Initiative entry points to the Egyptian masses. Montasser al- Zayyat played a key 
role in this respect by publishing a seasonal periodical under the name of “Murajaʿāt” in 
which this phenomenon was put under study.245 In addition, some journalists played an 
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important role in advocating the attempts of ideological de-radicalization in prisons 
including Diyaʾ Rashwān (a researcher in the ACPSS then) and then the “al-Shark al-
Awsat al-Dawliyya” newspaper under the responsibility of ‘Abdel-Latif Al-Manāwi, (the 
head of Cairo branch then) which published a survey and summary to all the Re-
thinking Doctrines that were published after the first four ones. In addition, “al-Ḥayyah” 
newspaper published all the EJI’s announcements. However, the real introduction to the 
Egyptian people came from the journalist Makram Moḥammad Aḥmad (editor-in-chief of 
Dar al-Hilal and al-Musawwar magazine) who was allowed to hold interviews with the 
EJI leaders, attend the tours to the prisons (al-ʿAqrab and Wadi al-Naṭrun) and to 
publish the details of these meetings allowing a large sect of Egyptians to be introduced 
to the Initiative.  
To sum up, the occurrence of the Initiative came as an outcome of the interaction 
between the internal and external factors. Now the EJI was moving from the state of 
defeat by repression, to the state of the transformation to legitimate political path. 
Moreover, another shift will be examined in relation to the wealth of the de-legitimizing 
violence literature produced. 
C. Re-thinking Doctrines  
The analysis of the Re-thinking doctrines in this study will focus on analyzing the 
new ideology from four main aspects: the general features, the ideological shift, the 
impact on the behavioral transformation, and the indications of the new Re-
thinking Doctrines. Furthermore, the elements of the success of the Initiative 
considering its impact will be examined in the end. 
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The historical leaders embarked, while still behind bars, on presenting a new 
vision that surpasses the duality of faith and infidelity, and the duality of violent 
confrontation with the ruler or passive acceptance. The general features of the new 
doctrines can be comprehended by the comparison with similar efforts in the field. 
Considering that ideological reassessments are either; constructive / preemptive or 
remedial / corrective, 246 the EJI’s Initiative falls under the latter type of remedial / 
corrective initiatives, characterized by the ideological and theological reassessment of 
radicalism through dialogue and proof. Similar precedents in the Islamic history include 
that of ʿAli ibn Abī-Talib and ʿOmar ʿAbdel-ʿAziz with the Khawarij.247Moreover, the re-
thinking revisions usually come in two levels, as in the case of the EJI: the first level 
depends on revising the ideas which employ violence to impose certain ideas on society 
and/or change the status quo, the second level is changing the view about the society 
itself, recognizing the state’s democracy, citizenship, acknowledging rights for all 
citizens, the status of women, and other ideological, social, and political issues.248 
The Islamist movements in general elaborated four kinds of ideological re-
thinking initiatives. The first is of theological and conceptual nature as “Duʿāh la Quḍah” 
of MB leader Ḥassan al-Huḍaybi, and “Ẓahirat al-Ghuluww fi al-Takīir” by al-Qaraḍawi. 
The second is of political nature reconsidering the legitimacy of political participation 
and other concepts.249 The third kind is of methodological nature shifting the behavioral 
course of action from pursuing the establishment of an Islamic state to the 
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establishment of religion. Finally, the fourth kind is of organizational and structural 
nature where the movement is restructured and military wings are disengaged and 
underground activities are halted. The EJI Renouncing- Violence Initiative, can be 
considered to have included and applied the four types altogether. 
The methodology and the language of the doctrines give further understanding of 
the general features of the doctrines. The methodology followed in the doctrines in 
relation to the sources of reference is the total reliance on authentic legal proofs from al-
Qur’an and Sunna in supporting every piece of argument throughout the doctrines, with 
a stress on mentioning the authenticity of every prophetic tradition referred to.250In 
addition, historical precedents and readings from early scholars as al-Ghazāli, the four 
main fiqhī scholars, al-Nawawi, ibn ‘Abdīn, al-Shahrestani, and ibn Taimiya, were 
commonly referred to. As for contemporary scholars, al-Qaraḍawi works were used as 
frames of reference including books like:  al- Ṣaḥwa al-Islamiyya Bayn al-Jumud wa al-
Taṭarruf”. Moreover, the linguistic analysis of the new doctrines also reveals that they 
could be considered ideological texts written in a literary style.251The language is 
eloquent, fluent and expressive to a large extent. The impact of the place and time 
context within which the doctrines emerged is very strong. The structure of the 
argument is based on a dialogue that is mostly imaginary. The authors are the group of 
historical leaders who are now considered the highest legitimate religious authority and 
their names come collectively on the covers of the early books as writers and editors 
without an intended specific sequence.  
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 The ideological shift in the new Re-thinking Doctrines is reflected in the title of 
the first four books which were issued as early as 2002-2004 under the title “Silsilat 
Taṣḥiḥ al-Mafāhīm”252(Correction of Conceptions Series). The four books of the Series 
come in around 600 pages. The doctrines come in two types: The first is the series that 
refutes the misconceptions as held by the EJI itself, which have now reached nearly 
twenty five books by the beginning of 2016. The second is the series that was 
successively issued later on, refuting the misconceptions held by other militant groups 
as al-Qaʿida (and now refuting Daʾish). These books provided an Islamically-based 
critique of al-Qaʿida’ and like- minded groups’ ideologies, strategies, and tactics. 
Another book criticized the clash of civilizations hypothesis “Hidayat al- khalāʾiq” (the 
Guidance of Mankind). Following this, the EJI was allowed to establish an official 
website, upon which the new literature was published. Some of the EJI leaders are now 
being interviewed on state-sponsored Egyptian television as well as satellite networks, 
and recently, 253 articles authored by some of the historical leaders appear in Egyptian 
newspapers on weekly basis.  
The first book of the “Correction of Conceptions Series” is titled “The Initiative for 
Ceasing Violence: a Realistic View and a legitimate Perspective”. The book generally 
addresses the practical and the ideological reasons behind the Initiative. The three 
other books, published concurrently, addressed what went "wrong" during the "jihad" 
(that is, the confrontation with the Egyptian regime), ideological extremism and 
excommunication of Muslims, and advice to those who participate in the preaching 
process of ordering the good and forbidding the evil.  
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Two main aspects of the ideological shift will be discussed: firstly the ideological 
and practical motives behind issuing the Initiative, and secondly the theoretical 
framework upon which the new ideology was based.254Firstly, the ideological and 
practical motives behind issuing the Initiative are stated in twelve points in the first book: 
“Mubadarat Waqf al-ʿUnf”. The first point emphasized how that the reassessment of 
ideas has become a mandatory religious duty “wajib sharʿi” considering the terrible 
damages “mafāsid ʿaẓīma” that had been inflicted.255The subsequent eleven points 
illuminate how the motives for the Initiative are built on the newly considered Islamic 
Jurisprudence rule of “safeguarding the interests and warding off the evils”.256 
Consequently, six interests are to be safeguarded and eight are to be warded off. The 
six interests to be safeguarded are as follows: resumption of the initial role of daʿwa as 
stated: “the freedom of da’wa was fully granted to us, but we sought to establish the Islamic 
State, so we lost both, the da’wa and the State”.257 Also, setting an example in backing-off 
from the wrong and deviated path as a religious must and also a moral courage, 
pursuing the pleasure of Allah even at the expense of the dissatisfaction of others 
“Whereas God satisfaction is the ultimate goal in Islam without regard to the wrath of the 
creature, so delinquency to peace is clearly ordered in our holy book“.258 The interests also 
included safeguarding the lives of the youth, preventing the re-occurrence of similar 
attacks, and finally relieving the nation- wide strain caused by their violence. Following 
the six interests to be safeguarded, the eight evils, which acted as push factors from 
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radicalization,259 to be prevented are listed as follows:  bloodshed, larger scale of 
arresting and repression of EJI members,260 tarnishing the image of Islam as a heavenly 
religion which consequently increased the grudge and hatred towards Muslims, the 
drain of the efforts and funds of the government which could have been devoted to a 
better path, benefitting the external enemy which freely practiced and achieved his 
strategic goals using Islamists’ violent incidents as a pretext for foreign  intervention,  
the further consolidation of misconception in the minds of the youngster, the greater evil 
of toppling the rulers, and the possible extirpation of the whole Islamist movement in 
response to its violence : “all this suffering never rendered Islam stronger or more 
immune.”261 
Secondly is the theoretical framework upon which the ideological shift was based. 
The EJI now realized that, ideologically, they used false standards of measurement and 
corrupt analogy. The analysis of the content of the doctrines reveals that the focus on 
the key concepts, as well as the hierarchy of priorities in the thought and stands of the 
EJI has largely changed. They also reflect how the EJI realized their miscalculated 
action against the Egyptian regime,262 and how the utility of the action, rather than the 
religious legitimacy is what really counts. The main religious jurisdiction rule to be 
prioritized is considering the Maqāṣid (Objectives) of the Shariʿa (the preservation of 
Religion, Life, Lineage, Intellect, and Property),263 and the main problematic issue to be 
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resolved is the revolt against the ruler. Some other key fiqhī concepts, that were 
previously rejected, were now accepted as frames of reference including: fiqh of 
priorities, considering the importance of time and place, the priority of duties, fiqh of 
consequences considering the results of the applied rule, fiqh of benefits and the evils 
taking into consideration that preventing evils precedes gaining benefits, fiqh of text 
interpretation as discriminating between what is decisive “qatʿi” and what is non- 
decisive “ẓani”, what is mandatory and what is optional, what is permanent and what is 
temporary, what is for legislative purposes and what is not. Also, fiqh of the reality which 
implies adequate understanding of the incidents upon which the religious rulings will be 
applied as stated in one of the Re-thinking books: “it is a clear error to take stances and 
decide religious rulings away from the accurate consideration of the reality”. In addition, fiqh of 
the history of previous nations and Islamic States, and fiqh of the contemporary political 
Islamic history, examining reasons for failure and success in the experience of different 
political entities, fiqh of “al-Aḥkām al-Siyadiyya” (the decisions to be taken only by the 
rulers and state institutions) considering that “war declaration and general mobilization are 
the missions entrusted to rulers at all times and places”.
264
 
 Considering the above mentioned new theoretical framework and its implications, it 
can be inferred that now the EJI ideologues had realized that the interest of the society 
determines the interpretation of the texts, rational calculations and material interests 
superseded the previously held literal orders “al-naṣ fawq al-maṣlaḥa”, the adherence to 
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which serves as an impetus to engage in armed confrontations against much stronger 
powers.265  
The third main aspect in the analysis of the new Renouncing- Violence Doctrines is 
concerned with the behavioral changes following the new theoretical framework. 
Among the behavioral implications of the new ideology is the perception of the wrong 
practices of Jihad and ḥisba and the inevitability of confrontation. Continued combat will 
not yield any benefits except more bloodshed. Most importantly, impediments to jihad 
“mawaniʿ ʿ” to the obligation of jihad were prioritized. Consequently, if the dangers 
inflicted after practicing jihad are ascertained, the religious rule of jihad becomes 
undesired or even abandoned.  Consequently, “The fairness of the cause does not 
entail the inevitability of the confrontation”.266Also, among the crucial newly adopted 
behavioral shifts is to tolerate an unjust ruler for the sake of preserving the unity of the 
umma, which was completely rejected before and which acted previously as a main 
ideological violence motivator. The Islamist movement erred seriously when it tried to 
overthrow regimes, which, no matter how decadent, cannot be declared infidel. The 
consequent harming of civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim, is forbidden in Islam. The 
focus of confrontation shifted from a clash with the local regime (near enemy) to the 
regional level of the (far enemy) in the context of the Arab Israeli conflict. Moreover the 
hostility with the secular movement was seen from a different perspective. Now they 
both shared the common concern of the burden of protecting the country from external 
threats.267In addition, the acceptance of the concept of citizenship and its implications 
the religious duty of coexisting with Egyptian Christians was introduced, and foreign 
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tourists are to be protected not attacked. The focus of action shifted from the struggle to 
guiding Muslims to the straight path. Fanaticism is the root for all militancy; hence, a 
golden maxim was extracted: “Nothing can render you a non-Muslim except nullifying what 
made you a Muslim”.268 They now realized that revolting against the ruler was a reason to 
create hostility to Islam, which is a clear shift from viewing the world by the eyes of a 
victim of the conspiracy theory to holding the responsibility to the assault on Islam. 
To sum up, the new body of literature, mainly deconstructs the eight major 
arguments of Jihadism: al-ῌakimiyya (God’s exclusive right to legislate), al-Ridda 
(apostasy, mainly of ruling regimes), al-Jihad/Qitāl (fighting for the Islamic State, Jihad 
al-dafʿ (defensive jihad), Aḥkām al-Diyār (rules of conduct in the “abode of Islam” and 
the “abode of Infidelity”), methods for sociopolitical change, the inevitability of 
confrontation, and the “neo-crusader” arguments.269The three elements of the EJI 
program (jihad, ḥisba and da’wa) remain at the core of the Re-thinking literature, 
stressing that jihad is a means to an end and the end does not necessarily justify the 
means, the duty of violent jihad falls into abeyance if the costs outweigh the benefits. 
The duty of ḥisba must be discharged in coordination with the state. Finally, daʿwa is 
the prime concern and raison d’etre of the Islamist movement. No step should be taken 
that may prejudice the goal of guiding humanity to salvation.270 
The fourth aspect in the analysis of the new ideology reflects some indications. The 
new Re-thinking Doctrines included two processes, inside them, that went parallel and 
were overlapping. The first process was deep rooted criticism of past thought and 
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practices. The second process included drafting a new thought and ideological layout 
that is not related to the past, and which became the reviewed group’s movement 
determinant in the present and the future. Among the other main indications also are:  
 The announcement of the Renouncing -Violence Initiative preceded issuing the 
doctrines by around 5 years. This might indicate the EJI’s desire to present a 
strong practical proof of renouncing violence, before issuing the theoretical 
framework, thus giving more credibility to that ideology that will be issued later.  
 The slow issuing of the doctrines for a period of around five years may also be 
due to the intention to allow for an interval for the social recognition by the 
Egyptian society after it had been badly injured by the EJI violence, or due to the 
gradual ideological maturation of the leaders considering that ideological shifts 
usually an accumulative process.271 
 The Initiative came free from any mentioning or praise or even condemnation to 
the second party; the security forces and the ruling regime. Torture and suffering 
were mentioned only in the context of the negative consequence of their violence 
not in the context of condemnation of other parties. 
 The leaders never mentioned at any point that they had been influenced by 
secular intellectuals and politicians who supported the Initiative. Despite that, 
they have expressed their gratitude for those secular intellectuals and politicians. 
This is a remarkable transformation; secularists in general, usually were the 
targets of the EJI harsh criticism,272 and sometimes its bullets.273The doctrines do 
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not in any place include any insults, degradation, or dishonoring to any of the 
opponents.274 
 The ideas expressed in the new literature, as well as the references cited, reflect 
a strong presence of modernism, only phrased in an Islamist theoretical 
framework.275  
 The idea of the enemy is still obvious, however the internal enemy of the 
government and its institutions was replaced by the poverty and illiteracy, and the 
external enemy is Israel and the West including its internal allies and the 
secularist ideology.276 
 The rejection of the “conspiracy theory” is considered a stipulation for the 
renewal of the “religious speech. 
 
To sum up, the new literature features a departure from upholding fiqh al-‘Unf 
towards discouraging armed confrontations and political violence on one hand,277 and 
towards getting re-integrated in the mainstream of moderate thinking, on the other hand. 
In this respect, the Re-thinking Initiative can be considered the most important example 
in the Islamic world which falls within the revisions of the militant Islamist jihadis. 
 A parade of commentary praised the EJI’s Initiative’s impact on the subsequent 
recantations seeing these events as signposts along the road to de-radicalization.278 
The EJI leaders pride themselves that the first Islamist movement to admit its mistakes 
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was the EJI, 279 knowing that: “No other political Islamist group in opposition has succeeded 
in gaining the trust of the regime in the history of Egypt as did the EJI”.280 In 1969 the MB 
initiated the first wave of Islamist ideological de-radicalization by authoring ““Duʿah la 
Quḍah” in an attempt to dismantle the MB’s armed wing and de-legitimize “takfīr” 
ideology. The EJI began a second wave in July 1997 which almost had a “domino 
effect” on other movements in Egypt and in the region including the Algerian AIS (The 
Islamic Salvation Army), other militias in Algeria, Islamist figures and individual suspects 
in Saudi Arabia (al-Munaṣaḥa), the Ijtihadi Salafi trend in Morocco, and the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which introduced re-thinking doctrines “Dirasāt 
Taṣḥiḥiyya fi Mafāhīm al-Jihad wa al-Ḥisba wa al-Ḥukm ʿala- al-Nās”.281  
Domestically, the Egyptian Jihad Group’s ideologue and Osama Bin-Laden’s 
former mentor Sayyed Imam al-Sherif issued “Wathiqat Tarshīd al-ʿAmal al-Jihadī” 
(Doctrine of Rationalizing the Action of Jihad) in 7002,  refuting the former Faraj’s “al 
Fariḍa al-Gha’iba”. ‘Abbud al-Zumur published a document titled “al-Badīl al-Thaleth: 
bayn al-Istibdād wa al-Istislām” (the Third Alternative: Between Authoritarianism and 
Surrender) in 2009, in which he  prescribes ways of ending political violence within Arab 
and Muslim-majority states, and he strongly argues for the necessity of electoral 
participation as well as for alliance with the “ideological” other.282  
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The successful conflict resolution settlement reached by the EJI and the Egyptian 
regime echoes the internationally applied transitional justice mechanisms.  And 
according to the UN system, transitional justice is the: 
 “Full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempt to come 
to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, 
serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. 283  
Some of the transitional justice mechanisms,284 which include trials, truth 
commissions, reparations, apologies, public memorials, forgiveness, and institutional 
reforms285 were applied- though unintentionally and partially - in the reached EJI 
reconciliation with the Egyptian regime. Mutual forgiveness between the EJI and the 
regime, the reparations introduced to the EJI members, the trials that the EJI were 
subjected to, (most of them had finished their sentences period by the time of the 
Initiative) are examples of these applied mechanisms. Moreover, instead of denying its 
violent attacks or blaming external conspiracies, the EJI genuinely confessed all their 
attacks and violence, and held for themselves what could be considered as a truth 
commission through which they passed to the acceptance of the political regime and the 
Egyptian society. Significantly, an equally important factor was the emerging mutual 
sense of guilt between the two clashing parties; the security forces on one hand, and 
the EJI on the other hand. Both parties had an innate desire to compensate the damage 
inflicted on the other. This desire acted as a push factor towards seeking a compromise 
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within which mutual forgiveness would be exchanged. This can be interpreted in the 
context of the common phenomenon of sympathy that grows between the oppressor 
and the oppressed.286 
While the EJI’s radicalization process followed the footsteps at of al-Jihad, its de-
radicalization preceded that of jihad by around 10 years. Emerging concurrently with the 
Jihad in the early seventies, and around half a century after the MB, only the EJI shifted 
irreversibly - so far - to coexistence with the ruling regimes in no more than two decades 
since its emergence. It seems that the EJI - which was the most violent group 
responsible for 95% of violent attacks during the nineties- cleverly, added the 
accumulative experience287 of the MB and other Islamists clash with the state to its own 
history to avoid a similar fate.  
In conclusion, although the Initiative can be considered authentic and self-
initiated, however, denying the impact of the pressures under which the Initiative was 
born into would be too idealistic. So, neither excessive idealism nor total reality denial 
can be taken as an explanation for the motives behind the Initiative.288The EJI was able, 
through successful leadership and ideological reassessment to achieve self-de-
radicalization. On the other hand, the Egyptian regime de-radicalized the EJI by an 
effective dual process of “defeat by repression”, and the “transition to a legitimate 
political process”.289In the end, both lions were tamed.   
                                                          
286
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287
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288
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289
 A RAND study of 648 terrorist groups during 1968-2006, almost half were defeated by police or military repression 
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Coalitions”, op. cit., pp.30-31. 
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“It is out of wisdom that right holders keep their rights. It is also 
wise to attempt to keep their record clear and spotless”.  
 
Najeḥ Ibrahim, “Man Naḥnu wa Madha Nurīd” 
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Conclusion 
The Future Prospects of the EJI Initiative 
The ideological contribution and the outstanding reconciliative impact of the EJI 
Initiative stand as a distinguished precedent to follow in relation to ideological 
reformation and conflict resolution domain of research. In the end, the Initiative 
achieved its goal and both lions were tamed; the militant death cult, and the outraged 
regime. The future of the Initiative will be determined by the extent to which other 
militant Islamist movements can follow the EJI de-radicalization model, in addition to the 
continued presence of the EJI in the contemporary daʿwa, social and political arenas.  
The extent to which other militant Islamist movements can follow the EJI de-
radicalization model depends on their ability and desirability to follow this model. Some 
opinions are doubtful that the EJI experience can be disseminated and consider the 
Initiative to be a specialty for the EJI and cannot be generalized to other groups. Other 
opinions argue that the MB is the most probable to reach a similar reconciliatory 
agreement with the regime. Opponents to this view attribute this to the lack of the MB’s 
ability of self-criticism, specialized religious scholars among it cadres, their continued 
alliance with external parties as the USA, and recent violence inclinations which hinders 
the process of reconciliation, among other reasons.  As for al-Jihad Group’s Initiative, 
analysts believe that its failure was due to the fact that it did not strive enough, even 
minimally to understand the contemporary political reality, or pass independent opinions 
concerning issues of democracy, human rights, and party politics. Moreover, the Jihad 
is unfortunate because the ten year delay of their Initiative than the EJI’s, witnessed the 
shift of local terror to the state of globalization. The new era of terrorism - within which 
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the Jihad’s Initiative was announced - witnessed the unlimited scope of terror in an open 
world where ad-hoc leaderless Islamists (and terrorists in general), come together 
through the social network rather than classic formal organizations (as the Madrid train 
attack in March 2004 leaving 191  killed and 2,000 wounded). Within this context, the 
Jihad Initiative, significant as it has been, seems to have gone in vain. The Initiative 
received no acceptance on the part of the grassroots and the core members, and it had 
no effect in halting the violence of like-minded groups as al-Qaʿida and the commonly 
known as Daʿish. To add to the problem, both the MB and Jihad Group have an 
element of access to external logistic and financial funding and support which tempts 
them to hold to their stances and hinders the process of making any concessions and 
reconciliation on their side. Besides, both groups did not reach the state of defeat as a 
group, as in the case with the EJI upon the emergence of the Initiative. 
Another determinant to the success of the EJI Initiative is the continued presence 
of the EJI in the contemporary daʿwa, social and political arenas. In spite of the eminent 
outcome of the Initiative, the future of the EJI is still to be questioned. On one hand, the 
political agenda of the regime is not putting enough efforts to keep the de-radicalizing 
impact of the Initiative activated, the Re-thinking books are not republished or 
circulated, and the repenting leaders and members are under high economic and social 
strains. On the other hand, the second-line generation of the EJI is acting on a relatively 
different agenda than that of the historical leaders, leaning towards a newly crashing 
attitude with the regime. The historical leaders resigned from the membership of the 
group and are now suggesting that they should embark on a second tour of ideological 
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dialogue with their grassroots to eliminate the growing signs of radicalization inside the 
EJI. 
The future of the Initiative is therefore conditioned with the regimes’ long-term 
policies that would keep the impact of the Initiative in activation and more importantly, 
with the EJI’s ability to re-define itself within the historical changes taking place in Egypt, 
especially after the 2011 revolution. For almost two decades since the declaration of the 
Initiative in 1997, the EJI had kept its former moderate non-confronting stand. However, 
the inclination of a few members to join the opposing “Taḥaluf Daʿm al-Sharʿia 
(Legitimacy Support Alliance), established after 2013, marks an alarming sign of a 
possible split within the previously consolidated group. Moreover, the moderate EJI 
website, which was earlier founded by Najeḥ Ibrahim in several languages including 
Arabic, English and Urdu, was closed.  Lately, a new website replaced the previous 
moderate one, but with a hostile stance to the current ruling regime.  The resignation of 
five of the historical leaders from the group and the opposing inclination of the new 
website raises fears and suspicions concerning the continuation of the EJI as a model 
for reconciliation and moderation and indicates that they might be, for the second time 
since their emergence in the 1970s, wasting the opportunity for appearing as an 
effective and integrated socio-religious force. 
As to prospects of the EJI’s political participation and pluralism, there are mixed 
messages on this subject. The EJI ideologue Najeḥ Ibrahim and Karam Zuhdi, for 
example, have called on Islamist movements to abandon politics and to focus on 
missionary activities. Najeḥ Ibrahim believes that “taking the aggressive opposition stance 
continuously is the worst thing, then you have to consider your opponent as oppressing you, 
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then you resort to underground activities.” However, the second-line generation leader 
Ṣafwat ʿAbdel-Ghani, and core member Tarek al-Zumur are in favor of establishing a 
political party and actually established “Hizb al-Bina’ wa al- Tanmiya” (Building and 
Development Party) in opposition to their historical leaders’ will. In general, the first 
generation is showing stronger commitment to the Initiative while the second generation 
is showing less devotion to the broad lines that demarcated the Initiative and more 
inclination towards violent opposition. The EJI’s success in keeping the relationship of 
the mutual acceptance with the regime and the different components with the Egyptian 
societies is conditioned by the continued ideological and behavioral affirmation, that 
they no more represent a threat.  
The retreat of some members from the mainstream reconciliatory and moderate 
position of the EJI, as: ʿAṣem ʿAbdel-Majid, and the recently deceased ʿEssam Derbala 
and others, raise further doubts. Some opinions hold that this is not a sign of failure to 
the Initiative; rather it is seen as individual incidents of dissent. ʿAbdel-Majid, who 
strongly joined the violent opposing stand of the MB after 2013 and fled away since 
then, and ʿ Derbala, who joined the opposing “Legitimacy Support Coalition”, were 
earlier separated from the other six historical leaders inside jails after their initial 
rejection to some of the Re-thinking ideas.  
Moreover, the reconciliatory impact of the Re-thinking Initiative of the EJI is 
questioned due to the re-emergence of violence motivating factors. Among these 
factors is the renewed tension between the official authorities and the political Islamist 
trend in general and the MB in particular after the rise of the latter to power in 2012 and 
its fall down again in 2013. Also, stronger calls for higher secularization and total 
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marginalization of Islamists (as a reaction to the relatively negative experience of the 
rise of Islamists to power following the Egyptian revolution 2011) are likely to heighten 
the clash with the Islamists. Weak policies of enforcing and supporting the Re-thinking 
Doctrines on one hand and the reintegration of the formerly-militant affiliates into the 
society on the other hand, in addition to coercive measures and the absence of struggle 
- mitigating mechanisms add to the quandary. 
It seems that the question of what the future holds for the EJI is still an 
unanswered question, considering that the Egyptian political life is in a fragile 
transitional phase that does not allow such questions to be even posed. Not only is the 
future of the EJI as a group is to be questioned, but in addition, the future prospects for 
the emergence of similar reconciliatory initiatives. The names of members of the EJI, 
who once took the lead on the media headlines for their brutal attacks, are now 
reappearing on almost weekly basis in several newspapers, and T.V. programs calling 
for the significance of moderation and the priority of conflict resolution and consolidation 
of the Egyptian society. Taking into consideration the changes occurring in the stands of 
the second generation, it is still to be foreseen whether EJI news will make a comeback 
to headlines on violence, or will remain appearing on newspaper articles and T.V. 
shows calling for moderation, or even will fade away for good? 
After critical examination of the results of the research, the study hypotheses are 
verified and show that the results come in congruence with the posed hypotheses. 
Resorting to underground activities by the militant Islamist groups and losing the trust of 
the ruling regimes are positively corelated. These clandestine activities provoke the 
state’s violent repressive reactions, whether legal or illegal. Likewise, the illegal security 
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measures and absence of proper procedure of law are also in direct proportionality to 
the ignition of more violence on the side of the militant groups. The prerequisite for the 
transition of militant Islamist groups to a legitimate political path is the intertwining of 
both legal security measures and the ideological dialogue approach. On the other hand, 
the violent behavioral deviation of the Islamist militant groups is inversely proportional to 
adequate understanding, and profound knowledge of “Shariʿa Objectives” which is 
highlighted by the violent projection on unacceptable social, religious and political 
realities. 
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Recommendations  
The theme of the study yields recommendations on the political, security and 
religious levels. In authoritarian systems, de-radicalization processes and programs are 
a short-to-midterm solution to the problem of Islamists political violence. Indeed, de-
radicalization does not mean that the root causes of radicalism were properly addressed 
and resolved. Now, the EJI has abandoned violence, but political repression, the 
socioeconomic strains, and exclusionary dogmas can ultimately reproduce similar 
organizations. Successful democratization and religious reformation can be the two 
keywords for a long-term, durable solution. Political regimes should consider that in the 
absence of proper democratization, power vacuums is not necessarily filled by the most 
qualified or the most popular, but rather by the best organized and sometimes the most 
aggressive.  
Rulers, throughout the history of Egypt since the time of the pharaohs till the 
present time, have made good use, or manipulation of religion, being an integral part of 
the Egyptian mindset.  In the modern history of the twentieth century, the fixed strategy 
of the successive regimes before and after the 1952 revolution was to manipulate 
religion for mobilizing and utilizing the masses to pursue the goals set by their own 
agendas. Politicians should consider that the Islamist groups fulfill a de-alienating 
function for its members in ways that are not matched by other rival political 
movements. Through Islamist groups, youths are offered a meaning, a sense of 
community and acceptance, in addition to an inflated sense of importance and prestige. 
The result is that these marginalized and oppressed groups identify with the aggressor 
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and become as aggressive as what they perceive as a violent society. They imitate their 
aggressor. 
It would be inaccurate to view the Initiative as an outgrowth of security pressures 
only. It is feared that, the conflicting evidence concerning the effect of state repression 
on both the radicalization and de-radicalization of the EJI may encourage regimes’ 
repressive tendencies. Regimes facing armed rebellion usually regard compromises as 
evidence of weakness and devote additional resources to military retaliation. The 
presumption justifying counterforce is that it deters; the greater a regime’s capacity for 
force and the more severe the sanctions it imposes on dissidents, the less the violence 
they will do. However, the effect is likely to be an intensification of resistance and 
dissidents will resort to greater force. Some kinds of force may be necessary, but 
exclusive reliance on force eventually rises up the forces that destroy it. Force threatens 
and angers men, especially if they believe it to be illicit or unjust. Threatened, they try to 
defend themselves; angered, they want to retaliate. 
 The public order is most effectively maintained when means are provided within 
it for men to work towards the attainment of their aspirations. Some religious actors 
apparently cling to harmful practices either because they are ignorant of the effects or 
because they know no viable alternative. The ability or failure of the state to provide 
openings to Islamist movements for participation in the political process and the manner 
in which it represses dissent is an important domain of research. 
Considering the security perspective, there should also be a distinction between 
terrorism and radicalism. While terrorism can only be combated through military 
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solutions, confronting radicalism is mainly an ideological task. In spite of the importance 
of the security approach for the preservation of lives and properties, the ideological 
confrontation remains at the core. Additionally, the absence of concepts of political 
security, besides to the traditional backgrounds on criminal sciences, in addition to 
miscalculated – or neglected - consequences of human rights violations and the 
excessive use of illegitimate power prolong the struggle and even escalate it.  
The last fifty years have seen an extraordinary period of religious revival around 
the world. A great deal of evidence suggests that the power of religion as a motivating 
force and the power of religious organizations as social actors and soft powers, have 
grown during this period. Those who seek to promote human security should, therefore, 
study the impact of religion in the societies in which they are working – to understand 
better the dynamics of the human security situation in that country and to identify 
possible enemies and allies in the fight to improve human security. Religions mobilize 
groups to resist oppression in both peaceful and in violent forms, and in many cases, 
they directly challenge states and governments that seek to oppress peoples with their 
power – justly or unjustly. 
On the Islamists part, they have to realize that religion’s impact on human 
security is however, multifaceted. Religious actors are among the biggest threats to 
human security, and they are also among the most important safeguards. The 
attainment of human aspirations through means that are more effective and less 
destructive should be sought. Exclusionary slogans as: “Islam Is the Solution” should be 
replaced with other slogans raising the values of mutual coexistence, dialogue and 
acceptance. The contemporary Islamic movement in Egypt, which has always acted as 
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a political force in opposition, should consider alternative non-exclusionary and non-
supremacist paths for promoting its ambitions. They have to learn how to act from within 
the society not to create parallel entities that act on behalf of the society. They also 
have to learn that theoretically, all acts, or even signs, of violence and underground 
activites pose a threat to the political system in two senses: they challenge the 
monopoly of force imputed to the state in political theory; and, in functional terms, they 
are likely to interfere with and, if  severe, destroy normal political processes. This will 
provoke the political authorities to react in a more repressive manner. 
The concepts of transitional justice are the most appropriate for the focus of this 
study. Transitional justice becomes more effective when supported by reconciliatory 
religious concepts as “The language of faith comes through strongly in domains of apologies 
and forgiveness”, and as John Paul II (1978 – 2005) appended to Pope Paul VI’s 1965 
maxim “no peace without justice” the corollary “no Justice without forgiveness”. Pre-
modern Arab Islam contains rich community rituals of ṣulḥ (settlement) and muṣalaḥa 
(reconciliation), similar to Judaism’s yeshiva. Pardoning is wider than tolerance because 
it entails forgiveness and letting go of blame. Reconciliation perspectives indicating the 
restoration of right relationship, overcoming enmity, trust building, and healing are to be 
considered. 
As for religious social actors and soft powers, a higher role of official religious 
establishments as al-Azhar, Ministry of Endowments, and Dar al-Iftāʾ’ is to be 
considered as a highest priority. In doing so, a review of the content of curriculums, 
qualified preachers, and the replacement of the traditional educational system with 
another one based on reasoning and plurality of thinking is a pre-requisite for the 
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effectiveness of the role of these institutions in the reform of religious rhetoric. Those 
who work to promote human security, will need to develop policies that will diminish the 
negative effects of religion on human security while preserving its positive impacts. 
Paradoxically, political violence is episodic in the history of most organized 
political communities and chronic in many. No country in the modern world has been 
free of it for as much as a generation. Conflict resolutions can be reached and peaceful 
coexistence can replace the struggle, only if history and human experience are of any 
guidance. 
Finally, due to limitations of time and space, some related fields of research were 
not covered by this study. Further study can be carried out in relevant domains to 
several relevant concerns. One field would be an in-depth comparative study between 
the re-assessment ideological and behavioral experiences on the domestic level in 
Egypt. This comparative study could be carried further to cover similar initiatives on the 
international level. From a political perspective, the EJI Initiative could be examined 
within the context of conflict-resolution leading experiences. From a socio-psychological 
perspective, a more specialized study on the subjective and objective characteristics of 
the EJI, in addition to all the previous areas would enhance our understanding of the 
probability of the emergence of similar reconciliative, conflict resolving initiatives, on 
both the domestic and international level.  
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Appendix A 
 
FIRST STATEMENT OF EJI RENOUNCING-VIOLENCE INITIATIVE  
 
 
“The leadership of EJI calls upon all its members and leaders, inside and outside Egypt, to halt 
all military operations, and all provoking statements, unilaterally, without any condition, for the 
sake of Islam and Muslims”.  
*the announcement above was pronounced orally in the military court room by EJI member    
  Moḥammed Amin ʿAbdel-ʿAlim as dictated to him by EJI leader Karam Zuhdi, on the 5th of July 1997.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
Najeḥ Ibrahim, “al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya bain al-Mubadara wa al-Murajaʿa”, in Diyaʾ Rashwān, ed., al-Murajaʿāt min 
al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya ila al-Jihad (Cairo: al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2008), P.31. 
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Appendix B 
EJI VIOLENCE DOCTRINES: LEGITIMIZING VIOLENCE  
S. Name Author(s) 
Publication 
date 
Publisher Remarks 
1 
Mithāq al-ʿAmal al-Islami  
  
Najeḥ Ibrahim, ʿAṣem 
ʿAbdel-Majid, ʿEṣam 
Derbala  
1984 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
EJI manifesto and the 
equivalent to al-Jihad’s “al-
Fariḍa al-Gha’iba”, written 
behind bars. 
2 
Qitāl al-Fi’a al-Mumtaniʿa ‘an Shariʿa 
min Shar’āiʿ al-Islam  (also known as 
“Ḥukm al-Ṭā’ifa al-Mumtaniʿa” 
Research)  
Derbala, ʿAbdel-Majid 
 
1984 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
For the purpose of being 
delivered to the court of al-
jihad trial, 
Written behind bars. 
3 Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwajaha ʿEṣam Derbala  1984 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
 
4 Al- Dhab ‘an al- Ṣaḥāba Ṭalʿat Fouʾad 1984 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
This book incorporated 
moderate ideas though 
published in the era of 
violence doctrines. .  
5 Aṣnaf al- ῌukkām wa ’Aḥkāmihim 
Derbala 
Hisham, ʿAbdel-Ẓaher   
Revised by: ʿOmar 
ʿAbdel-Raḥman   
1984 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
 
6 Wugūb al-ʿAmal al-Jamāʿi  
The eight historical 
leaders 
1984 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
 
 
7 
Kalemat Ḥaq ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman  1987 Dar al-Eʿteṣam 
The book was issued for the 
purpose of being presented 
 114 
 
 in the trial, and it does not 
represent ʿOmar ʿAbdel-
Raḥman’s ideas. 
8 ʾAʾiIlahun maʿa Allāh ʿAbdel-Majid 1987 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
 
 
9 
Al-Rad ʿAn Shubuhāt al-ʾAmr bi al-
Maʿoruf wa al-Nahi ‘an al-Monkar  
Abdel-’Akher Ḥammad 1989 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
 
10 
ʾEmaṭat al-lethām ʿAn Baʿḍ Aḥkām 
Dhorwat Senām al-Islam 
Rifāʿi Taha 
Not 
mentioned 
Not mentioned  
Wrote it individually in 
disagreement with EJI 
leaders.   
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Appendix C 
RE-THINKING BOOKS  
S. Book name Author (s) 
Publication 
date 
Publisher Remarks 
Silsilat Taṣḥiḥ al-Mafāhīm 
1 Mubadarat Waqf al-ʿUnf  
Osama Ḥafez, 
ʿAbdel-Majid 
2002 Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami  
2 Ḥurmat al-Ghuluww fi al- Din wa Takfīr  al-Muslimīn 
Ibrahim,  Ali al-
Sherif 
2002 Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami  
3 Tasliṭ al-ʾAḍwāʾ ‘ala ma Waqa‘a fi al- Jihad min Akhtā’ 
Ḥamdi ʿAbdel-
Raḥman , 
Ibrahim, al-Sherif   
2002 Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami  
4 
Al-Noṣḥ wa al-Tabiyyīn fi Taṣḥiḥ Mafāhīm al-
Moḥtasebīn  
al-Sherif, Ḥafez 2002 Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami  
5 
Nahr al-Dhikrayāt: al-Murajaʿāt al-Fiqhiyya li al-Jamaʿa 
al-Islamiyya   
Ibrahim, Ḥafez  
2003 
 
2005 
Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami  
  
Maktabat al-ʿUbaikān  
 
6 Daʿwa li al-Taṣāloḥ maʿa  al-Mujtamaʿ Ibrahim  2004 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
7 Hidayat al-khalāʾiq bayna al-Ghāyāt wa al-Wasāʾil  Ibrahim 2004 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
8 Fatwa al-Tatār; Dirasa wa Taḥlil  Ibrahim 2004 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
9 Ḥatmiyyat al-Muwājaha wa Fiqh al-Natā’ij Ibrahim 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān 
Refuting the first 
“Ḥatmeyat al-
Muwajaha”  
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Others 
10 Al ʿUdhr bi al-Jahl    Derbala 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
11 Man Naḥnu wa Madha Nurīd? Ibrahim 2006 
EJI website before its 
closure.   
EJI new manifesto 
after the initiative. 
12 Al-ῌakimiyya: Naẓra Sharʿiya wa Roʾya Waqeʿiya  Ibrahim 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
13 Aḥkām al-Diyār Ibrahim 2006 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
14 ‘Eīdāḥ al-Jawāb fi Tasā’olāt ‘Ahl al-Kitāb ʿAbdel-Majid 2006 
Unofficial publishing inside 
jail during the Initiative’s 
lectures. 
 
15 Taṭbiq al-Aḥkām Min Ekhtiṣāṣ al-ῌukkām Ibrahim 2004 
Unofficial publishing and 
limited distribution. 
 
16 Tajdīd al-Khitāb al-Dini; Ahammiyatoho wa Maḍmonoh Ibrahim 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
17 Naẓarāt fi ῌaqiqat al-Isteʿlā’ bi al-Imān  Ibrahim 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
18 Al-Islam wa Tahdhīb al-ῌorūb Derbala 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikān  
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Appendix D 
GENERAL BOOKS REFUTING OTHER MILITANT GROUPS’ VIOLENCE 
S. Book name Author (s) 
Publication 
date 
Publisher Remarks 
1 Tafjirāt al-Riyāḍ …al-Aḥkām wa al- Athār Ibrahim 2003 Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami  
2 Esteratijiyyet wa Tafjirāt al-Qaʿida Derbala 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikan  
3 Al-Akhṭā’ wa al-Akhṭār Derbala 2005 Maktabat al-‘Ubaikan  
4 Naṣiḥa Wajiba li Qadat al-Qaʿida ʿAbdel-Majid 2009 Not mentioned   
5 Barqiyāt Mohemma ila Shabāb al-ʾUmmah  Ibrahim 2014 
Al-Shorouk International 
Bookshop  
 
6 Khareṭat Ṭariq li al-Ḥarakāt al-Islamiyya al-Moʿaṣira Ibrahim 2012 
Al-Ahram Center for publication, 
translation and distribution  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the researcher’s own preparation, revised by Najeḥ Ibrahim.  
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Egyptian Islamist Movements and Groups  
Non-political Islamist Groups 
and Associations  
Charity 
Assosciations  
community 
development and 
charity projects 
as: 
- "Jamʿia Sharʿia l 
Taʿawon al-
ʿAmelin b al-kitab 
w al-Sunna"  
- "Jamaʿat  Ansar 
al-Sunna al-
Muḥammadeya" 
- other 
associations of 
Islamic interest 
*After Jan. 25, 
they started 
supporting Salafi 
political parties 
Sufi Sects  
constitutes 
around 15% 
of the 
Egyptians. 
there are 
around 77 
sufi groups 
(tariqas) 
* after Jan. 
25, one Sufi 
sect 
established 
a political 
party.  
Political Islamist Groups 
and Movements  
Reformist 
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
since the early 
70s till 2013.  
- Al-ʿAmal al-
Islami Party 
- Al-ʿAmal al-
Islami New Party 
- Al-Wasat Party 
- Al-Nur Salafi 
Party. 
- Others  
 
Radical 
Takfiri  Groups 
(Isolated )  
Different 
excommunicat-
ing groups as:  
“al-Takfir wa al-
Hijra” group 
under the 
leadership of 
Shoukri Mostafa.  
Jihadi militant Groups 
(Localized Terrorism 
Generation ) 
Jihad Militant 
Groups  
Various militant 
groups that 
emerged in the 
early 1970s 
encouraging the 
so-called “Jihadi 
ideology” and 
committing a 
number of 
terroristic 
operations. 
-Al-Fanniyya al-
‘Askariyya 
Organization. 
-Al-Jihad 
Organization. 
-Tala’eʿ al-Fatḥ 
Organization.  
-Others. 
Egyptian 
Jamaʿa 
Islamiya (EJI) 
Started as a 
daʿwa group, 
then went 
militant till 
the 1997 
“Ceasefire 
Agreement”; 
till the 
“Renouncing-
Violence 
Initiative” 
Salafi-Jihadi militant Groups  
(Globalized Terrorism 
Generation) 
Al-Qaʿida 
(The 
International 
Islamic Front 
for Jihad 
against Jews 
and 
Crusaders) 
owning an 
Egyptian 
branch.  
Islamic State 
Organization , 
previously 
known as 
"ISIS". with an 
Egyptian 
branch is called 
"Welayat Sina" 
Appendix E 
EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND GROUPS’ ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
  
  
Source: Brigadier Hussein Hammouda, former senior officer in State Security Department and an expert in combating international terrorist groups. 
 
Egyptian Ashrāf Families   
 
 
Jamʿiyyat Al-Shubban al-Muslimīn  
Founded in 1927  Ranging from 5 to 6 Million persons across Egypt.  
*Lately, their “Naqīb” was nominated as the 
representative of the Egyptian Parliament 2016, which 
may mark the beginning of their participation in 
political life.   
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Appendix F 
EJI ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AT ITS EMERGENCE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brigadier Hussein Ḥammouda, former Senior Officer in State Security Department and an Expert in Combating International Terrorist 
Groups.    
 
General Amir and mufti  
ʿOmar ‘ʿAbdel-Rahman  
EJI Shura Council 
Militant Wing 
EJI spokesperson  
Cairo Communication Agent  
Giza Communication Agent 
Luxor Communication Agent  
Aswan Communication Agent 
Minya Communication Agent  
Asyuṭ Communication Agent 
Bani Suwaif Communication Agent  
Others  
EJI Military commander 
'Ein Shams Cell 
Rawd al-Faraj Cell 
Al-Waily Cell 
Manfalout Cell 
Dairout Cell 
Al-Haram Cell  
Embaba Cell 
Others 
Da’wa wing 
EJI Shura Council consisting of Governorates ʾAmirs 
Provinces and Villages ʾAmirs 
EJI Grassroots Allocated in Mosques   
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Appendix G 
GLOSSARY 
 Dar al-Islam/ Abode of Islam: a peace zone. It is the territory where Islam is enacted, and therefore 
no warfare can take place within it.   
 Dar-al Kufr, Dar–al- ῌarb: the abode of infidels; a war zone. It is designated as the land where Islam 
does not rule, a territory where, according to Islamic fundamentalists, fighting can occur. According to 
fundamentalist ideologies, dar al-ḥarb is anywhere where Shariʿa is not applied regardless of 
territorial boundaries or demographics.  
 Daʿwa: propagation of the mission; proselytization. 
 Dhimmiyyūun, Ahl-al-Kitab: people of the book, a notion that normally applied to Jews and 
Christians, but also applied in some stages of Muslim history to others (e.g.: Buddhists). 
 Fatwa: a religious judgment by a certain ‘alim based on certain rules of interpretation in the Qur’an 
and Sunna. 
 Ḥakimiyya: political sovereignty and rule on earth. The radical fundamentalists use ḥakimiyya as a 
justification for jihad against any group or government that does not make tawḥid its basis. It reasons 
that humans follow Allah’s pathway and are therefore followers of Allah. However, ḥakimiyya is 
conducted by humans because no person can claim absolute finality of his interpretation.  
 Islamic militancy: actual violent group behavior committed collectively against the state or other 
actors in the name of Islam. 
 Jahiliyya: a jahili society is one that does not apply Shariʿa (Islamic Law) and that violates the 
teachings of the Quran and divine governance. To the fundamentalists, moderate and radical alike, 
the essence of Islam is one that focuses on the destruction of jahiliyya. Many radical fundamentalists 
feel that all contemporary societies are jahili.  
 Jihad: literally struggle, yet generally covers all means of preaching and defending the faith. In the 
most basic of terms of fundamentalism, jihad is simply an armed struggle against any institution or 
force that opposes or restricts Islam. A moderate view on jihad is that it is not a means of aggression 
and expansion but rather a protection of Daʿwa. Radical fundamentalists, however, see jihad as not 
only a defensive action, but also a way to establish Islam in the lands where it does not exist. In other 
words, jihad should not just protect Islam, but it should also destroy jahili societies and transform 
them into Islamic ones.  
 Takfīr: the condemnation of a society or political regime for unbelief which confers religious 
legitimacy upon a revolt against it. Also known as, excommunication.  
Islamic groups and related concepts: 
 De-radicalization: a process of relative change within Islamist movements, in which a radical group 
reverses its ideology and begins to de-legitimize the use of violent methods to achieve political goals 
General Amir and Mufti  
ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman  
EJI Majlis al-Shura 
Militant Wing 
EJI spokesperson  
Cairo Communication Agent  
Giza Communication Agent 
Luxor Communication Agent  
Aswan Communication Agent 
Minya Communication Agent  
Asyuṭ Communication Agent 
Bani Suwaif Communication Agent  
Others  
EJI Military commander 
'Ein Shams Cell 
Rawd al-Faraj Cell 
Al-Waily Cell 
Manfalout Cell 
Dairout Cell 
Al-Haram Cell  
Embaba Cell 
Others 
Da’wa wing 
EJI Majlis al-Shura Consisting of Governorate's 
Amirs 
Provinces and Villages’ Amirs 
EJI Grassroots   
(in the mosques)   
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as well as accepting gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context. De-
radicalization can occur on the behavioral level as well. On that level, de-radicalization means 
abandoning the use of violence to achieve political goals without ideological de-legitimization.  
 Historical leaders: The term “historical leaders” was coined by the Egyptian media and it refers to 
the EJI leadership of the 1970s. Almost all of the leaders were sentenced in the so-called al-Jihad 
Trials of 1981 following the assassination of President Sadat. Most of the historical leaders were still 
serving their sentences or administratively detained by the regime in 1997. The historical leaders 
currently represent the majority in the EJI Majlis al-Shura. The leaders who are still alive in 2016 are 
Karam Zuhdi, Najeḥ Ibrahim and ʿAṣem ʿAbdel-Majid.   
  Islamist groups: sociopolitical movements which base and justify their political principles, 
ideologies, behaviors, and objectives on their understanding of Islam or on their understanding of a 
certain past interpretation of Islam. Islamist groups can be distinguished along a broad spectrum, 
from moderate to radical. 
 Khawarij: a group of early Muslim dissidents who disapproved of the behavior and action of the 
Fourth Caliph Ali, as well as that of his challenger Mu’awiya. The Khawarij fought both at one time 
and never consented to the central authority of the Umayyads in Damascus or the Abbasid in 
Baghdad. One fundamental tenet of Khawarij is insistence on the unity of faith and deeds. Thus a 
tyrant ruler is not to be obeyed, nor can there be obedience to a sinful command. This goes against 
the mainstream Sunni doctrine, which would tolerate a tyrant for the sake of preserving the unity of 
the Umma. The mainstream Sunni establishment considers the Khawarij heretics. The term has now 
come to be used in describing any group that the established political and religious authority 
perceives as threatening the “unity” of society by rebelling   
 Moderate Islamist Groups: an Islamist movement that ideologically accepts, at minimum, political 
and ideological pluralism, and aims for gradual social, political, and economic changes. Behaviorally, 
moderate groups accept the principles of working within the established state institutions regardless 
of their perceived legitimacy, and shun violent methods to achieve their goals. Moderate Islamists can 
also be called reformists, pluralists, or modernists. 
 Radical Islamist Groups:  those movements that ideologically reject democracy as well as the 
legitimacy of political and ideological pluralism. They aim for revolutionary, social, political and 
economic changes refuse to work within the established state institutions, and utilize violent means to 
achieve their goals. Radical Islamists also can be called revolutionaries, extremists or exclusivists.  
 Radicalization: a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or 
behavioral transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles as well as to the use of 
violence, or to an increase in the level of violence.  
 Salafi: those who strictly adhere to the spirit and the letter of the Prophetic traditions and early Islamic   
practices. 
 122 
 
Salafi-Jihadi: the Salafi-Jihadi current is a Sunni-based Islamist ideological trend that combines 
elements from two major Islamist trends: Salafism and Jihadism. Salafist movements are 
characterized by their adherence to the teachings of the first three Muslim generations as well as their 
Sunni-based literal/puritanical interpretation of Islamic sources. Salafist movements can be political 
(Salafiyya-Jihadiyya) or apolitical (Salafiyya- ʿilmiyya – Scholarly-Salafism). Jihadist movements are 
characterized by their legitimization and frequent use of violence as a method of social and political 
change, their rejection of both electoral and liberal democracy, as well as their intolerance of 
sociopolitical rivals.  
 Wahhabi Movement: a movement that started in the latter decades of the eighteenth century. Its 
founder, Muḥammad Ibn Abdel-Wahhab, a puritanical fundamentalist, allied himself politically with the 
house of Al-Saud of Najd in central Arabia. Together they began to drive to unite Arabia and to 
institute fundamentalist Islamic institutions. Despite the ups and downs of this alliance, vis-a-vis the 
outside world, it persisted and finally triumphed politically in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Saudi Arabia today is a culmination of this effort.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  
 ʿOmar Ashour,” Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist 
Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4 
(Autumn, 2007), pp. 596-625.  
 Mathieu Guidere, Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism. (Plymouth: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2012). 
 Walid Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-
81. (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994). 
 Saʿd Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and 
Preliminary Findings”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.12, No.4 (Dec. 1980), pp. 
423-453.  
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Appendix H 
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR VIOLENT ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS  
AND MAJOR EXTERNAL INFLUENCES (1928 – 2015)  
 
N.B.: Attacks committed by the EJI are highlighted in Bold. 
Year Events External influences 
1928  Mar.: Foundation of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in Ismailiyya.  
1948  Dec.: Dissolution of the MB on charges of “attempts to overthrow the existing regime. The war in Palestine. 
1949  Assassination of Hassan al-Banna.  
1953  Dissolution of all political parties except Muslim Brotherhood.   
1954  Oct.: MB accused of attempting to assassinate Nasser in Alexandria.  
1966  Sayyid Qutb hanged.  
1967  Jun. 1967: Six-day war that ended by Arab countries’ defeat by Israel.  
1968  Feb. 1968: Student demonstrations against those responsible for the defeat.  
1969  Emergence of Islamic movements in universities.   
1972  Muslim Brothers set free and started their “Daʿwa” activity in university.   
1973 
 Birth of the Islamic groups (Jamaʿāt Islamiyya).  
 Oct.: 6
th
 of October victory. 
 
1974 
 Apr.: Attack at Heliopolis Military Academy by Siriyya group (al-Faniyya al-ʿAskariyya). 
 First participation for Islamists in student unions. 
 
1976 
 The Islamist movements control the Congress of the Student Union. 
 Conflict between MB and other Islamist groups in universities regarding the latter’s attitude 
in applying Ḥisba. 
 
1977 
 Jan.: Riots in Cairo against the rise in price of subsidized products. 
 Jul.: the assassination of Sheikh al- Dhahabi by the Jama’āt al-Takfīr wa al- Hijra. 
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 Nov.: Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem and signing Peace Treaty.  
1978 
 Regime bans the Islamists in Student Unions and the later violently criticizes the 
“Shameful peace with the Jews”.  
 Sep.: Signature of the Camp David accords. 
 
1979 
 Formation of al-Jihad organization (Salem Raḥḥal starts  recruitment)  
 Ending Islamist control over student unions.  
 Dec.: Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan 
 Iranian Islamic revolution 
1980 
 Sectarian clashes in Asyuṭ. 
 Meeting between Faraj (Jihad main ideologue) and Zuhdi (leader of EJI). 
 Choosing ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Raḥman as EJI spiritual leader.  
 Afghanistan war (U.S.A supported 
Islamist mujahidūn)  
 
 
 
1981 
 
 
 
 
 Aug.: EJI members rob jewelry shops in Nagaʿ Ḥammadi to fund and arm their group.  
 Sep.: Islamist movements banned, Islamist press suspended. 
 Sep.: Sadat arrests 1,536 oppositionists, demotes the Coptic Pope and suspends the 
oppositionist press raising the slogan “la siyasa fi al-din w la din fi al-siyasa”.  
 Oct. 6
th
: Assassination of Sadat. 
 Oct. 8
th
: Asyuṭ Security Department attacks killing more than 100 police officers.  
 Dec.: Release of MB leaders.  
 
1982 
 Apr.: Five death sentences are pronounced and executed in Sadat’s assassination trial. 
Faraj and Khalid al-Islambulli were amongst those five. 
 Setting free those who took lightened verdicts in al-Jihad case. 
Apr.: the agreed upon date for 
Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai.  
1985 
 May: The People’s Assembly rejects for demanding the application of the Shariʿa. 
 Jul.: All mosques are placed by decree under the control of the Ministry of Awqāf . 
Arrestment of Sheikh ʿOmar Abdel-Raḥman and his release later then. 
 
1986 
 Islamist members leave to Afghanistan to join “al-mujahidīn” there.  
 Burning video shops in Shubra. 
 
1987  May Assassination attempt of former minister of the interior Ḥassan Abu Basha.  
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 Jun.: Five hundred Islamist militants are arrested. 
 Assassination attempt on journalist Makram Moḥammad Aḥmad.  
 Aug.: Assassination attempt on minister of the interior al-Nabawi Ismail (by al-Jihad). 
1989  Dec.:  Assassination attempt on Zaki Badr.   
1990 
 Aug.: Killing of ʿAlaa Mohi Al-din –speaker of EJI- giving rise to anger of EJI members.  
 Oct.: Assassination of Rifʿat al-Maḥjūb –Head of People’s Assembly-  
 
1991  Oct.: Hostile reactions to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in Islamist circles. 
Dec.: disintegration of the Soviet 
Union  
1992 
 Apr.: Assassination of the essayist Faraj Foda by EJI. 
 Release of Osama Ḥafez –EJI leader- from prison in an attempt  to mitigate EJI violence  
 Oct.: Attacks on tourists leave several dead or wounded. 
 Oct.: Earthquake in Cairo leaves 552 dead and 9,000 injured. Islamists take part in the 
assistance efforts following the earthquake. 
 Dec.: Military trials for the returnees from Afghanistan and the execution of eight of them.   
 
1993 
 Resigning of minister of interior ʿAbdel- Ḥalīm Mousa after his meeting with al-`ulama` 
committee to discuss mediation. 
 Attempting to assassinate –Minister of Interior Affairs- Hassan al-Alfi and Prime Minister 
Atef Sedki by al-Jihad.  
 Assassination attempt of Ṣafwat al-Sherif –Minister of Media-  
 
1994 
 Apr.: Assassination of State Security Senior Officer General Raʾouf khairat.  
 Jun.: Execution of EJI members who were accused of Ṣafwat al-Sherif assassination.  
 Oct.: Assassination attempt of Najīb Mahfouz Nobel prize winner. 
 
1995  Jun.: Assassination attempt of president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa   
1996 
 Announcing Khalid Ibrahim’s initiative –EJI ʾamir in Aswan- but it went without recognition.  
 EJI militants opened fire on Greek tourists in front of Europe Hotel in Al-Haram.   
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1997 
 Jul.: EJI announcing “the Renouncing Violence Initiative”. 
 Nov.: Luxor massacre causing the death of 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians. 
 
1998  Foundation of the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders    
2001 -  
2005 
 Beginning the leaders’ tour on prisons to introduce their cadres to the new ideology.  
 Issuing the first edition of the “Correcting Conceptions Series”.  
 Setting free Mamdouḥ Yusuf, Karam Zuhdi, Najeḥ Ibrahim, Fou’ad al-Dawalībi and Ṣafwat 
Abdel-Ghany. 
 
2006   Launching EJI website in a step to let EJI resume its da’wa efforts.  
2011 
 Mar.: Setting free some EJI leaders and other Islamists including ‘Aṣem Abdel-Majid, 
Tarek al-Zumur and ‘Abbud al-Zumur by former President Mohammed Morsi  
 
2013 
 ‘Aṣem Abdel-Majid, Tarek al-Zumur, and other EJI leaders join “Taḥaluf Daʿm al-
Sharʿiyya” and later on, escaped to Turkey and Qatar. 
 
2014  Resignation of EJI major leaders Najeḥ Ibrahim and Karam Zuhdi.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  
Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt (London: Al Saqi Books, 1993).  
Salwa al-ʿAwwa, al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya al-Musallaḥa fi Misr, (Cairo: al-Shorouk International Bookshop, 2006).   
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Appendix I 
INTERVIEWS 
 
N.B.: interviews above are sorted in chronological order.  
  
s. Interviewee Title Date Remarks 
1 Najeḥ Ibrahim  Main ideologue and one of the 
historical leaders of the EJI.  
5
th
 of Dec. 
2015 
Phone interview  
Recorded 
2 Fouʾad ʿAllam  General, former Deputy Chief of State 
Security Department during the 
eighties.  
6
th
 of Dec. 
2015 
In-person interview  
Recorded  
3 Kamal al-Saʿīd Ḥabib Ph.D. in political science, former core 
leader in al-Jihad Group and a 
specialist in 
 Islamist movements. 
8
th
 of Dec. 
2015 
In-person interview  
Recorded 
4 Aḥmad Kamal Abul-Majd A prominent Islamic scholar and 
member of the Mediators Committee of 
the Initiative. 
16
th
 of Dec. 
2015 
In-person interview  
Recorded  
5 Kamal Boraiqaʿ ʿAbdel-Salam Lecturer in the Faculty of Language 
and Translation,  
Al-Azhar University, member of the 
Interfaith Dialogue and Head of 
English Department in al-Azhar 
Observer. 
29
th
 of Dec. 
2015 
In-person interview  
 
 
Recorded  
 
6 Kamal al-Helbawi Ph.D. in political science, dissident 
member of the MB, Ex-spokesperson 
and member of MB Shura Council.  
1
st
 of Jan. 
2016 
In-person interview  
 
Not Recorded  
7 Karam Zuhdi Ideologue, a historical leader and 
former EJI General ʾamir. 
4
th
 of Jan. 
2016 
Phone interview  
Recorded 
8 Ḥussein Ḥammouda Mostafa Brigadier, former Senior 
 Officer in State Security 
Department and an expert  
in Combating International 
Terrorist Groups.    
5
th
 of Jan. 
2016 
In-person interview  
 
General Amir and Mufti  
ʿOmar ʿAbdel-Rahman  
EJI Shura Council 
Militant Wing 
EJI spokesperson  
Cairo Communication Agent  
Giza Communication Agent 
Luxor Communication Agent  
Aswan Communication Agent 
Minya Communication Agent  
Assiyut Communication Agent 
Bani Suwaif Communication Agent  
Others  
EJI Military commander 
'Ein Shams Cell 
Rawd al-Faraj Cell 
Al-Waily Cell 
Manfalout Cell 
Dairout Cell 
Al-Haram Cell  
Embaba Cell 
Others 
Da’wa wing 
EJI Shura Council consisting of Governorates Amirs 
Provinces and Villages’ Amirs 
EJI grassroots    
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Interview with Nageḥ Ibrahim on Dec. 5th, 2015 
(Main ideologue and one of the historical leaders of the EJI) 
 
What is the principal reason behind the adoption of violence the (EJI)? 
The Jamaʿa first started with a peaceful call (daʿwa) for people; educating them to 
learn the Quran by heart and to keep the prayers. We’ve grown stronger and moved 
from one university to the other, until we became predominant on campuses. The bigger 
the EJI became, the lesser it was prone to control. Moreover, the larger the scope of 
groupings, the more liable they become to have some members who are rather austere 
or even violent and the bigger the role they search for themselves and the like. Thus, 
they don’t suffice by call for religion, but rather pursue changing society at large. The 
group in this manner does not stop at the call for religion (despite the fact that this is the 
greatest mission of reform).  
We didn’t have an influential leader with experience to pass on to us. Thus, we relied 
on ourselves; the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) used to visit, give us lectures, and attend 
our camps. They haven’t informed us about their experience, such as telling us that 
going underground was to their detriment. They did not warn us against the use of 
weapons and the troubles this could entail. They didn’t impart their own experience. We 
had thought that the rulers as such were the ones who oppress us and the MB, and that 
the MB hadn’t done anything wrong. The authorities were the ones who tortured and 
imprisoned the MB, killed Sheikh Ḥassan al-Banna and started a series of executions 
with no fault on the side of the MB themselves. Strangely, all what we heard about 
torture, murder, assassinations, and injustices was mainly at the time of Abdel- Nasser 
and to some degree during the reign of King Farouk. Unconsciously, we have projected 
such action on Sadat, despite the fact that he had stopped torture and allowed the 
Islamist groups freedom. To tell you the truth, the state during Sadat’s reign didn’t do us 
injustice. The oppression at the time of Nasser was projected on the times of Sadat. 
The true injustice, torture, and assassination were rather experienced at the time of 
Mubarak not Sadat.  
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Thus, subconsciously we took the role of opposition. We are not sure how this was 
passed to us – in fact this role is a legacy from one generation to another. Islamist 
groups and movements like to be in opposition and rather shun agreement; they feel 
ashamed from acquiescing to the state or not being in clash with the state. This is why 
when were slightly stronger we attacked Sadat fiercely. If someone was arrested we 
would organize demonstrations for him without knowing the reasons for arrest, and 
even if this person was not a member of the group to start with. We started acting 
irrationally: Thus, we took up roles not fit for us. The stronger you become, you become 
closer to a group seeking domination and renown in this world, which makes the 
educative element recede.  
 Change using physical force started. Of course, changing evil with hand is the 
gateway to violence, and this is one of the key mistakes committed by EJI. Certainly, 
the university, on the other hand, should have avoided provoking people, and should 
have limited itself to learning and knowledge. The university is not the place for concerts 
nor is it a place for inviting singers.  
You took over the role of the state? 
At the time we did not understand that this is the role of the state. We understood 
it was permissible to change evil with hand. When we reached a better knowledge of 
religion, we realized that change with hand is the responsibility of the ruler, while 
change with the tongue is the responsibility of the scholars, and with the heart that of 
the laypersons. The problem of the Islamic movement as we have come to realize is 
that we were undertaking roles not ours, such as the role of the state to change evil and 
so one. However, the state did not change this evil like the selling of drugs, corruption, 
bribery and other forms of perversity. Also, secular extremism was prevalent, while the 
state remained silent.  In fact, the state could do injustice, oppress, imprison, and torture 
while all the hoped for social and political justice were seen missing from the state and 
on the contrary, good and pious examples were seen in the group the more the 
individual melts within it. Two factors existed: there were young men driven by text 
misinterpretation and the heat of youth as well as the surrounding conditions of society 
and the state, where there was no social or political justice.  
 130 
 
You mean that this was a reaction because the state does not take any action? 
This is how we saw it. If anyone goes to the police station to file a report, nothing 
would be done. There was a gang in Asyuṭ who were homosexuals and they were the 
sons of university professors. We would hold those kids and beat them to stop this 
behavior. However, this has a more negative impact because you are entrenching the 
idea of usurping the right of the state to use force. Furthermore, as time passes, bad 
people would jump in, and overcrowd the good people.  
The conclusion I have reached is that when you desire to change using violence, 
you could have people joining you who were originally thugs or bad people. They want 
to wash off their sins in Islam. They are therefore efficient and hardhearted; this is why 
they excel in this approach. This is what happened to us after we have been 
imprisoned. The educational level of the group declined after having had university 
graduates as members, most of the membership is from among holders of vocational 
diplomas and technicians. They used this approach for other issues not simply changing 
evil but to show off themselves in the name of Islam.  
Usually, the Islamist movement after establishment and engaging in the call for 
religion would take the role of opposition. Thus, the character of the Islamic movement 
is rather passive: there is a passion for the role of opposition, and this role cannot be 
abandoned even if it comes to power. The Islamist movement after Morsi’s role 
organized huge demonstrations, even though Islamists are in power and parliament, 
such as the million-march demonstration for legitimacy. What kind of talk is this? You 
have the parliament, the power, the legitimacy! Demonstrations and demands are for 
opposition not for those who are in power.  
Islamist groups and movements have had several issues concerning their 
educational upbringing. First, the individual loves the group and revolves in its orbit. It is 
the cauldron in which the individual acts and reacts because it is the source of learning 
the Quran, knowledge, and educational, political, and administrative matters. Usually, 
such topics are not covered in universities. If the person is employed in a company 
owned by the MB, the company becomes everything – it has become the alternative, as 
the state hasn’t offered anything, not a job opportunity or anything. Second, the 
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individual marries from within the group. Members are committed to one another, and 
they become one and the same thing unconsciously. The individual is more protective 
of the group than of Islam. 
In conclusion, this individual melted within the thought of the group. Nobody had 
ever taught him the thought of the state, and he had never engaged with the state. The 
state prosecutes and excludes, making the person detached from the state, which 
neither provides care nor works with the person, especially when coercion starts. An 
operation of armed violence is usually followed by torture, beating, humiliation, charges, 
and random accusations. Thus, the individual is driven deeper into the arms of the 
group.  
You mentioned that you have prevailed in universities at a time when there was 
no leadership. How was this case?  
Indeed, there was no specific leadership, but we used to learn from the MB who 
attended the camps and tried to control – from afar – the new nascent entity, which 
revitalized them. Similar to the EJI nowadays, the MB at the time had almost clinically 
died. After the calamity between 1954 until 1974, they had almost ceased to exist. Thus, 
when they found this budding entity, which pumped new blood into them, they gave life 
to this newborn. Both entities gave one another much. Had the MB imparted their full 
experience, we would have learnt what to avoid and what to do – such as treating the 
Christians properly. They were afraid though to tell us about their experience. Had they 
told us their mistakes, we would not have joined them. For instance when I am asked 
about torture, I do not talk about it as I believe that over-discussion of torture leads to 
one of two things, first of which is: a wave of pronouncing people infidels, secondly 
followed by a wave of vengefulness and hatred. This is proven by experience of the MB 
who wrote books on the torture. One example is saying “I received a thousand lashes 
when I was taken to prison.” When I have been there, it was only three lashes and 
beating boards, which makes one faint.  
When we started we were obsessed with the thought that this regime is unjust 
and tyrannical, hates religion, and acts as such out of hatred to religion. This and all 
what the MB have experienced was a firm belief in our minds. Later on, we understood 
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that this was a political conflict between the MB and Nasser. Each party believed it was 
more entitled and fit to rule; and as a result they vied – the strong beats the weak and 
inflicts all sorts of torture thereon. It is not a conflict over religion. Had the MB let Nasser 
be, he would not have harmed them. When they opposed him, he penalized them. 
When we were younger, we used to say that the government hates religion and shuns 
it. Evidence shows that Sadat let the supporters of religion be. But we were blinded 
because we were only informed of torture, beating, humiliation, and hatred of religion; 
and we were only told anecdotes about what they have done to this scholar or the other, 
as well as all other ambiguous issues. 
How did the Re-thinking Initiative come into effect? And what is the relative 
significance of the ideological shift in comparison to the security approach? 
We made mistakes, and the regime also made mistakes. In the Initiative we have 
corrected our mistakes and the regime did so, and this is why we agreed. Both sides 
have reviewed their positions autonomously. They did not force us, neither have we 
done so; but when we changed they did. Therefore, the first step for the groups to 
resolve their problems is to change themselves, then, the governments would change. If 
I stop attacking you for a whole year, you would not have any justification to beat me. 
But, as long as I attack the judges and officers, they would torture and beat without 
being instructed to do so by the state, and there would be aggravated sentences. 
Do you believe that Ahmad Raʾfat encouraged the project or was it the state? 
The Initiative was fortunate when the leader of the military wing responded to 
Sheikh Karam and turned himself in together with others (unconditionally). The state 
dealt with them intelligently and professionally. There was no treachery, which made the 
Initiative successful. The role of the state is very important. General Ahmad Raʾfat was 
responsible for this success as he encouraged the state and the intelligence. At the 
beginning of the Initiative, he encouraged the project, and he used to say, “If it fails, I 
will be responsible.” He was courageous and adventurous. Also, Sheikh Karam was the 
real master of the Initiative. He was the originator of the idea. He put his reputation at 
stake to make the project a success.  
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You mentioned that Islamists like to take the side of opposition; do they also like 
to feel victimized?   
Yes, Islamists like to take the side of opposition. After the individual or groups are 
taken to prison, they like to play the role of killed victim. They forget what they have 
done. They say, “We have been tortured, they killed our brother.” They tortured and 
killed and we killed them; they beat us and we beat them; they acted and we did. This 
was our battle and conflict. The conflict was not about religion, but a conflict over power. 
We wanted to change the regime and remove it violently. The state cannot accept this. 
However, the movement only thinks about what the authorities have done to the 
members instead of thinking about the explosions and the like.  
The EJI did not believe in conspiracy theory, if we commit an action we admit it. 
Even after the revolution, it was claimed that Mubarak interfered to have Sadat killed, I 
denied this stating that Mubarak is innocent of Sadat’s blood. Those who killed Sadat 
are well known, and did so out of principle and belief. In their view, Sadat made 
mistakes. However, there is no justification for murdering a person based on this 
mistake. We are not guardians of blood or rulers. One other issue where we made a 
major mistake was the case of Rifʿat al Maḥjūb, and the rumors that he was 
assassinated by Mubarak. I said this before on TV that those who killed him are well 
known, not out of love for Mubarak, but rather for the sake of telling the truth, “truth is 
more worthy to be followed”, 
 In the Islamist movement, all mistakes are foundational. No individual achieved 
any gain from the group. There was no material gain, but membership was all losses. 
Nothing was achieved except humiliation, torture and imprisonment. Most members 
were conscientious, for instance ʿAṣem Abdel-Majid was distinguished and smart. 
Sheikh ʿAṣem and Sheikh ʿEssam came from good families and made sacrifices.  
ʿAṣem wrote most of the books and formulated foundational volumes of the past. He 
was also the one who drafted one of the statements of the Initiative. They were 
geniuses. Ayman el-Ẓawahry was a noble, disciplined, and mannered person. His 
problem was his thought. These people did not make any profits from the EJI. It is naive 
to say so; for example, somebody such as Osama bin Laden does not need any gain 
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from this world. Thus, it is a matter of thought – this is why the deficiency is rather 
intellectual. 
There is also a technical point that is lost to all: had such ideals existed in society 
not in a group, there wouldn’t have been a problem. However, as long as they are a 
group, they would seek change. We try to change, the government confronts them, and 
therefore they say we need to go underground. This is the beginning of slipping; after 
resorting to working underground, they complain that the government is attacking and 
such entity is torturing us, so we need to form a group that responds.  
Do you believe that forming groups is a misguided strategy? 
In brief, when I reviewed groups since their formation in the forties and up to now 
and the fruits of their work, I found both the good and the bad. However, the 
shortcomings overweigh the advantages. Forming a group that goes underground, and 
then forms a special military wing leads to violence. The state arrests everybody and 
not this group only. The state beats and tortures everybody, which causes injustice to 
become prevalent, and this leads to pronouncing people infidels wholesale. The rift 
between us and the state widens and animosity increases. Rulers see no other path but 
torturing and oppressing such people. This chain reaction grows and leads to breaking 
any group that is formed and to their ultimate degradation and imprisonment. The more 
you are hostile towards some rulers, the more unjust and dictatorial they become. Thus, 
we have mobilized two sides: armed violence on the part of Islamists and dictators.  
Armed violence is by no means justified. When you proselytize – your role is to 
call for religion in the light of four concepts: be callers, not judges “Duʿāh la Quḍāh”, 
callers not rulers “Duʿāh la Wulāh”, callers not cruel “Duʿāh la Qusāh”, callers not 
tyrants “Duʿāh la Bughāh”. On Doomsday, would Allah ask us how many have we 
pronounced as infidels or immoral? He won’t ask us this then. He will ask how many 
persons have you managed to attract to religion, how many have you made happy, how 
many have you managed to make merciful? Once you pronounce the ruler infidel, you 
see the ugly face. The infidel ruler must be rebelled against; but not he alone. He and 
his ruling institutions must be rebelled against and changed. “Pharaoh and Haman and 
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(all) their hosts were men of sin”, even the Quran was respectful and said men of sin not 
infidels – unlike ISIS stamping people with this stigma.  
There is a difference between a call for Allah and a call for a group or an 
organization; both are confused. We call any human being to Allah; if they respond, well 
and good, regardless if s/he joins the group. Why are morals on the decline in Egypt, 
despite the existence of many proselytizers? Because most of the calls are party 
oriented, they call for themselves, for their parties, for the ruler, for a sect, for a group – 
all of which are losers. 
To what extent do the concepts of religious sociology apply, regarding the 
deprivation theory or the theory that holds that religion is a form of protest? 
I myself was not deprived of anything – not love not money – and I did not seek 
any power or property. Ayman al-Ẓawahry was convinced: his father was a surgeon, his 
grandfather was Sheikh al-Azhar, his sister a professor, his uncle a dermatologist. 
When food was brought to him, he would not touch it. He was a wealthy person not 
deprived of anything and high up the social scale. Thus, what moved him was rather the 
love of Islam. His project was intellectual (misguided), but partially driven by social and 
political injustices, secular extremism, corruption, and all other motives. The main 
elements of the EJI were from university; they were fine and naturally cultured people 
from the faculties of Medicine and Engineering.  
Then, it was a form of protest?  
The major pitfall of Islamic movements was the stance of opposition. Even if the 
government is good they have to oppose (Ali was opposed and even declared an 
infidel). Both Ali and Muʿawiyah were declared infidels and were both targets of 
assassination. You start with the idea of being in opposition. The worst thing about it is 
that you start as being illegitimate, then an infidel, then you have to change, and then I 
cannot change you except by force. (The problem is that you are denying me any 
means to oppose you).  
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But were there people who suffered from deprivation? What about the remaining 
base of people representing the Islamic movement in the seventies?  
Most of the people came from university students. When there was restriction on 
the activities holders of vocational and professional training certificates joined, 
especially when our work was prohibited in the university. Thus the second phase is of 
lesser quality compared to the earlier leaders. One of the state security officers told me 
that the first generation is irreplaceable. The third and fourth generation is really bad; 
they are rather inclined to violence. They want to be visible.  
The critical point in the EJI shift to bearing arms came through Sheikh Karam 
Zuhdi who was a hasty man and wanted to change everything overnight. He met 
another hasty man, Moḥammad Abdel-Salam, who was Jihad-oriented and who sought 
a coup. Thus, he convinced Zuhdi with the idea of the coup and the underground 
organization after having seen us in the camp, maintaining that since you are a large 
group, you have a strong base of human resources. There was a huge difference 
between the EJI and the Jihad Group. The Jihad was constructed of cluster cells 
working underground without any support from a group of callers. The EJI, however, 
had well known leaders, who could have been easily arrested. The alliance, 
nonetheless, continued because Sadat had then issued the decision of seizing people. 
Fugitives are usually watchful, believing that anyone would arrest and torture him – we 
were inexperienced.  
In September, a decision was issued to arrest everybody until the delivery of 
Sinai, and then all would be released. We did not see this at the time. We thought he 
would do the same thing like Abdel Nasser in 1954, so we escaped. Some of us were 
arrested. Sadat did not stop at that and kept arresting people in groups.  
Thus, the critical point in your shift was this alliance between Karam Zuhdi and 
Moḥammad Abdel Salam?  
Indeed, after having been imprisoned we separated, because they were driven 
with the underground mentality. The mentality of declaring people infidels and the 
mentality of coups ruled. However, from the start we were call oriented.  
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This means that the Re-thinking Initiative was but a restoration of your old 
selves? 
Yes.  
So how did this mentality of coups or armed fight find its way to the EJI? 
It found its way via two specific persons: Karam Zuhdi and Moḥammad Abdel-
Salam. The worst point in the whole history of EJI was the moment of the alliance 
between Karam Zuhdi and Moḥammad Abdel-Salam.  
With what was the Charter of Islamic Action substituted? 
“Man Naḥnu wa Madha Nurīd” (We and What We’ve Desired) (2004-2006). All 
mistakes in the Charter were amended. All ideas were corrected without being pointed 
to. We made substitutions for everything in the new Jamaʿa literature. We did not suffice 
by discussing our own ideas, but we discussed the ideas of all other groups. We were 
the first to respond.  
Was everybody in agreement with the Initiative? 
We pledged that we won’t take with us except those who approved of it. There 
was neither compulsion nor coercions. Only one person disapproved of the Initiative 
and the peaceful approach (one of his relatives died) and he did not come. No one was 
forced to attend. However, we had asked to put the EJI members in prison in separate 
wards to avoid disputes and exchange of abuses. We advised our members not 
respond to any abuse and we urged them to be patient and tolerant even those whose 
brothers had died.  
Does this mean that you prepared the EJI members psychologically? 
The members were convinced with the idea of the Initiative, even those whose 
brothers died out of torture or at the hands of security, even those who were sentenced 
to death or life approved.  
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What did al-Azhar represent to you when you were young students? And what did 
it mean to you when you adopted violence, and after this period?  
We used to like al-Azhar, but there were some who would defame key figures of 
al-Azhar such as Sayyed Sabiq and al-Baqouri – whom they used to call al-Munafiqury. 
However, the EJI did not fall into this trap of hatred, though we believed that al-Azhar 
lives in the shadows of the government, and cannot progress because it is tied by the 
government. Later on, we realized that Islam cannot develop without al-Azhar; the Book 
and Prophetic traditions cannot be preserved without al-Azhar, because Islamic 
movements were always subject to disasters and tribulations. Nonetheless, we liked al-
Azhar and were opened to it at the time of the Initiative as without it, Islamic 
jurisprudence scholarship would be lost. But the truth is, al-Azhar had no role to play in 
this Initiative, not even in the Committee of the Wise Men (Committee of Mediators). In 
fact, the catalyst of this Committee was Dr. Salim al-ʿAwwa.  
Did the state try to open paths of dialogue with Islamic groups after the Sadat 
accident? 
Yes, Ḥassan Abu Basha (former minister of interior affairs) and General Fouʾad 
ʿAllam tried. However, Abu Basha was transferred and Fouʾad ʿAllam left the State 
Security Department. Zaki Badr was their successor, and had no knowledge of political 
security. For him all Islamists were all the same – he didn’t differentiate between EJI 
and the Jihad Group or the MB for that matter. All had to go to prison. His policies hit us 
in the heart and led the political wing to confrontation with the state once more, which 
rekindled violence. Badr arrested whoever would just hang the announcement of a 
lecture.  
ʿOmar Abdel-Raḥman made a fatwa of fasting for 60 days after the Asyuṭ events? 
He believed that the Asyuṭ event were wrong. In fact, he was an Azharite in 
thought, and EJI was the one that influenced him not otherwise. He was not the one in 
control. The EJI assigned him to defend the brothers. This was not his line of thought. 
This was what was written and exchanged among generations. It was a group of 
brothers who prepared the book. Everyone accepted the Initiative except Sheikh Rifaʿi 
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and his rejection ended up with his arrest. Osama Ḥafez and ʿEṣam Derbala later 
changed their positions.  
Have they changed their positions because they were influenced by the 
Initiative or by the events? 
  Sheikh Osama Ḥafez has always been peaceful, but with rather strict opinions. 
He did not partake in violence. He was always opposing governments. Sheikh ʿAṣem, 
unfortunately, has been among the first to write the statements of the Initiative and one 
of the early supporters. However, his flaw is that amidst crowds, he would become 
zealous and tends to play on emotions. Another flaw in Sheikh ʿAṣem is that he needs 
to have an enemy all the time. If he failed to find one, he would make one. 
How did the EJI look administratively? 
When the military wing was dissolved the first time, there were no casualties 
(when al-Huḍaybi in the MB tried to discipline the Secret Section, there were 
assassinations, but thank goodness, Sheikh Karam Zuhdi managed to end the issue of 
the military wing calmly and smoothly.  
Do you believe that the EJI was democratized internally through Majlis al-Shura?  
Since the outset the EJI was driven by consultation. ʿOmar Abdel-Raḥman 
was in the Majlis al-Shura headed by Sheikh Karam. The Jihad Group became a 
separate group after imprisonment. Sheikh Abbud and Tarek joined the group. 
The consultative council used to be in control. There was a council in prison and 
another outside. Thus, consultation was there from the beginning and decisions 
were taken by majority.  
Has the EJI deviated from the Initiative? Do you think the Initiative deviated? 
No, it has not deviated. The deviation was external to the key line of the EJI. 
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But how do you explain the resignation of many of the historical leaders such as 
yourself, Karam Zuhdi, and Ḥamdi Abdel-Raḥman? 
They have resigned primarily because they could see what would happen next. 
Had you read the resignation letter, you would have found fear of deviation from the 
path of the Initiative. The future is not promising. Many of the members were arrested. 
Part of the leaders died. They are prevented from undertaking any activity political or 
religious. The decision of joining “Supporting Legitimacy Alliance” was wrong. All of this 
led to resignation. However, I felt that matters were not going in the right direction. I do 
not think there is a return to violence but rather a return to conflict, i.e. conflict with the 
state (we are not properly understood).  
Does this mean that the EJI is in a juncture? Or is it on the path to 
moderation, or caught in violence? 
The Jamaʿa shall not revert to violence but will become weaker, even if some try 
to leave. The name of the Jamaʿa shall remain connected to the Initiative. This Initiative 
is more logical than conflict, because it created a momentum that cannot be overlooked.  
Whenever a charter or method is sought, only the Initiative comes to mind. 
What is the position of the EJI towards the legitimacy of democracy? 
After 25 January, they established a party named Al-Bināʾ wa al-Tanmiyah.          
I believe that that the group has not yet matured democratically. 
Do you think that the line of the Initiative is linked to some leaders? 
If the upholders of the idea disappear, the idea will die; if the upholders of the 
opposing idea and become a majority, they will take matters to the direction they like. 
Leadership definitely has an effect.  
Do you see the basic factors of success (of the revisions) available for other 
groups? Are there factors such as leadership? 
Currently, success factors are available. The MB is the only one who has such 
factors: leadership, thought, and organizational structure.   
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Interview with Fouʾad ʿAllam on December 6th, 2015 
(Former Deputy Chief of State Security Department) 
 
What is the principal reason behind the adoption of violent extremism by the 
(EJI)? 
President Anwar Al-Sadat assigned Moḥammad Othman Ismail, the MB affiliate 
and the then Asyuṭ governor, the task of establishing Islamist groups in the Egyptian 
universities to confront leftist groups who were against al-Sadat’s policies. Al-Sadat 
made this move without the prior knowledge of the Egyptian security agencies and even 
restricted them from taking any procedures against these groups. This policy didn’t 
change until Omar al-Telmisani, the then Murshid (leader) of MB and Abd al-Mun’im 
Abu al-Futuh dared to criticize him in a public meeting.  
What are the subjective and objective factors that had contributed to the success 
of the ending-violence Initiative? 
The relationship based on human considerations that developed between 
General Ahmad Raʾfat, (chief of Counter Fanaticism Section in the in the State Security 
Department), and the EJI’s historical leaders contributed significantly in rendering the 
Initiative successful. Unfortunately, their books stopped to be printed after his death. 
The chain was broken by the death of Ahmad Raʾfat, who used to hear from them, and 
carry their messages to whom it would concern.  
Do other militant Islamist groups possess the elements of success of the Re-
thinking Initiative as possessed by the EJI?  
The circumstances differ for every group. It is for the first time that militant groups 
like “ISIS” take over large country lands, the first time to have huge funding and the first 
time to own large amounts of weapons. There should be specialized systems to study 
how those should be combated. Also, a difference between the current militant groups 
and EJI is that EJI members studied in the same universities and were later imprisoned 
together in the same cells, unlike ISIS and al-Qaʿida that are decentralized with a lot of 
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secret cells and branches worldwide. A global organization has to be formed and should 
consist of 300 or 400 experts in every relative field to combat terrorism.  
So what is the Fiqhi doctrine that they refer to in order to legitimize carrying out 
massacres? 
They are more fanatic than Sayyid Qutb himself. They did not live during his time 
neither meet him. The ones who did are the old members. The new members’ ideology 
is affected by that of Qutb’s who views the world as jahili. He contends that in order to 
save the world from this jahiliyyah, Muslims must found the Islamic group that would 
establish the Islamic state. This idea was great for them and attractive for the lay 
persons. Also, when you look at Hassan al-Banna’s two rasaʾil (writings) of political 
parties and dealings, they both call clearly for takfīr. He describes those who believe in 
political parties as infidel and so are those who participate in political parties because 
parties lead to the dispersion of Muslims. 
To what extent can we depend on the Re-thinking books in understanding the 
behavior of the Islamist movements? 
The Re-thinking Initiative is very important. When we see the examples of Najeḥ 
Ibrahim or Karam Zuhdi or similar groups, we realize that they did not have inclination to 
violence at the first place, and that violence was not instilled in their minds. This is 
obvious because; they studied the experience and found out that result would have 
been more successful if addressed in a scientific way. The problem is that other violent 
Islamist groups neither benefited from them, nor from their books. The EJI lost their 
credibility in the eyes of other militant groups, because they deserted jihad.  
What are the EJI’s current chances of success at the preaching and social levels, 
and politically through their “Building and Development” party? 
There must be political will on the part of the state to be fully convinced that out 
of 15000, they can benefit from at least one thousand. There should be political will so 
we can benefit from the behavior and experience of those groups. We should 
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communicate the message seeking the help media experts, like I did before with “Hilmi 
Al-Buluk”.  
Do you think the mediation committee is a successful idea? 
The reconciliation committee including El-Shaʿrawi, al-ʿAwwa and Abul-Majd, 
was the idea of Abul-Majd. But it came to an end because of a conflict among the 
political leadership. This was the result of giving the wrong picture to the president.  
Do you believe in negotiations? 
 It’s a very successful experience, although it is limited in the case of MB with 
whom no negations took place. My mistake was that I focused on re-thinking the 
ideologies of the takfīrī groups, not on that of the MB’s. My fault was that I did not start 
the negotiations with MB, simultaneously with my negotiations with the takfiris. This is 
because the takfīrī thought and organization was the most dangerous during the time. 
My main concern was to face it first, at this level. 
What are the prospects of success for the presence of the EJI on the daʿwa, 
social and political arenas?  
If there were no political will to benefit from them in a scientific way, it will come 
to an end. Even worse, the members at the grassroots may become more rebellious. 
 
 
  
 144 
 
Interview with Kamal Ḥabib on December 8th, 2015 
(Former core-leader in al-Jihad Group and a Specialist in Islamist Movements) 
 
What is the principal reason behind the adoption of violent extremism by the EJI? 
  The EJI started violence in the context of the promotion of virtue and prevention 
of vice. They came from Upper Egypt, and Upper Egypt has its own customs and 
traditions: the use of arms, violence, vengeance, and tribalism. 
Also, the youth factor, as young people believe that violence is an easy path to 
change, violence is luring; because it achieves a change on the ground. More 
importantly, I believe was the following: The EJI did not start with a project or an 
organization. The members met with the Jihad Group in Lower Egypt (Moḥammad 
Abdel Salam Faraj) who carried the Jihadist legacy since 1974, Faraj criticized the 
current groups (the MB and the Tablīgh Group) and indicated that the lacking obligation 
is that of Jihad. This project gave the EJI a symbolic moral frame for violence. 
The main shift in the EJI was meeting the Jihad Group who maintained that the 
Islamic state could be achieved using armed force. Their start without a project pushed 
them towards violence. Indeed, this is an old project, since the end of the sixties. These 
were ideas taken from Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taimiya. They shifted from the idea of 
promoting virtue and prohibiting vice, randomly on campus. Their role grew. They took 
Sheikh ʿOmar Abdel-Raḥman as an Azharite reference, and to be their façade.  
There are other factors connected to character and psychological aspects. There 
is the Afghani factor, which entailed pulling the youth there. Both the Algerian and 
Afghani factors were key sources of violence by the EJI. Also, the rise of Salafi thought 
was the result of inundating the country with the thought and fatwas of Ibn Taimiya more 
than the thought of Qutb. They read the works about the abstaining sect (at-ta’ifa al 
mumtaniʿah).The influence of Ibn Taimiya was much greater than that of Qutb, all of 
which are intellectual sources for violence using what we term “interpretation.” 
The difference between the EJI and Jihad is that EJI sprung from the university, it 
was semi-public, without a project, promoting virtue and prohibiting vice rather 
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emotionally, coherent, having tribal affiliations, and very patriarchal. Geographically, the 
members come from Upper Egypt upholding the customs and traditions of the region. 
The Jihad, on the other hand, is a rather civilian organization. There were no 
discrepancies in creed except after imprisonment.  
The other groupings were Salafist and did not declare a Muslim to be infidel 
without having committed an error that deserves such. Hence, the generation of the 
seventies has a history of wasted opportunities. The MB was exhausted by 
imprisonment. The new generation was volunteering for revenge from the times of 
Nasser, which made them talk about torture (Al Bawwaba al-Sawdaʾ [The Black Gate], 
by Ahmad Rai’f, was quite exaggerated; because the youth were angry at the time.  
In terms of belief, these were simple people. The simple Salafist idea prevailed. 
Jihad were more involved in intellectual dialogue; prayer behind the imams, political 
oppression, and so on, we (al-Jihad Group) were also under the influence of 
exaggerations  
To what extent do the concepts of religious sociology apply, regarding the 
deprivation theory and the theory that holds that religion is a form of protest? 
Most of the members of the Islamist groups were not deprived. They were not 
poor. It was a crisis of identity, and this is the closest interpretation of the whole thing. 
Economic interpretations or theories of deprivation are not fit for responding to this 
issue. This is not a social movement. The interpretation is cultural, value-oriented, 
identity related. Identity is the key point.  After the project of nationalism collapsed, 
people started to search for a new identity. The old identity was Arab nationalism, which 
was broken before Israel and could not deliver, neither was secularism capable.  
You think that religion is a venue for protest?  
Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 onwards, the perception of religion started 
to change in the West and the non-Western worlds. As a framework for protest, we 
applauded the Iranian revolution and considered it a revolution against Israel. It was an 
example for destroying a secular regime and the US. This was the side we saw of the 
Iranian Revolution, not that it turned into a sectarian country. We didn't realize that it 
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was filling the power vacuum at the expense of the Arabs and the Sunna. This is where 
religion started as a tool for protest; it was the authority for protest. When the Khawarij 
came, they claimed to protect religion (God). Also, the Umayyads and the history of 
Arabs and Muslims shows this. The crisis is the connection made between power 
"sultan" and the Quran. The more the state is separated from Shari’ah (Islamic Law), a 
crisis of identity is created, particularly the state with exaggerated secularism. This was 
the cause for protest on religious basis.  
In Egypt, we are not as secular as Turkey. The Constitution of 1923 stated that 
Islam is the key source of legislation. However, with the aggravation of crises in the 
seventies, the rise of the Church, the rise of the Islamists, religion started to be used. 
The state manipulated religion to exploit social, political, and religious groups, which is 
very grave. In this case, power is not separate from the Quran, but the Quran is 
exploited for self-interest. This is a very dangerous issue. The Khawarij said: “the 
command is for none but Allah”. They used this claim to confront Ali ibn Abi Taleb. 
Thus, they used religion to confront Ali. This is Invalid interpretation.  
Al-Jihad groups are anarchist movements against power whatsoever. Islam has 
a position towards the unjust ruler. The Jihad members believed in theories of defying 
the ruler. They saw this as part of belief. They don’t see this as part of the thought that 
could change with the change of time and place. This is why all the terminology of the 
religious discourse should be reviewed.  
The EJI had a problem of self-affirmation vis-à-vis the project of Jihad. Therefore, 
they created the Charter for Islamic Action, which upheld the words of Ibn Taimiya. 
Do you believe the Re-thinking Initiative was a successful intellectual shift or the 
outcome of security treatment? 
Violence is not inherent in the methodology of the EJI, unlike the Jihad Group. 
They had the possibility of becoming open. Violence and counter-violence started in the 
eighties. The EJI could have been one of the political players. The state requested that 
there would be a separation between those who work in calling for religion and those 
who are interested in governance. However, the state realized that they didn’t comply 
and it had to react to the Islamist’s violence repressively.  
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 However, the members of the EJI remained restless. When they were 
imprisoned, they started to reconsider. Even if some people took tortuous paths, those 
who started with daʿwa want to return to it, such as Dr. Najeḥ Ibrahim. Also, The EJI is a 
local organization. The local element was strong, which made revisionism easier. The 
Jihad is rather global and regional. It is much more difficult.  
Has the security given the members the opportunity to enter into revisions and to 
realize the consequences? 
The security treatment, arrests, repeated violence, pressure in prison and open 
violence were the main features. The EJI started to attack tourists in the early nineties. 
This topic of attacking tourists is quite sensitive. No one could accept the violence of the 
group with tourists. The group deviated from a wise project to adopt violence. Violence 
is seductive. However, it leads the proponents to an impasse – what to do next? 
Violence for the sake of violence has to come to an end. It is used for political reasons; 
you tie the noose around your neck. However, violence without controls leads to chaos. 
The security tried violence and counter-violence from 1990-1997. If one of the sides 
persists on violence, it’s not going to work out.  
Gradually, some of the officers put themselves up to the mission. They accepted 
the task. They accepted to negotiate the thoughts. Also, Karam Zuhdi did so. He had 
strong convictions. Moreover, he did not uphold the project of violence initially.  
Intellectually, have you influenced the revisions? 
We reviewed positions and we used to engage in discussions. General Fouʾad 
ʿAllam believed in dialogue. Dialogue is important. We need intellectual dialogues once 
again. I exited in 1991 and produced the book Al-Ḥaraka al-Islamiyya min al-Muwajaha 
ila al-Murajaʿa (The Islamic Movement from Confrontation to Revision). 
Do you believe that the Re-thinking Initiative was successful? 
Yes. The revisions were also quite useful for the EJI in Libya (Moḥammad Ali el-
Salabi) and in Saudi Arabia. What the EJI managed to do isn’t attainable by al-Azhar or 
even Dar al-Iftāʾ. Dar al-Iftāʾ is the mouthpiece of politics not religion and this 
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catastrophic. The same intellectual revisions are not as credible among other groups. 
We were accused of being weak.  
I believe Intellectual revisions were successful for the many reasons the most 
important of which is the production of Intellectual material responding to questions 
based on old ideas as: Jihad a means or an end? May promoting virtue and prohibiting 
vice be conducted by an individual person? Tourism and tourists, Christians and the 
position towards them, and detaching the factor of violence. 
Is the recantation of some members considered to be a failure of the Initiative?  
No, it was not. There were individual differences (ʿAṣem, for example has his 
mindset). This was a very good experience. If it is revived and reintroduced, it could be 
good. This was a successful and a unique experience. The experience is very 
important. The Initiative shall remain to be an important topic. The group remained to be 
coherent. The EJI did not have a project of violence, but a political project.  
Do other militant Islamist groups possess the elements of success of the Re-
thinking Initiative as possessed by the EJI? 
This is a very unique case of the EJI and does not help in projections. By the end 
of the sixties, the MB wrote a book “Duʿah la Quḍah.” Had the MB not entered into 
power, they could have continued on the political path. The MB cannot live separately 
from the state, but oppose it. The MB is capable sooner or later; Mahmoud Ezzat and 
Ibrahim Mounir are attacked by some of the younger members. The new youth maintain 
that they are revolutionary, which is a cover for violence. There is an internal conflict 
within the MB currently. They will negotiate with the state from inside prisons 
As for other groups, there are elements in ISIS who are mainly concerned with 
writing and researching as well as broadcasting on the internet; and their work is read 
by the youth. The absence of an intellectual project is what makes ISIS ideas appealing 
to them.  
A very important issue is the redefinition of Islamist groups of themselves with 
the post 2011 revolution. With the rise of ISIS and other groupings, barriers among 
groups were blurred.  
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What are the opportunities for success of the EJI with the state? How could it 
continue? 
Continuity is tied to setting itself free from the control of the “Alliance to Support 
Legitimacy”, and is linked to moral responsibility. It needs to consider itself as an 
intellectual group offering Egypt an intellectual project. If the group remains as it is, it 
shall become even weaker in the future. The second generation is even more violent, 
especially those who went to Afghanistan. However, it is still capable of taking steps as 
Al-Wasat Party had done (Abul ʿila Maḍi). 
Egypt is a state that needs to reach the right mix. Egypt should respect religion 
and should not appear to be antagonistic to it. It is very important to put religion in 
consideration so that the state would look just.  At the same time, a new discourse for the 
Islamists is required, and the state needs to accept them. Regardless Erdogan, the 
experience of Turkey was very important as a conservative democracy. Confidence 
should be built.  
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Interview with Ahmad Kamal Abul-Majd on December 16th, 2015 
A prominent Islamic scholar, and member of the  
Mediators Committee of the Initiative 
 
What is the principal reason behind the adoption of violent extremism by the EJI? 
In some cases, this is due to misinterpreting the text and, in others, to the 
political repression. The political repression usually leads to violating the limits of all 
laws and orders. The militant groups, who misinterpret the text, are excused because of 
their ignorance. The correct Islamic approach leaves us in no need of these 
approaches. The one who uses violence cannot be excused. Inventing excuses would 
cause violence to spread. Why should I use two swords in my slogan? The slogan 
“Islam is the solution” is a reduction of many meanings in few words. But this is 
dangerous when the one who interpret these words is not qualified. 
To what extent do the concepts of religious sociology apply, regarding the 
deprivation theory or the theory that holds that religion is a form of protest? 
It is hard to provide one single answer to this problem that has different forms. 
Some instances and reactions indicate that those people are deprived. Many of the 
lower classes are deprived. Some extremist reactions are caused by deprivation. 
ʿOmar, the second Caliph, said:    
 “I wonder why the one who does not find sustenance for himself and for his 
family does not attack people.” 
In reality, phenomena are hard to explain through one answer because one 
phenomenon may be an expression for many meanings. For example, in the deprivation 
theory, the deprived deviates, bears grudges, and protests, but to protest is more 
courageous. I have rights and the others have rights as well. This sort of protest is 
required. There are some people who resort to violence and protest while they do not 
suffer deprivation.  
Everyone should recognize the distinction between protest that brings people 
closer and the one that provokes alienation. Protesting is not healthy when it continues 
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because it keeps the phenomenon going. If everyone manipulated the law for himself, 
we would indulge into civil war. I’m wondering how Muslim Brotherhood’s situation 
became that bad.  
What did motivate you to become a mediator in the Initiative? 
I visited them in prison and found among them individuals of reasonable thinking 
who gave me some of their writings. I realized that they did not constitute any danger.    
I never thought that someone like Nageḥ Ibrahim would attack someone with a bomb for 
example. I found out that there was hope but there was shortcoming at the part of the 
state and Muslim scholars. Also, the prosecution practiced against some of the group’s 
member is a subject that one cannot be silent on. 
In your point of view, did the Initiative succeed? 
The revisions by the EJI are exceptional. People look for solutions that both 
please Allah and remove hardships. In order for the Initiative to be reproduced, there 
should be a way of communication characterized with tolerance, forgiveness and 
lenience. But this won’t be the case if they used violence. If someone attacked me with 
a weapon, it is logical that I would respond with a stronger one. The Re-thinking Books 
that effective, being authored by the individuals who used violence, gives them 
credibility and effect for them but not us. 
The current EJI’s website is different from the old one The current one contains 
pictures of ʿOmar Abdel -Raḥman, words like “the military ruling regime”. 
This is nonsense. But we still shouldn’t fight them. We should give way to 
peaceful negotiations first. 
Is this an indication that the EJI is retracting the Initiative? 
The fact is that the second-line leaders are not that serious and moving closer to 
violence. The suffering that people would experience as a result of that is clear. 
This Initiative seems to have transitional justice mechanism? 
The Initiative included concessions and reconciliation within a social conflict. 
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There are opinions that religion has a positive role in the procedures of the 
transitional justice. Is this due to the religion’s principles of toleration and 
forgiveness? 
Religion is an essential component because it addresses an issue and it’s 
opposite. 
Do you think al – Azhar has a role? 
Al-Azhar does not have influence on extremist groups because they discredit al-
Azhar. However, al-Azhar took positive steps in this regard. 
Could you give us examples of the steps taken by al-Azhar in this regard? 
The most important steps are: revising the content of the curriculum, and 
preparing a team of successful leaders who travel abroad and can speak more than one 
language. They are at ages that qualify them to work actively. This work will be fruitful 
seen. 
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Interview with Kamal Boraiqaʿ on December 29th, 2015 
Lecturer in the Faculty of Language and Translation, Al-Azhar University, member 
of the Interfaith Dialogue and Head of English Department in Al-Azhar Observer 
 
What is the principal reason behind the adoption of violent extremism by the EJI? 
From the very beginning, the EJI emerged as a radical group. They were drawing 
on the thought of Sayyed Qutb and al-Mawdudi. The writings of Mawdudi and Qutb 
legitimatize violence against the regime. However, one can discern some factors that 
led to the emergence and proliferation of this radical group in 1970s in Egypt. Politics 
was one of these important factors that led to their appearance, as President Anwar al-
Sadat encouraged the emergence of this Islamist radical group as a counterweight to 
the Nasserite –dominated associations and student unions. The Theological factor 
should be underlined here as this group and others  were  the victims of Qutb’s deviant 
thought that goes against the interpretation of the well-reputed Muslim scholars who 
represent the main stream Islam and  reflects the true image of Muslim faith. This is 
besides some social and economic factors that led to the rapid development of this 
group particularly in Upper Egypt, such as illiteracy, poverty, lack of social services, and 
the rise in the number of independent mosques that was not dominated by the Ministry 
of Religious Endowment. The mosques provided a safe environment for recruits and 
brainwash of new members who joined the group. 
To what extent do the concepts of religious sociology apply, regarding the 
deprivation theory or the theory that holds that religion is a form of protest? 
Both theories are applicable. The theory of religion as a form of protest could be 
applied to the leaders and founders of EJI and the second theory to their followers. 
How did the Re-thinking Initiative come into effect? And what is the relative 
significance of the ideological shift in comparison to the security approach? 
The joint efforts of al-Azhar and the government played an important role to render 
these Initiatives successful. The security approach provided a safe environment to the 
detained members of the EJI to think their ideologies over. One of the criteria held by 
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the EJI to promote the ordinary members to an ʾamir is that he should be tried and 
imprisoned; they used to take pride of the number of years they spent in jail. However, 
none could think to change his ideology if he were outside the jail, as he will be 
threatened and will inevitably suffer the tragic end of being killed and assassinated at 
the hands of the faithful members of the Jamaʿa who will consider killing such disloyal 
members as an act of obedience that will bring them close to God.  The jail was a safe 
meeting point between the scholars of al-Azhar who were easily able to decontextualize 
and refute the very basis of the arguments raised by the uneducated and unspecialized 
leaders of the group.  Peer pressure and the fear of being assassinated by other 
members of the groups make us safely believe that these re-thinking initiatives would be 
impossible to succeed if it has taken place outside prison. 
Has the Re-thinking Initiative achieved an end to EJI violence? And does the 
subsequent rejection of the Initiative by some operatives of the EJI represent a 
failure for the Initiative?  
The Re-thinking Initiative was completely successful. The subsequent rejection of 
the Initiative by some operatives of the EJI does not represent a failure in any way as 
their number were very few in comparison to the number and position held by those 
who changed their ideology. The circumstances were different, so there is no room to 
talk about resurrection of the old ones, however there are some other factors such as 
the manipulation of those members to serve a hidden agenda or/and their political 
aspirations to be the rulers of Egypt in case of the success of their coup d’état attempts 
that has nothing to do with theological arguments.  
Do other militant Islamist groups possess the elements of success of the Re-
thinking Initiative as possessed by the EJI?  
We should differentiate between extremism and terrorism. Dialogue is not always 
the proper method to combat terrorism. However, it is the proper method to combat 
extremism. 
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What are the prospects of success for the presence of the EJI on the daʿwa, 
social and political arenas?  
The EJI has already faded in the Egyptian society. It has no real weight in the 
Egyptian society. The active role of al-Azhar in daʿwa, the renewal of religious 
discourse, the ease through which the young men obtain information, the increase of 
religious awareness, the large number of educated people and the containment 
approach made the proliferation and reemergence of the  EJI in the Egyptian society 
very difficult.  
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Interview with Kamal al-Helbawi on January 1st, 2016 
Ph.D. in political science, dissident member of the MB, Ex-spokesperson and 
member of MB Shura Council 
 
What is the principal reason behind the adoption of violent extremism by the EJI? 
The principal reason behind the adoption of violent extremism by the EJI, is the 
high aspiration to establish an Islamic State even by military struggle since political 
peaceful means were totally closed due to political repression and absence of 
democratization process. Of course this move, in general, was due to text 
misinterpretation both of Quran and Traditions in addition to early Salafi fatwas. 
How did the Re-thinking Initiative come into effect? And what is the relative 
significance of the ideological shift in comparison to the security approach? 
The Re-thinking Initiative came into effect due to different reasons and 
circumstances, among them the popular feeling of insecurity, the solicitors’ contacts in 
the courts with the leaders, the will of the Ministry of Interior to end the struggle, the well 
trusted ʿUlamāʾ, scholars, in addition to the growing rational concept of some leaders 
such as Dr. Najeḥ Ibrahim. Yes, both the ideological shift and the security approach, 
assisted in rendering the Initiative successful. I do believe that the ideological shift and 
relative proper understanding of Islam had more weight in this regard. 
Has the Re-thinking Initiative achieved an end to violence? Does the rejection of 
the Initiative by some operatives of the EJI represent a failure for the Initiative?  
The Re-thinking Initiative achieved some success in relieving violence, but it did 
not bring an end to it and will never do that. There are members and leaders in the EJI 
who will never stop this wrong attitude like Eng. ʿAṣem ʿAbdel-Majid for example. I met 
some of those infected persons in Afghanistan who considered themselves the 
only Muslims on earth. The Initiative succeeded in this regard. In this area there is only 
relative success. No absolute achievement and no end for violence until the Day of 
Judgment. The disease of violence needs continuous treatment on different levels 
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because; it yields Takfīr and Istiḥlal and both lead to military struggle and the wrong 
belief of martyrdom (suicide operation).  
What are the subjective and objective factors that had contributed to the success 
of the ending-violence Initiative? 
The subjective and objective factors that contributed to the success of the ending 
violence Initiative include: the impact of some entrusted personalities like Sheikh al-
Shaʿrawi, Sheikh al-Ghazali, Dr. al-ʿAwwa and others. They also include the continuous 
suppression and chase to the members of the EJI and their families. This is in addition 
to emergence of other fiqhi valid opinions. 
Do other militant Islamist groups possess the elements of success of the Re-
thinking Initiative as possessed by the EJI?  
No and yes at the same time. I do not think that a group like Daʿish possesses 
the elements of success as those possessed by the EJI. They believe that they 
contributed a mile to establish the Khilafa. They have gained and controlled materials, 
equipment, money, world recognition, in addition to areas like Peshawar in Pakistan on 
the borders of Afghanistan. Some other smaller groups can accept the EJI Initiative of 
Re-thinking violence if properly approached. The behavior of other Islamist militant 
movements has similar and different reasons for revolt and carrying guns. We cannot 
rely totally on the Initiative to comprehend and predict the behavior of all other Islamist 
militant movements. During the MB parliament, we saw a member raising Azan for 
prayers during the session. It is so far difficult to have proper dialogue with any of them. 
What are the prospects of success for the presence of the EJI on the daʿwa, 
social and political arenas? In other words, what is the future of the EJI?  
Prospects of success for the EJI on the daʿwa, social, and political arenas are 
meager. It could be only individual. The process may need two or three generations to 
succeed. Comprehensive strategy is required including educational curriculum and 
proper implementation of the democratization process. 
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Interview with Karam Zuhdi on January 4th, 2016 
Ideologue, a historical leader and former EJI General ʾamir 
 
What is the principal reason behind the adoption of violent extremism by the EJI? 
This takes us back to the seventies which was a decade full of takfīr and 
intimidation as a result of the foregoing decade that beheld conflicts with the Islamic 
current. As soon as President Sadat came to power, there were remainders of the 
memories of the shed blood, in 1965 that preachers –not only MB - always used to 
mention causing the mobilization of youth to take revenge and pursue violence. 
Although Sadat was too patient, showed sympathy to youth and kept announcing that 
he doesn’t want youth to enter jails anymore, however, preachers’ speeches continued 
to grow in provoking violence and calling for Jihad.   
To what extent do the concepts of religious sociology apply, regarding the 
deprivation theory or the theory that holds that religion is a form of protest? 
 Actually, the real influence was religious and intellectual. Youth got influenced just 
by attending a lecture that called for extremism in religious rulings. If deprivation was or 
not an influence, it’s a yes; it definitely had a side influence, but we can’t say it’s the 
driving force. The real driving force was intellectual, and it is also the only path now to 
influence them to renounce violence. Intellectual confrontation is the key.    
So can we say that security oppression caused you to renounce violence? 
No. security had no influence on changing our minds. We announced the 
Initiative and we asked the security for help in providing us with the books we needed 
and we let go of our conditions that we initially desired from the state. 
Did the security forces respond to your demands? 
Yes, they did via specific persons as Ahmad Ra’fat. He believed us and that we 
didn’t launch the Initiative to push them to release us from prisons. We were almost 
done with our penalty period (only one or two years were left on our release by then). 
We were honest when we announced the Initiative and we were very keen to spread the 
corrections of our old conceptions inside prison.  Dialogue is the key word. From our 
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experience with the Initiative, we can conclude the following; what drove us to issue 
doctrines and refute them later is misinterpreting the text.     
Has the Re-thinking Initiative undertaken by the EJI achieved an end to violence?   
Yes, the Initiative went through many stages. General Ahmad Raʾfat allowed us 
to tour the prisons and hold lecture and provided buses to take us. Fortunately enough, 
our lectures were of great influence and I claim that violent ideas were terminated after 
this tour.    
And does the subsequent rejection of the Initiative by some operatives of the EJI 
as ʿAṣem Abdel-Majid- represent a failure for the Initiative?  
There are members who claim they didn’t approve the Initiative in the first place 
although they participated in writing our Correction of Conceptions Books. Any 
drawback in their stances is intimidated by members of other groups after the 25th of 
January revolution and only aims at attaining personal gains that have nothing to do 
with the EJI stance.  
Do other militant Islamist groups possess the elements of success of the Re-
thinking Initiative as possessed by the EJI?  
Yes, definitely. I wish that MB leaders reach an agreement for reconciliation with 
the Egyptian regime in the first place and the whole international society in general.         
I consider the acts committed by MB a reason for havoc in all Islamic countries and 
Muslim youth. We have to revise the old Initiative in a contemporary way starting with 
members in Upper Egypt and those who show violent inclinations, then spread the idea 
in the rest of the governorates.     
What are the prospects of success for the presence of the EJI on the daʿwa, 
social and political arenas?  
The future of the Initiative is tied to EJI’s success to start a constructive dialogue 
that the state has to support in order for the Initiative to re-succeed. The desire of some 
EJI current core leaders to seek power and authority is the reason for our resignation 
now to set an example for all members of the group that one should do good in 
devotion, sincerity and faith in Allah, regardless of the benefits, positions or rewards.   
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What are the subjective and objective factors that had contributed to the success 
of the ending-violence Initiative?  
There should be general and specific factors to render any Initiative successful. 
As far as the EJI's Initiative is concerned, the main influencing factor is the mutual 
empathy and sympathy between the two sides: state and the EJI. The former is 
represented by the State Security Department’s officers of the ex-regime, who carried 
on negotiations on behalf of the political regime (Mubarak’s regime), and the latter is 
represented by the EJI members. The feelings emerging from EJI members towards 
security officers can be defined as a bit of “Stockholm syndrome”, defined as “the 
psychological phenomenon in which hostages express empathy, sympathy and positive 
feelings toward their captors, sometimes to the point of defending and identifying with 
them”. The offender (criminal) here is the EJI members who directed their violence 
towards civilians and policemen. The EJI members later felt they were the ones who 
pushed the counter attack from the state. They even started justifying the oppression 
and torture practiced against them since the moment they were arrested till they were 
judged and even exceeded that period. They contended that torture was forgiven 
because; it was in return for the violence they started at the first place and that torture 
was a tool of obtaining information about the group. (I have to mention my disagreement 
regarding this point because torture cannot be forgiven under any circumstances). 
On the other hand, the State Security Department, as well as the Prisons 
Department officers, felt guilty about the torture crimes they committed for EJI prisoners 
to extract information. That could be a reason why they accepted the Initiative, once it 
was offered by the EJI leaders. It is worth mentioning here that 44 officers at that time 
were accused of practicing torture, but they were finally acquitted. 
The above mentioned discussion dealt with the objective reasons that led to the 
success of the Initiative. Meanwhile, the subjective factor is the existence of charismatic 
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negotiators, at one side is General Ahmad Raʾfat, who represented the State Security 
Agency, and on the other side, prominent EJI's leaders: Karam Zuhdi and Najeḥ 
Ibrahim. Those two sides developed a unique interpersonal relationship that was mostly 
evident in the scene on General Ahmad Raʾfat’s funeral when I met Dr. Najeḥ Ibrahim, , 
and the latter was praying:  
“May he –General Ahmad Raʾfat - rest in peace; for relieving the suffering and 
pain of hundreds of Muslim families who were released from prison because of his 
mediation” AMEN.  
Finally, there are some indicators to the setback of the EJI in case of lack of state 
support, societal containment, and resurrection of the Initiative by EJI historical leaders. 
Otherwise, the Initiative is likely to turn on its heels and lay in ashes. However, it will 
remain - at least theoretically -  a leading unprecedented imperial practice in the Islamic 
world in the previous century, and a reference for all Islamist militant groups who look 
forward to copying it, only if sincere intentions exist.             
Do other militant Islamist groups possess the elements of success of the Re-
thinking Initiative as possessed by the EJI? 
It is not likely for other similar fanatic groups to hold a similar Initiative; as the 
current violent groups like “ISIS” feels proud of the victories and they believe that their 
extremist activities are successful and unprecedented; meaning that they lack the 
desirability and ability to make compromise with national state governments. Moreover, 
there is another factor that stands as an obstacle to make us expect success for future 
Initiatives, which is “Globalized Terrorism Generation” which has connections with USA 
and other Western forces. What worsens the situation is that their belief in the 
westernized notion of “Clash of Civilizations”; meaning that those groups believe they 
represent the sound Islamic civilization “al-Khilafa al-Rashida” that carries the role of 
combating the western infidel allies represented in the current Arabic and Islamic 
regimes. 
 
 
